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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that accountability was a central concern in Mill’s liberal-utilitarian 
political thought. This concern was a product of his conviction that a truly democratic 
society, which permitted individuals to develop their deliberative capacities, was possible 
only where there was an equilibrium of power. Without such an equilibrium, the danger 
was that the majority would impose conformity with its own values and practices. It is 
argued that Mill proposed the institutionalisation of debate in order to aid individuals in the 
use of critical reasoning, which he regarded as an essential component of human well-being 
and a necessary means for the improvement of society. He saw the protection of individual 
liberty from the encroachment of the majority, and the multiplication of the centres of 
power in society, as instrumental in rendering the masses accountable, and thereby 
preventing stagnation. Mill aimed to protect individual liberty by preventing the formation 
of power which was unaccountable both in the public and private spheres. He thought that a 
balance of power in all areas of society promoted co-operation in political, economic, and 
family relations. In this sense, unchecked forms of economic power were as detrimental to 
society as unchecked forms of political power, in that they both brought about tyranny. Mill 
adopted the optimistic belief that the institutionalisation of debate would make human 
beings into altruistic moral agents. This thesis argues that Mill's liberal-utilitarian 
conception of democracy makes a significant contribution to political theory, in that it 
enshirines the ideas that a well-ordered society prevents individuals, groups, and 
governments from improperly imposing their wishes over others, and that socio-political
reforms have to take into account the characteristics of human nature and national 
character, and the historical trends operating in society.
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INTRODUCTION
It is evident that almost all of the commentaries produced since the early 
1860s on John Stuart Mill's political philosophy in general, and on his 
account of democracy in particular, have serious deficiencies. Among these deficiencies, 
three in particular are worth mentioning: 1) the lack of recognition of the fact that a 
peoccupation with accountability has a central role in Mill’s political thought; 2) the 
propensity to separate the study of the socio-political institutions that Mill proposed from 
the broader concerns of his moral and political philosophy; and 3) the disregard of the fact 
that Mill believed that socio-political reforms had to take into account the characteristics of 
national character, the historical trends operating in society, and the characteristics of 
human nature. This thesis argues that accountability was a central concern in Mill's liberal- 
utilitarian thought. It was a concern that permeated his attempts to construct institutions 
which would prevent groups and governments from imposing their wishes on others and 
facilitate the removal from power of those who were governing against the interests of 
society. This concern helped to give orientation to Mill's account of political, economic, 
marital, and parental relations. In this sense, for him, a truly democratic society was 
characterised by an equilibrium of power which permitted individuals to pursue the 
improvement of their deliberative capacities without rendering them unduly submissive to 
society. This made possible the full expression of individuality which Mill regarded as vital 
for the renewal of society. Thus, the term accountability is used in a broader sense in the
context of this thesis. It relates not only to the need to place limitations on government but 
also to the need to strengthen social practices that would prevent excessive concentrations 
of power being placed in the hands of individuals and groups, and even in the hands of the 
masses. In order to create an atmosphere of diversity in which individuals would advance in 
their use of critical reasoning, Mill proposed the institutionalisation of debate. For Mill, 
debate was an essential component in the well-being of society. It will be argued that Mill 
believed that autonomy and democracy depended on such an institutionalisation of debate. 
In addition, it will be claimed that, despite Mill's unjustified belief that people endowed 
with higher capacities of imagination and reasoning would not use them to inflict harm on 
society, he made a significant contribution to political theory by showing that 
accountability was essential to the creation of an environment where human beings might 
flourish.
This thesis comprises six chapters. The first chapter will examine Mill’s approach to the 
secret ballot. The central question at stake is: why did Mill ardently defend the secret ballot 
in his youth and drastically oppose it in his later years? It will be argued that he defended 
open voting on the grounds that publicity was necessary to render voters accountable to 
their fellow-citizens. He also claimed that open voting was compatible with the English 
national character, which valued truthfulness and publicity. It will be shown that Mill was 
wrong to insist that the risk to electors from intimidation diminished significantly during 
the 1860s, but that his main concern was accountability. The secret ballot was an issue that 
Mill examined throughout his life, and in which the discussion of institutional mechanics is 
deeply intertwined with political theory. The second chapter will investigate the affinities 
and differences between Mill’s and Tocqueville’s political theory. It will be claimed that
Mill adopted Tocqueville’s idea that democracy did not work properly if the masses were 
not rendered accountable, and that the educated minority had the role of counterbarlancing 
the power of the majority. It will be argued that Tocqueville should be recognised as the 
single most important influence on Mill’s political thought. Both Mill and Tocqueville 
thought that the multiplication of the centres where decisions were taken was essential in 
motivating people to work together for common purposes and in preventing the tyranny of 
the majority. Nonetheless, Mill’s ultimate intention was to design electoral institutions 
capable of couteracting the influence of the masses, while Tocqueville was more interested 
in encouraging voluntary associations and local traditions. The third chapter will examine 
the main electoral institutions Mill proposed from the early 1850s onwards. It will be 
argued that Mill assumed that plural voting and Hare's system of proportional 
representation would favour the election of educated MPs and render the masses 
accountable, while the population at large was educated for a broader participation in the 
political process. It will become evident that the institutions designed by Mill would not 
have been capable of creating the balance of power he intended, but there is no doubt that 
they represent an important attempt to create a political atmosphere in which participation 
and competence are encouraged. In the fourth chapter it will be shown that Mill complained 
that, in order to have an accountable government which would truly respect the interests of 
the citizens, women should be enfranchised. He thought that this was essential to protect 
women from familial tyranny, to allow them to control those who governed and to be 
responsible for their own choices. The fifth chapter shows that Mill admitted the possibility 
of state intervention to help people to acquire the basic means of subsistence and education, 
grounded on the presumption that such means were the pre-condition for citizenship. In his 
view, an excesive concentration of economic resources tended to generate unnacountable
powers that might lead to the undermining of freedom. It will be claimed that Mill favoured 
small-scale socialist experiments, assuming that they that could be discussed and evaluated, 
as opposed to revolutionary forms of socialism which tended to generate unnaccountable 
powers. Preoccupied with the issue of accountability, Mill proposed a type of market 
socialism in which co-operatives of workers would compete among themselves, and their 
members take part in the administration of their respective enterprises. In the sixth chapter, 
it will be argued that Mill thought that the institutionalisation of debate and critical 
reasoning could progressively create a moral consensus and drastically reduce political 
conflict. His conclusion was based on the Socratic belief that knowledge necessarily leads 
to correct moral decisions, and on the view that human beings were sympathetic to the 
interests of society when their nature was not perverted by inappropriate institutions. 
Ultimately he believed that, when critical thinking permeated social relations, the altruistic 
mentality of human beings would emerge in its full strength. In the general conclusion, the 
arguments presented in each of the chapters will be brought together in order to show that 
accountability was the comestone of Mill’s liberal-utilitarian conception of democracy.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SECRET BALLOT AND THE BADGE OF SLAVERY
1.1. INTRODUCTION
John Stuart Mill believed that the voting process must be understood within the context of a 
broad notion of participation, in which public activity represented the means by which the 
individual could develop an active character and cultivate the intellect..Participation thus 
refered both to the development of individuality and to the creation of public spirit. In this 
chapter it will be shown that Mill failed in his attempt to advocate a system of open voting 
as the proper instituition to secure accountability and promote individual improvement. 
Mill's main mistake was his failure to see that publicity in the act of voting is inadvisable 
because it is not merely a public duty, but also has a bearing on what he usually called the 
private sphere of conduct. As a result. Mill's conviction that people should be free to hear 
what others have to say requires an alternative institution capable of harmonising the 
characteristics of the British national character with the need to permit individuals to pursue 
experiments of life. By insisting on the open ballot, Mill seems unwittingly to have 
supported the same standardising effects promoted by the commercial spirit, leading to the
17
suppression of individuality and diversity, that he had earnestly intended to oppose.
In this chapter, it will also be argued that some of Mill’s commentators are unable to 
properly assess his political thought because they disregard the importance that he 
attributed to national character in his polical reasoning. In the second section of this 
chapter, it will be shown that Mill regarded political participation as a means of civic 
education, and saw it mediating between individuality and sociability. In the third section, 
the evolution of Mill's approach to the question of the secret ballot will be surveyed, and it 
will be shown that his major concern was to promote civic education and accountability. 
Mill believed that accountability required not only that those in power be held responsible 
before society for their actions, but that individuals be accountable for their votes. In the 
fourth section, it will be argued that commentators have not grasped the meaning of Mill’s 
account of the secret ballot because they have not recognised that national character is a 
central preoccupation of Mill's work. In the fifth section, it will be shown that Mill’s 
approach to the secret ballot is flawed because he misunderstood the very nature of the act 
of voting, regarding it as an instrument whereby people fulfil duties towards others, without 
seeing that it is also a means by which individual claims are promoted and individual 
interests protected. The final and concluding section will show that there is a blend of 
modem and classical motifs in Mill's conception of democracy, and that he conceived the 
open ballot as a mechanism compatible with the British national character, capable of 
promoting mutual responsibility amongst citizens. Overall, it will be claimed that Mill 
failed to realise that the secret ballot is more appropriate for protecting voters who are not 
in agreement with the prevailing values. This failure stemmed from the fact that he did not 
recognise that, in the electoral process, individual interests and privacy were also at stake.
18
1.2. BALLOT AND PARTICIPATION
In Mill’s view, the dynamic of modem society required that people in general participated 
in public functions, in order to develop a sense of being part of a common enterprise, and a 
recognition that society was dependent on their exertions. Effective participation in the 
shaping of public institutions required not only the capacity to deliberate on social matters, 
but also the capacity to explain to other citizens why the choices thus made would 
contribute to the improvement of society.1 Mill expected citizens to take into account the 
views of those who suggested alternative solutions to the problems of society. People 
should devote themselves to the improvement of their own capacities and to the building up 
of social institutions. Societies would thus benefit from the participation of both men and 
women in political deliberations, while their engagement in reasoned argument would 
strengthen their capacity for choosing the best policies. Mill was emphatic that people must 
be self-conciously accountable in relation to the outcome of their participation in public 
deliberations. In other words, they must take responsibility for their decisions about 
collective matters throught the simple recognition that such decisions affected the lives of
'y
others and as such represented, to an extent, the exercising of power over those lives.“
It should be borne in mind that Mill's conception of participation is a comprehensive one. It 
comprises engagement in voluntary associations, local government, and juries, as well as
1 See J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliam entary Reform, (The C ollected Works o f  John Stuart M ill), J.M. Robson 
and others (eds), 33 vols., (Toronto and London: University o f  Toronto Press and Routledge & Keagan Paul, 
1963-1999). XIX, p. 335. Hereafter this edition o f  John Stuart M ill's works will be referred to as (CW).
~ See J.S. M ill, Considerations on Representative Governm ent, (CW), XIX, pp. 488-9.
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involvement in the electoral process. The voting process needs to be understood within the 
context of this broad notion of participation, which promotes the individual active character 
and intellect. In this sense, participation refers both to the development of individuality and 
to the creation of a public spirit. It is true that in On Liberty, Mill’s main concern was to 
provide a theoretical foundation for the prevalence of individual liberty over collective 
legal and social constraints, so that individuals could thereby fulfil the demands of their 
own natures. This would allow them to exercise the active power of their minds by making 
choices that shaped their lifestyles and carried forward the process of self-construction and 
the quest for the most adequate form of life. Opportunities for a variety of experiences were 
required to make it possible for each individual to engage in a process of self- 
improvement.4 This process of individual self-improvement presupposed a field in which 
liberty prevailed over all encroachments, and where the involvement with public concerns 
provided individuals with the variety of stimuli necessary for personal improvement. This 
gives an educational dimension to Mill's conception of democracy, because the building up 
of an active character required both the processes of self-cultivation and of dialectical 
deliberation over public concerns. Mill conceived of the former as primarily the 
individual’s quest to determine the range of experiences necessary to realise the 
potentialities of his own nature. Such potentiality could only be developed if society were 
forbidden from encroaching on individual freedom, thereby allowing people to develop 
their unique range of capabilities/ However, the development of individuals was also
3 See J.T. Paderson, ‘On the Educational Function o f  Political Participation: a Comparative Analysis o f  John 
Stuart M ill’s Theory and Contemporary Survey Research Findings', in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill's  
Social and P olitical Thought: C ritical Assessm ents, 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), iii. 223-36; J.S. Mill, 
On L iberty , (CW), XVIII, p. 306; Considerations on Representative Governm ent, (CW ), XIX, pp. 411, 535.
4 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty. (CWJ.XVIII, pp. 266-7. 270.
5 See J. Gray, ‘M ill’s Conception o f  Happiness and the Theory o f  Individuality’, in J. Gray and G.S. Smith 
(eds), J.S. M ill On Liberty in Focus, (London : Routledge, 1996), p. 204.
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indispensably linked to society. Thus, engaged reasoning and participation in political 
deliberation were the most expedient processes for broadening the ambit of people’s 
concerns and enlarging the set of experiences available to them. Mill, therefore, considered 
reason to be an essential tool for the development of individuality and sociability.6 Besides, 
the challenges inherent in debates and disputes were powerful activators of human 
capabilities. Additionally, society profited from individual contributions to political debate. 
It was precisely in these contributions that society found the original ideas which were 
essential to its renewal.7
Mill's praise of altruism and belief in the educational efficacy of participation was present 
in both On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government. There was a blend 
of modem and classical motifs in his democratic theory. He certainly agreed with the Greek 
conception expressed in Pericles’ ‘Funeral Oration’, according to which individuals should 
be mindful both of their own affairs and also of what concerns society as a whole. Mill 
explicitly asserted that, ‘there will never be honest or self-restraining government unless 
each individual participant feels himself a trustee for all his fellow citizens and for 
posterity. Certainly, no Athenian voter thought otherwise'.9 However, it is also important to 
recognise the modem aspect of Mill’s theory, whereby participation was not to be 
dissociated from the process of self-cultivation, ensuring that the ethical, aesthetic, and 
mental faculties of individuals were not stultified.
6 See D. F. Thompson, John Stuart M ill and R epresentative Governm ent, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), p. 47.
7 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty. (CW ), XVIII, p. 267.
8 See ibid., p. 277, and Considerations on R epresentative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 164.
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According to Mill, the secret ballot should be judged according to its capacity to promote 
civic education. In other words, as a social institution, the secret ballot should favour a kind 
of individual participation that benefited both individuals and society. When Mill evaluated 
the secret ballot, what was at stake was, primarily, the sort of participation it favoured, and, 
secondarily, its implications for individual and social life. As well as examining its efficacy 
as a practical procedure, he considered the implications of suggesting to people that voting 
was a right rather than a duty. The disapproval of the secret ballot in Mill’s later works was 
grounded on the fact that secrecy itself suggested that voters had a right to make choices on 
behalf of their private interests rather than fulfilling their duty to the public interest. For 
Mill, publicity was necessary to make the voters responsible to their fellow-citizens. These 
considerations are essential for understanding Mill’s account of the secret ballot and for the 
critical work to be done in subsequent parts of this chapter. They must, however, be 
complemented by a survey of the evolution of his views on the secret ballot, and this will 
be the task of the next section.
13. J. S. MILL AND THE SECRET BALLOT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The debate about the secret ballot occupied a prominent place in the writings of the 
Philosophic Radicals. Bentham defended secret voting in his radical programme, and, 
together with James Mill and George Grote, contended that it was an important component 
of representative democracy.10 Although there were a number of radical reformers, such as
9J.S. M ill, L ater Letters, 1849-1873 , (CW), XV, p. 608.
10 See J. Bentham, Plan o f  Parliam entary Reform, (London: R. Hunter, 1817), p. Ixi; J. M ill, The H istory o f  
British India, 10 vols., (London: J. Madden, 1858), iii. 451-2; G. Grote, Statement o f  the Question o f  
Parliam entary Reform, (London: Baldwin, 1821), pp. 19-20.
Joseph Parkes, who were less enthusiastic about the secret ballot, secret voting was 
nevertheless a feature of J.S. Mill’s radical political philosophy up to the end of the 
1830s.11 Bums is correct to note that Mill campaigned continually in favour of the secret 
ballot from 1829 to 1839.12 In this period, he basically followed the reasoning developed by 
James Mill: the importance of the secret ballot lay mainly in its contribution to the 
elimination of intimidation and bribery. According to James Mill, ‘while voters are liable to 
be suborned, and while the rich obtain their purpose with the people by corrupting them, 
they do corrupt them’.13 On 5 December 1830, J.S. Mill echoed his father’s account in an 
article headed ‘The Ballot’ in the Examiner. However, he suggested that his father’s 
account contained an ambivalence towards the secret ballot. He hinted that James Mill 
defended the secret ballot not as a matter of principle, but because of its appropriateness in 
the circumstances:
Mr. Mill’s proposition, it will be recollected, was this - that the Ballot is bad, where 
the voter’s own interest points in a wrong direction, and where the restraint which 
public opinion imposes, is indispensable as a check to that interest. But if the voter’s 
own interest accords with the public good, as it must do when the public themselves 
are the voters, this restraint is not necessary; and the Ballot, consequently, is 
desirable as often as the voters are liable to be acted upon, either in the way of 
bribery or intimidation, by the interest of powerful individuals.14
11 See W. Thomas, The Philosophic Radicals: Nine Studies in Theory and P ractice , (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), p. 262.
12 See J.H. Bum s, ‘J.S. Mill and Democracy, 1829-1861', in J.B. Schneewind (ed), Mill: A Collection o f  
C ritical Essays, (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 281-307.
One can infer that Mill believed that his father had treated the secret ballot as a question of 
tactics. Hence James Mill had stressed that the secret ballot was not suitable for all 
situations, but was desirable as often as the voters are liable to be acted upon intimidation.15 
On 12 December 1830, again in the Examiner, in an article headed ‘Controversy On The 
Ballot', J.S. Mill argued that ‘the temptation sometimes comes from the interests of people 
who can influence the voter, and sometimes from the voter’s own interests: that in the first 
case the ballot puts an end to the temptation, while in the second it removes only the 
restraints’.16 It is worth noting that, in an article headed ‘French News’ also published in 
the Examiner on 25 September 1831, J.S. Mill criticised secret voting in the French 
Chamber, regarding it as ‘pure mischief. What he called ‘pure mischief was the attempt to 
‘shield the representatives from responsibility to their constituents’.17 At this time, he did 
not yet extend his criticism to the electoral process, but restricted it to the voting procedures 
within the Chamber. But one might argue that Mill should have explained on what grounds 
he opposed the use of secret voting within the French Chamber, while defending its use in 
the electoral process. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that Mill was not simply 
contradicting himself, but rather making two different judgements, because he thought that 
voters in an election were at risk in a way that their representatives voting in the Chamber 
were not.
Following the same line of reasoning, Mill, in his review of Rationale o f Political 
Representation by Samuel Bailey, on the one hand, defended the utmost publicity for the
13 J. Mill ‘The Ballot', W estminster Review, 13 (1830), p. 38.
14 J.S. Mill, N ew spaper Writings D ecem ber 1822-July 1831, (CW), XXII, p. 206.
15 See J..Mill, ‘The B a llo f, p. 38.
16 J.S. Mill, N ew spaper Writings D ecem ber 1822-July 1831, (CW), XXII, p. 210.
24
proceedings of parliament and, on the other hand, the secret ballot.18 In this review 
published in 1835, he presented the following argument in favour of the adoption of the 
ballot: ‘the votes at elections must be so taken, as to express the real sentiments of electors, 
and not the sentiments merely of some person who has the means of bribing or coercing 
them '.19 Crucially, the discussion of the ballot was here linked with the concept of 
accountability as the foundation of democracy. In this sense, the mechanisms of 
representative democracy should render those in power responsible to the people.
Until 1839 Mill was committed to the the secret ballot. He wrote to Alexis de Tocqueville
on 7 January 1837 that the implementation of the secret ballot would bring a new era to
->n
politics and undermine the power of the aristocracy." But more than this, in 1838, Mill, in 
an article published in The London and Westminster Review, equated radicalism with 
advocacy of the secret ballot..21 In ‘Reorganisation of the Reform Party’ published in April 
1839 in The London and Westminster Review, and in a letter to John Mitchell Kemble on 
14 October 1839. Mill still argued that the secret ballot was necessary, but did not 
advocated it as a defining feature of radicalism. In the article, Mill emphasised that the 
central object of radicalism was to add ‘weight in the scale of the two elements of Numbers 
and Intelligence, and taking it from that of Privilege’."" In the letter, he defined the radicals 
as those who ‘wish to carry their changes beyond those which would be consented to by 
Whigs or Tories, & in particular who widen the basis of the representative system’.23 The
17 J.S. M ill, New spaper Writings August 1831- O ctober 1834, (CW), XXIII, p. 335.
18 See J.S. Mill. Rationale o f  Representation , (CW), XVIII. pp. 17-46.
19 Ibid.. p. 25.
20 See J.S. Mill, E arlier Letters, 1812-1848, (CW), XII, pp. 316-17.
21 See J. S. Mill, Essays on England, Ireland, and The Em pire, (CW), VI, p. 409.
22 Ibid.. p. 479.
23 J.S. M ill. E arlier Letters, 1812-1848, (CW), XIII, p. 410.
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secret ballot was thus an instrument to threaten the aristocracy - a middle class doctrine, not 
a radical one: ‘The ballot though in my opinion necessary, & but little objectionable, is 
passing from a radical doctrine into a Whig one as will be seen the moment it is carried. It 
is essentially a juste milieu, middle class doctrine’.24
Mill’s assertion that the secret ballot was passing into a middle class doctrine caused some 
puzzlement, due to the ardour of his previous defence of the secret ballot as a means of 
promoting radicalism and undermining aristocracy. Nevertheless, he was correct in 
that,‘after the elections of 1835 and 1837 more and more Whigs were inclined to agree that 
the ballot, while not necessarily acceptable as a principle, might be a valuable barrier 
against the conservative revival'.2:> This attempt to introduce the ballot as a barrier against 
conservatism correlated with Mill's strategy of promoting government of the middle classes 
in order to benefit the working classes. However, the relationship between the two classes 
was a very complicated one. If the majority of both classes were - as Mill stated in 
Reorganisation o f the Reform Party - made up of ‘natural Radicals’, it would be easier for 
them to develop a common political programme." However, it can hardly be denied that 
the groups had different degrees of interest in the secret ballot. The implementation of the 
secret ballot without the extension of the franchise was of no benefit to the working classes 
because they would remain excluded from the electoral process. Harmonising two different 
political agendas to facilitate an alliance was difficult. Thus, the defeat of Grote's motion to 
introduce the secret ballot in 1839 was to an extent the result of the difficulty of uniting the
24 Ibid., p. 410.
25 N. Gash, Politics in the Age o f  Peel, (London: Longman, 1966), p. 20.
“6 See J.S. Mill, Reorganisation o f  the Reform P arty . (CW ), VI, pp. 475-6.
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middle and working classes against the aristocracy, and was also an important factor in 
sidelining the issue of the secret ballot during the 1840s.
According to Joseph Hamburger, the secret ballot was regarded by the radicals in the 1830s 
as a means of achieving a re-alignment of political forces. Their intention was to merge the 
question of the secret ballot with the question of the opposition between democracy and 
aristocracy. Regarding the secret ballot as a litmus test to verify the democratic convictions 
of politicians, the radicals expected the question to split the Whigs into two factions: one of 
aristocratic and another of liberal Whigs. The radical party would then be formed by an 
alliance between radicals and liberal Whigs. From the radical point of view, if such an 
alliance had occurred, it would have better reflected the real opposition existing in society
->7
between the interests of the people and those of the aristocracy."
B.L. Kinzer accepts Hamburger's analysis, and uses it as a wider context in which to 
understand the evolution of Mill’s approach to the question. Furthermore, he shows that 
Mill did not develop a philosophical argument in favour of the secret ballot during the 
1830s. His defence of the secret ballot in this period was designed to address the particular 
political circumstances, and thus ‘was not of an abstract character’. In other words. Mill 
defended the secret ballot because he regarded it as tactically important in undermining the 
political influence of the aristocracy and in establishing the Radical party.28
27 See J. Hamburger, Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart M ill and The Philosophic Radicals, (New  Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 68-73.
28 See B.L. Kinzer, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Secret B allot’, H istorical Reflection, 5 (1978), p. 22.
Mill’s attempt to re-align political forces was then marshalled in Coleridgean fashion in 
that he aimed to reproduce, at the level of political representation, the clashes that he 
believed existed in society between conservative forces and the forces of progress. It is 
important to note, however, that from 1835 to 1840, Mill was assimilating influences that 
re-shaped his philosophical outlook. His article Civilisation (1836), his two reviews of 
Democracy in America (1835 and 1840), and his essay Coleridge (1840) reveal that Mill
29was making self-cultivation a central concern of his thought. This concern would be given 
a philosophical basis many years later in On Liberty (1859) and in Considerations on 
Representative Government (1861), but some of its premises were operating in Mill’s 
thought by the beginning of the 1840s. Mill’s increasing acceptance of Tocqueville’s 
insight that individuality and diversity must be protected, otherwise democracy could 
become stagnant and immobile, can be traced to this period. In a letter to Tocqueville on 11 
May 1840, Mill expressed his agreement in these terms: ‘the real danger in democracy, the 
real evil to be struggled against, and which all human resources employed while it is not yet 
too late are not more than sufficient to fence off - is not anarchy or love of change, but 
Chinese stagnation & immobility'.30 The conception of democracy as a means of bolstering 
self-improvement was central to Mill's later thought and significantly influenced his 
account of the secret ballot.
The issue of the ballot was sidelined in the political debate during the 1840s.31 This was a
period in which Mill withdrew from political activities. In the first part of the decade, he
concentrated on his major philosophical work A System o f Logic (1843). In many letters
29 See W. Stafford, John Stuart Mill, (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 38.
30 J.S. Mill, Earlier U tte rs , 1812-1848, (CW), XIII, p. 434.
written in the first three years of the decade, Mill asserted that he was completely focused 
on writing this book. In one letter, addressed to John Robertson on 7 September 1841, Mill 
stated: ‘I am doing and thinking of nothing but my Logic, which I shall soon have re- 
written the first half o f . ' In another, he related how his concentration on A System o f Logic 
had precluded any involvement in politics: ‘I have scarcely been thinking at all except on 
the two subjects I have just mentioned, Logic & the Romans. As for politics I have almost 
given up’.33 This period was also marked by an important exchange of letters with leading 
French intellectuals such as Comte, Tocqueville, Guizot, Michelet, and others, which 
likewise suggests that Mill did not have sufficient time to pay attention to political debate, 
being focused on these other time-consuming activities. Another factor that may be helpful 
in explaining the absence of references to the secret ballot in this period is the prevalence of 
the debate over the repeal of the Com Laws. However, it is possible to detect signs that, in 
the second half of the decade, his thought was evolving towards a commitment to an ideal 
of democracy that furthered self-improvement and opposed the dictatorship of the majority. 
Mill flattered Tocqueville by stating that he was the man in Europe whom he esteemed 
most highly, and in a letter to William Lovett, an influential leader of the Chartist 
movement. Mill openly asserted his concerns about democracy:
Those opinions, as you, at least, are aware, do not go with you to the full extent. The 
same horror which you yourself entertain of class legislation, makes me object, in 
the present state of civilisation at least, if not on principle, to a legislature absolutely
31 See J.H. Bum s, ‘J. S. M ill and Democracy, 1829-1861', pp. 281-307.
32 J.S. Mill, Earlier Letters, 1812-1848, (CW), XIII, p. 485.
33 Ibid., p. 543.
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controlled by one class, even when that class numerically exceeds all others taken 
together.34
During the second half of the 1840s, Mill devoted himself to writing and revising 
Principles o f Political Economy. But he also ‘spent six of those months writing forty-three 
leaders for the Morning Chronicle on the Irish potato famine, and continued to fulfil his 
duties at India House'.35 In this period, there was still no explicit reference to the secret 
ballot.
Mill's first clear stand against secret voting appears in a letter to Lord Monteagle of 20 
March 1853.36 In this letter. Mill discussed the Reform Bill, which was under scrutiny at 
the time, and was intended to re-arrange the political system. Among the changes he 
regarded as necessary. Mill listed the following: the elimination of small constituencies by 
the merging of small towns into common electoral districts; the requirement of an 
educational qualification for all voters; and the enfranchisement of women. However, 
referring to the secret ballot, he stated that it would now be a step backwards instead of 
forwards.
It is difficult to estimate to what extent Harriet Taylor was responsible for Mill's opposition 
to the secret ballot, but there is no doubt that since their marriage in 1851, Mill's circle of 
friends had drastically diminished and she was his main intellectual interlocutor.37 In 1853,
34 Ibid.. p. 533.
35 W . Stafford, John Stuart M ill, p. 55.
36 See J.S. Mill. Later Letters. 1848-1873 , (CW), XIV, p. 103.
37 Ibid., p. xxvi.
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Mill wrote part of the essay Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, which combined a 
programme of reforms that received subsequent revision and improvement, and was 
eventually published in 1859.38 Mill had discussed in detail with Harriet the changes to be 
made to political institutions, and she preceded him in opposing secret voting and 
influenced his own opposition to it.39 The rejection of secret voting was part of a 
programme that included a minimal education requirement for voting; a reconfiguration of 
the boroughs; measures to free candidates from a property qualification; and the adoption 
of the plural voting system. Plural voting was intended to combine the claim of each 
individual to be heard in public matters with the need to give superior value to the votes of 
those whose opinions were based on superior knowledge.40 The arguments Mill advanced 
against the secret ballot were based on the notion that publicity was important in fostering 
the sentiment of responsibility that voters should possess towards others. Secrecy would be 
as detrimental to parliamentary proceedings as to the electoral process because, in both 
cases, voters would be prevented from being scrutinised by others, and thus would tend not 
to pay due attention to the grounds on which their decisions were made.41 The voting 
process should, therefore, be undertaken under public scrutiny, because the possibility of 
their choice might be criticised was essential in making voters aware of their 
responsibilities towards others. Mill claimed that he had defended the secret ballot thirty 
years earlier in order to prevent coercion by landlords and employers, but with changing 
circumstances, the selfishness of the electorate had become a much greater concern than
38 See J.S. M ill. Rationale o f  Representation, (CW ), XVIII, p. xxix.
39 See J.S. M ill, Autobiography and Literary Essays, (CW), I, p. 261.
40 See J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliam entary Reform, (CW), XIX, pp. 223-30.
41 See ibid., p. 335.
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such coercion.42 Once lower-rank electors were not subservient to those of higher rank, 
each voter should act with an awareness of the opinions of other people. Mill did not claim 
that intimidation had been eclipsed, but argued that it was no longer the most significant 
threat to the electoral process. In fact, he detected in the spread of bribery a clear sign that 
local influences, such as those exercised by landlords, customers, and employers, had 
weakened.43 If voters were being dominated by these local influences, bribery would have 
been neither necessary nor possible. Rather, in Mill’s view, voting patterns indicated that 
electors were selling their votes because non-local interests were prevailing. The 
dominance of the commercial spirit was, therefore, responsible for encouraging the 
unfettered pursuit of material goods, thereby destroying the loyalties and ties on which 
local influences had been built.
In Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform Mill argued that the secret ballot could create a sort 
of ‘schizophrenic* citizenship, introducing the possibility that choices would be made for 
selfish reasons, but that they would be pubicly justfied on other grounds. In Mill’s opinion, 
this was a threat to the most noble characteristic of the English national character, namely 
truthfulness. Mill saw a respect for the truth as one of the few aspects of morality in which 
the English people were distinguished:
There are but few points in which the English, as a people, are entitled to the moral 
pre-eminence with which they are accustomed to compliment themselves at the 
expense of other nations: but, of these points, perhaps the one of greatest importance
42 See ibid., p. 332.
43 See ibid., p. 333.
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is, that the higher classes do not lie, and the lower, though mostly habitual liars, are 
ashamed of lying. To run any risk of weakening this feeling, a difficult one to create, 
or, when once gone, to restore, would be a permanent evil too great to be incurred 
for so very temporary a benefit as the ballot would confer, even on the most 
exaggerated estimate of its necessity.44
Mill’s mature thought on the secret ballot was again revealed in Considerations on 
Representative Government, and can be summarised as follows: its adoption would bring 
no good capable of outweighing the evils that it would necessarily cause. Political 
institutions were required to promote civic education, and the secret ballot should be 
rejected because it failed to do so. The central object of Considerations on Representative 
Government was to provide the theoretical foundation on which the institutional framework 
of the state could be built. The institutions in question should be evaluated according to 
their appropriateness in promoting individual improvement, itself grounded in autonomy. 
The way in which such institutions operated was important because it determined the way 
in which people participated in deliberation over the life of the community, and such 
participation was vital in shaping both individual character and social life generally. In this 
sense, institutions were vital in increasing the scope of human capabilities by exposing 
individuals to a wide range of experiences, challenges, and influences. So, for Mill, the 
voting process should be a means of promoting both individual and social improvement. It 
was not merely a private matter. If it were so, voters could hardly be blamed for trading 
their votes.4:> Secrecy was thus justifiable only in places where intimidation could occur. As
44 Ibid., p. 338.
45 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, pp. 488-9.
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far as Mill had been able to observe, the coercion of voters was declining, therefore 
intimidation could not be cited as a sufficient reason for defending the secret ballot:
But in the more advanced States of modem Europe, and especially in this country, 
the power of coercing voters has declined and is declining; and bad voting is now 
less to be apprehended from influence to which the voter is subject at the hands of 
others, than from the sinister interests and discreditable feelings which belong to 
himself, either individually or as a member of a class. To secure him against the 
first, at the cost of removing all restraint from the last, would be to exchange a 
smaller and a diminishing evil for a greater and increasing one.46
The idea that the act of voting should be performed publicly because it concerned public 
life was presented both in Thoughts oti Parliamentary Reform and in Considerations on 
Representative Government. In the latter. Mill clearly stated that voters were under an 
obligation to give priority to public over personal interests, and were consequently morally 
obliged to choose the alternative that they regarded as most beneficial to society. Secrecy 
was unacceptable in the voting process even when universal suffrage had already been 
achieved.47 This is founded on the key idea of Mill's political philosophy, namely, that 
active intellectual effort was paramount in promoting human improvement, because it 
entailed the exercise of reason in questioning settled opinions, a task that passive characters
48were not likely to undertake.
46 Ibid., p. 491.
47 See ibid., p. 490.
It must also be noted that both On Liberty and Considerations on Representative 
Government are deeply marked by Mill’s sense that the dynamic of nineteenth-century 
democratic society favoured collective mediocrity. The hegemony of the commercial spirit, 
with its crass materialism and increasing concentration of the power of the state, 
represented a direct threat to individuality and diversity. Under the powerful influence of 
these factors, individuals tended to collude with the spirit of the times, and found it difficult 
not to follow the prevailing social influences. These forces were so hostile to individuality 
that, for Mill, the most urgent task was to introduce institutional procedures to counteract 
them, and thereby to prevent society from descending into uniformity and thereafter into 
stagnation. Mill believed that real improvement in society would be preceded by changes in 
mentality.49 Nevertheless, he was convinced that the situation was not favourable to such 
changes. In view of this he thought it was necessary to discuss the implementation of the 
institutional procedures needed to counteract the social forces of standardisation. In 
summary, he thought society would soon enter a situation in which it would be virtually 
impossible to bolster diversity, and he hoped to avoid this by implementing suitable 
legislation. Moreover, without adequate instititutional devices, the ideal of truly democratic 
society would become unachievable. Mill's concerns over the route which nineteenth- 
century society was taking were expressed in this passage from Considerations on 
Representative Government:
The natural tendency of representative government, as of modem civilisation, is
towards collective mediocrity: and this tendency is increased by all reductions and
48 See ibid., p. 407.
49 See J.S. Mill, Essays on Governm ent, (CW), XVIII, p. 151.
extensions of the franchise, their effect being to place the principal power in the 
hands of classes more and more below the highest level of instruction in the 
community. But though the superior intellects and characters will necessarily be 
outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether or not they are heard. In the false 
democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, gives it only to the local 
majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may have no organs at all in the 
representative body. It is an admitted fact that in the American democracy, which is 
constructed on this faulty model, the highly-cultivated members of the community, 
except such of them as are willing to sacrifice their opinions and models of 
judgement, and become the servile mouthpieces of their inferiors in knowledge, 
seldom even offer themselves for Congress or State legislatures, so little likelihood 
have they of being returned/0
In 1868, Mill took a firm stand against the secret ballot. In a letter published on 31 July in 
the Daily News. Mill asserted that John Bright had misunderstood his position in suggesting 
that he was in favour of the secret ballot in Ireland. Bright had claimed, in a speech to his 
constituents on 24 July 1868, that Mill was in favour of a trial of the secret ballot in Ireland. 
Mill made two main points in response: first, that he was against the adoption of secret 
voting in Ireland: and second, that he had voted against its adoption there/1 Earlier, in a 
letter addressed to William Dougal Christie of 6 June 1868, Mill had expressed regret over 
the support given by Radicals to the introduction of the secret ballot, on the grounds that it 
was an essential step in improving the political system. For Mill, improvement could be
50 J.S. M ill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 457.
51 See J.S. M ill, N ew spaper Writings D ecem ber 1847-July 1873, (CW), XX V, p. 1218.
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achieved more effectively by the strict implementation of the Bribery Bill.52 In both letters, 
Mill supported the idea that voting should be subjected to public scrutiny. In this way. Mill 
reasserted a position that he had articulated in Considerations on Representative 
Government, where he had stated that the secret ballot was not able to prevent bribery and 
selfishness, factors that endangered the electoral process. In order to meet these threats, 
legislation was needed to render voters accountable to society. Otherwise they would tend 
to use their votes to favour their own interests, rather than to promote those of society. In 
this way, secrecy, by preventing public criticism, would undermine voting as an 
accountable moral act:
This being admitted, it is at least a prima facie consequence, that the duty of voting, 
like any other public duty, should be performed under the eye and criticism of the 
public; every one of whom has not only an interest in its performance, but a good 
title to consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than honestly and 
carefully. Undoubtedly neither this nor any other maxim of political morality is 
absolutely inviolable; it may be overruled by still more cogent considerations. But 
its weight is such that cases which admit a departure from it must be of a strikingly 
exceptional character.53
As late as 1870. Mill, in a letter to Rowland G. Hazard, showed great concern over the fact 
that the secret ballot was going to be tried in Britain. This was an attitude that he had 
expressed openly from at least 1853, but which had only received its first theoretical
52 See J.S. Mill, Later U tte rs , 1849-1873, (CW), XIV, p. 1409.
53 J.S. M ill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW ), XIX, p. 490.
statement in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform (1859). In his letter to Hazard, Mill 
attributed the success of the secret ballot in America to the fact that it was regarded there as 
a convenient means of collecting votes, and had not been specifically implemented for 
some substantive purpose. According to Mill, the American system had not undermined 
voting as an accountable moral act, because the American people were not accustomed to 
keeping their votes secret. Thus, secrecy was not, in fact, a feature of the American political 
system. Mill believed, however, that if the secret ballot were introduced in Britain, there 
would result an ever-decreasing level of moral responsibility amongst its citizens. Mill 
suggested that it would be better to place voting under collective scrutiny, since it would 
then further civic education. In the end, voters would pay more attention to their choices 
because they would be public and could be criticised. Of course, for Mill, controversy over 
political choices was not only desirable but essential in making people understand the 
complexity of what they were doing. In his letter to Hazard, Mill stated his disapproval of 
the ballot in the following way:
1 am much obliged to your son for the information you kindly sent respecting the 
operation of the Ballot in the United States. From these and other communications I 
infer that the popularity of that method of voting in America depends upon its 
convenience as a mode of collecting large numbers of votes, and not upon its 
secrecy, which, as a general rule, does not exist in America. It is now, to my great 
regret, going to be tried in the United Kingdom; for, having been proposed by Mr. 
Gladstone’s Government, it is sure to be carried before long. Voting by putting 
tickets into a box is a very good method, provided that each voter signs his ticket 
with his name. But in England the object in view is to conceal the name; and though
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the voters can scarcely, by any change, be made to feel less moral responsibility for 
their votes than a great proportion of them do now, I believe that the secrecy of the 
vote will tend very much to prevent the growth of a feeling of moral responsibility 
in time to come, while it will shield from all discredit the man who votes contrary 
his known or professed opinions.54
It has been suggested that Mill’s political philosophy is marked by a concern to promote 
civic education. This can be seen, for example, in his idea that government was a sort of 
educational agency, in his belief that dictatorships were detrimental because they inhibited 
societal improvement, and in his rejection of the secret ballot. At the end of his life, he 
advocated the open voting system as an appropriate means of bolstering responsibility and 
engaged reasoning, and consequently civic education. Mill followed the secret ballot debate 
from the period of the Great Reform Act in 1832 up to the time of the Ballot Act of 1872. 
The Great Reform Act of 1832 was enacted to include the middle classes in the polical 
system and thus bring the electoral system in line with the new social reality of Britain. The 
number of voters was increased due to the lowering of the property qualification, and the 
representation of the boroughs was changed so as to establish a more equal correlation 
between the number of representatives and the number of voters in each constituency. 
Fifty-six smaller English boroughs were disenfranchised. Before 1832, the middle classes 
had been growing in number and economic power, but the representation of the urban areas 
in which most of them lived was not in proportion to the population. The so-called rotten 
boroughs were small constituencies generally controlled by aristocrats and other wealthy 
patrons, and with a number of representatives in excess of their real size in terms of
54 J.S. M ill. Later Letters, 1849-1873 , (CW), XVII, pp. 1723-4.
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population. The changes favoured the Whigs, who came to dominate the political scene for 
a significant time. The extension of voting mainly benefited industrialists and professional 
males, although the composition of the parliament after the act remained largely influenced 
by aristocracy. It is appropriate to bear in mind that, from a democratic point of view, 
inadequacies remained in the political representation and that Britain remained commited to 
a tradition of gradualism and reform.35 Besides, the Great Reform Act virtually excluded 
the working classes from the franchise. It is, therefore, correct to say that, ‘on the whole, 
however, the new borough voters were petit bourgeois or middle-class’.36 By the by, 
representatives of radical opinion such as Willian Lovett, founder of the National Union of 
the Working Classes, rejected the Great Reform Act, because it did not establish universal 
manhood suffrage.37
Secret voting was introduced by the Ballot Act of 1872. Most of the urban working classes 
had already been enfranchised by the Reform Act of 1867. Enfranchisement was preceded 
by large campaigns in many British cities, and its success is partially to be attributed to the 
capacity of the Trade Unions to mobilise support, and to the advocacy of John Bright. His
influence over Gladstone was of paramount importance in implementing the secret ballot at 
a time when it was not deemed a particularly important political question. In 1871, a similar 
Bill had been thrown out of the House of Lords. John Bright had long been campaigning 
with Richard Cobden to implement the secret ballot. Cobden died in 1865, but Bright 
continued to work towards its introduction. Hawkins notes that,: ‘by 1872 the Ballot was
55 See E.J. Evans. The G reat Reform Act o f  1832, (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 43.
^  D.G. Wright, D em ocracy an d  Reform 1815-1885 , (London: Longman, 1970), p. 51.
57 See I. Mahin. The Rise o f  D em ocracy in Britain, 1830-1918 , (London: Macmillan, 2001), p. 17.
58 See A. Hawkins, British P arty Politics, 1852-1886, (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 109-11.
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the price Gladstone had reluctantly to pay for Bright’s continued support’.59 Gladstone gave 
up his opposition to the secret ballot in order to retain Bright’s support, and in consequence 
of the new political situation generated by the 1867 Act, which had extended the franchise 
to people more vulnerable to coercion and bribery, a feature of the general election of 1868:
Observing in an 1870 ballot speech that whereas the possession of property and a 
degree of independence had been characteristic of the pre-1867 electorate, those 
enfranchised by the second Reform Act were ‘dependent for their bread upon their 
daily labour’ and consequently extremely vulnerable to the exercise of coercive 
influence. Thus the combination of the 1867 Reform Act and the extent of 
corruption and intimidation at the 1868 general election contributed to re-shaping 
Gladstone's view of the ballot.60
Mill's opposition to the line of argument supported by Bright and reluctantly adopted by 
Gladstone has been emphasised in this chapter. Mill feared that the secret ballot would 
undermine civic education and thus hinder the establishment of his ideal Athenian society. 
He thought that open voting would be more favourable to the improvement of society. By 
contrast, when the ballot was used as a device to prevent open debate, the stimulus to self- 
improvement was denied to both people and society. The voting system should be an 
institution that broadened the range of people's interests by showing them that the well­
being of the community depended upon the co-operation of all of its components. 
Moreover, open voting had the further benefit of making citizens aware that their choices
59 Ibid., p. 163.
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affected other people's lives, and allowed them to be held accountable before society. It is 
quite remarkable that the Athenian democracy had many devices which purported to render 
officials accountable due to the fact that they were randomly selected.61 As J. Elster points 
out, the political culture associated with such a democracy was extremely result-oriented, in 
that people could be punished for an unforeseen but unfortunate outcome of their actions. 
Nevertheless, it incorporated mechanisms for preventing the mob from behaving 
irresponsibly by putting checks on them. Therefore, in any democracy, it is necessary to put 
checks both on the people and on its agents. "
A survey of Mill's thought on the secret ballot shows that his ideal of democracy, based on 
self-cultivation and opposition to the dictatorship of the majority increasesd in strength 
following his review of Toqueville's Democracy in America, and was linked with his 
concern for accountability, first formulated in theoretical terms in his review of Samuel 
Bailey's Rationale o f Political Representation (1835). His notion of accountability was so 
all-encompassing that it required not only that those in power were to be held responsible 
before society for their actions, but that individuals were accountable for their votes as well. 
Mill's notion of democracy favoured participation in political life and wide-ranging 
mechanisms to make both people and officials accountable. Both Mill’s and the classical 
notion of democracy oppose despotic regimes, and are commited to the idea that 
government should be carried on through political struggle. However. Mill’s conception of 
democracy is not a Greek one because it is a representative democracy, and not a direct
60 B.L. Kinzer, ‘The Failure o f Pressure from without: Richard Cobden, the Ballot Society, and the Coming o f  
the Ballot Act in England’, Canadian Journal o f  H istory, 13 (1978), p. 418.
61 See J. Elster, ‘Accountability in Athenian Politics’, in A. Przeworski, S.C. Stokes and B. Manin (eds), 
Democracy, Accountability and Representation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 264.
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one. As a matter of fact, the idea of representation emerged in the late middle ages in the 
context of an organic conception of society. According to this view, society is like a living 
entity, easily damaged or destroyed when subjected to drastic changes. Members of society 
are linked by relationships that determine their role in the social order, thus shaping their 
identities. M.V. Clarke argues that an anonymous tract written in the fourteenth century, 
entitled Modus Tenendi Pcirlicimentum, is an illuminating document, since it advocated a 
balanced distribution of power between the estates that formed society, and precluded any 
irrevocable delegation of power in favour of a continually renewed delegation for specific 
acts. This appears to be motivated by a concern for accountability.63 Mill, however, did not 
relate his defence of representative government to medieval institutions, and assumed that, 
somehow, representation fulfilled a role in modem society that corresponded to that 
performed by direct democracy in ancient Greece. In the end, representative democracy 
was seen to be necessary because of the impossibility of reconstituting in modem times the 
ancient assemblies of Greece.
1.4. COMMENTS ON THE BALLOT
The object of this section is to provide a critical analysis of the commentaries on Mill’s 
position on the question of the secret ballot. It is important to show the limitations of these 
accounts in order to clarify Mill's reasons for defending the secret ballot in his early career. 
The critical evaluation of these accounts will underpin the argument of the next section,
62 See ibid., pp. 166-7.
63 See M.V. Clarke, M edieval Representation and Consent: a study o f  early parliam ents in England and  
Ireland with special reference to M odus Tenendi Parliamentum, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 4- 
6 .
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which will suggest that Mill was wrong in his defence of the open ballot because he 
misunderstood the very nature of the voting process. The ballot is one of the most neglected 
topics in Mill scholarship, although many authors have remarked upon it in passing.
In the early 1940s, Schapiro extolled Mill as a pioneer of democratic liberalism in 
England.64 He argued that Mill recognised more than any of his contemporaries that every 
citizen should have a degree of control over the state, because its affairs were of concern to 
everyone. Nevertheless, Schapiro regarded Mill’s rejection of secret voting as basically 
flawed because of the demand it made on vulnerable electors to maximise utility to their 
own detriment: ‘like the puritan that he was, he condemned those who yielded to coercion 
even more than those who did the coercing'.6^  In this way, Schapiro believed that Mill, 
misled by his moralistic approach, failed to appreciate the benefits that the secret ballot 
could bring to society.
To an extent. Schapiro was correct in drawing attention to Mill’s moralist inclinations: on 
various occasions. Mill failed to recognise that the political alternative most compatible 
with his moral ideals could not be implemented in practice. His ambition to establish a 
radical party based on an alliance between Radicals and Liberal Whigs, thus stirring up 
radical sentiments supposedly latent in society and kick-starting a new era in British 
politics, is an example of his lack of realism. As has already been shown, Mill’s idea of 
aligning the middle and working classes around a radical agenda proved to be unfeasible. 
Mill and the Philosophical Radicals thought of themselves as representing the interests of
64 See J.S. Schapiro, ‘John Stuart Mill, Pioneer o f  Democratic Liberalism in England’, Journal o f  the H istory 
o f  Ideas, 4  (1943). p. 141.
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society as a whole, and regarded Chartism, for example, as merely a class-based movement. 
The fact is that Mill was moved by ideals that did not match reality, whereas ‘both middle 
and working-class parties implicitly acknowledged inherent conflict within the populace 
and thus denied the validity of the conception of universal interests and the social reality of 
“the people'” .66
Mill’s rejection of the secret ballot was a further occasion on which he failed to appreciate 
the impracticality of his ideals. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Mill believed that 
open voting should be the norm, but that it might be overruled in exceptional situations, 
and, in this sense, it was not an ‘inviolable norm of public morality’.67 Mill assumed that 
the power to coerce was in decline, and that the sinister interests of individual voters 
presented a greater challenge to the well-being of society. In opposing secrecy, he aimed to 
harmonise his moral ideals of improvement with what he regarded as the most suitable way 
of promoting them. Schapiro's criticism only took into account local influences over voters, 
while, for Mill, the influence of traditional agencies of social control over the electoral 
process was outweighed by the overwhelming influence of a commercial spirit that 
favoured selfishness and standardisation. Mill regarded the general diffusion of the 
commercial spirit as not only a powerful influence, but one with which individuals tended 
to collude. Inspired by Guizot’s view that individual character was growing weaker in 
modernity, and Tocqueville's warnings that the despotism of opinion was a threat to human 
improvement. Mill designed institutions intended to counteract these tendencies in modem 
society. The secret ballot was one of these institutions. He hoped that institutional
65 Ibid., p. 141.
66 J. Hamburger, Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and The Philosophical Radicals, p. 254.
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mechanisms would prove effective in counteracting these general tendencies by reinforcing 
the characteristics of those individuals strong enough to oppose it. Therefore, these 
institutions would exploit aspects of national character in order to produce the effects at 
which they were aimed. The component of the British national character that Mill praised 
highly was truthfulness; in this respect he thought that the British people were entitled to 
moral pre-eminence over other nations.68 However, just as the Romans acquired virtues that 
were not common in southern Europeans types of national character by subjecting 
themselves to discipline, the British might lose their virtues through lack of discipline.69 
Thus for Mill, the voting process needed to be open because, as a social institution, it would 
reinforce the propensity of the British people to be truthful and to exercise self­
assertiveness and vigour, which were par excellence the means to counteract 
standardisation. This disciplinary element of voting should not be understood as an 
artificial control over individuals, but as an effort to strengthen the characteristics that they 
already possessed but that nonetheless needed to be exercised to retain their vitality.70 The 
absence of any such discipline would weaken the individual character, and render it unable 
to counteract the prevailing ethos. Mill's reasoning implies that a secret voting system 
would lead the British people to lose their sense of responsibility. Such a loss would be 
damaging, in Britain more so than elsewhere, because the British were marked by an 
unusual lack of social feeling. In this way, every man entrenched within his family, feels a 
kind of dislike and repugnance to every other, because there is hardly any concern in
67 J.S. M ill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 490.
68 See J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliam entary Reform, (CW), XIX, p. 338 and Public and Parliam entary 
Speeches N ovem ber 1850-Novem ber 1868, (CW), XXVIII, 1988, p. 253.
69 See J.S. Mill, Essays on Equality, Law and Education, (CW), XXI, p. 309.
70 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX. pp. 400-1.
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England for great ideas and the larger interests of humanity’.71 Mill cannot be counted 
among those who believe that individuals should care for nothing other than themselves 
and their families. Most of the misunderstandings over Mill’s account of the secret ballot 
arise out of a disregard of the importance of national character in Mill’s theoretical 
framework:
For unlike, say, ‘social structure’ or ‘modes of production’, the explanatory 
framework provided by ‘national character’ maintains the focus on political affairs, 
partly by emphasising the importance of the political events which shaped the 
unique course of each national history, partly simply by taking the ‘nation’ (and 
most often the ‘nation state') as the primary analytical unit and its politics and state­
craft as the essential expression of its identity. It is this reciprocal relation between 
‘character’ and political institution which really engages Mill’s interest.72
B.L. Kinzer claims that the emotional overtones of Mill’s arguments against the secret 
ballot resembled the frequent stigmatisation of secret voting as ‘un-English’ by ordinary 
people.73 Kinzer refers to an article in The Times in which the secret ballot was portrayed as 
inconsistent with the national characteristics of ‘publicity and self-respect’ on which British 
institutions had to be based to work properly.74 The inclination to associate secret voting 
with deceit, slyness, and knavery, and open voting to manliness, honesty, and Englishness, 
which was present in Mill’s opposition to the secret ballot, was present in many of his
71 J.S. M ill, Papers on W omen’s Rights, (CW), XXI, p. 385.
72 S. Collini, ‘The Tendencies o f Things: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic M ethod’, in G.W. Smith (ed), 
John Stuart M ill’s Social and P olitical Thought, 4 vols.,(London: Routledge,1988), iv. 99-100.
73 See B.L. Kinzer, ‘The Un-Englishness o f the Secret Ballot’, Albion  3 (1978 ), p. 237.
fellow-citizens. Kinzer remarks: ‘a wide belief in the ballot’s essential un-Englishness 
contributed significantly to the difficulties encountered by dedicated advocates of secret 
voting in their efforts to mobilise popular support on its behalf.75 However, it is necessary 
to have a deeper appreciation of the extent to which the view that the secret ballot was un- 
English dovetailed with Mill’s concern to promote the valuable aspects of national 
character. There were differences between Mill and popular critics of the secret ballot: first, 
the latter drew heavily on national rivalries with the central aim of showing the superiority 
of English virtues over the vices of foreign nations; and second, Mill purported to organise 
social institutions in a way that invigorated the valuable characteristics of the national 
character, thereby counteracting the ethos of the commercial society. Mill accepted the 
broad conclusions of the popular critics of the secret ballot, although for him the point- 
scoring comparison between nationalities was irrelevant, since the institutions of each 
nation should be designed according to its national character, otherwise they would fail to 
achieve their purposes.76 But Mill shared with the popular critics the conviction that the 
open ballot was congenial to the British people. In the article in The Times referred to by 
Kinzer, there were some passages which implied that secret voting was something almost 
unnatural. It was a mechanical device imposed on people to make them achieve by artificial 
means what they were incapable of achieving by means of moral agencies:
Freedom, on the other hand, puts her reliance on the contrary of all this, - on a living 
mind to work on mind, - on checking abuses by the strength of an opinion which she 
is continually striving to form and to enlighten, - on the influence which men
74 The Times, 10 December 1856.
75 B.L. Kinzer. ‘The Un-Englishness o f  the Secret Ballot’, p. 256.
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exercise on each other without interference and without violence, in a society the 
public action of which is criticised by public speech. We have seen a hundred times 
mechanical pitted against moral force, and uniformly with the complete defeat of the 
former. Opinions are formed in spite of the censorship, and votes will be made 
known in spite of the ballot-box. The will of man will overleap all hindrances that 
may be placed in its way; and the will of man in this instance is to publish the very 
thing that Greenwich wishes to conceal. Before the change could be made to operate 
as it is wished in England you must effectually change the character of the English 
people.77
The secret ballot was ranked amongst ‘those contrivances on which despotism mainly 
relies', and was thus a hindrance to the circulation of ideas. This was the kernel of the 
debate, because here the ‘un-Englishness? claim levelled against the secret ballot dovetailed 
with Mill's account, in that both accepted that secrecy blocked the diffusion of information 
and thus had a detrimental effect on society. Mill was worried about the implications of 
adopting the secret ballot. The belief that the secret ballot was detrimental to the diffusion 
of information explain why popular support for it had never been especially strong in 
England, even amongst the Chartists.78 The popular perception of the secret ballot 
correlated with Mill's confidence in the desire of the average man to listen to reasoned 
arguments, provided the channels to truth were kept open: appeal to facts and not to 
prejudices, open discussion, and freedom of assembly. For Mill, if the secret ballot were
76 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (C\V). XIX, p. 394.
77 The Times. 10 December 1856.
78 See B.L. Kinzer. T he Un-Englishness o f the Secret Ballot’, p. 249; and T h e  Failure o f  Pressure from 
w ithou t: Richard Cobden, the Ballot Society, and the Coming o f the Ballot Act in England’, pp. 405-10.
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introduced people would be prevented from knowing the reasons for other people’s 
choices, which would be at odds with the very core of Mill’s political philosophy:
Rather, the emphasis is on the fact that people must be free to hear all that has to be 
said on the topic if they are to develop and grow in their individuality. Freedom of 
thought is therefore ultimately justified not on the individuals’ right to express 
opinions but on the right of individuals to hear opinions expressed.79
Accountability, a central concern of M ill's political thought, would be undermined if secret 
voting were implemented: this would represent a threat to society, both because opinions 
would be allowed to pass unchecked, and because people would not profit from hearing and 
debating other people's opinions. Mill's account relied on his view that national character 
was a central analytic category of political reasoning, and on his perception that 
truthfulness was a pre-eminent characteristic of the British national character. The popular 
supporters of the ‘un-English' argument did not possess such a methodological framework. 
Nevertheless, they shared the fear that the abcense of openess in elections would destroy 
voting as an exercise of accountability.
D.C. Moore thought that Mill accepted the idea that the deference that members of
communities accorded to local political authorities and leaders was a legitimate form of
80influence, because of the importance of the local influences and institutions in social life.
74 K.C. O ’Rourke. ‘John Stuart Mill and Freedom o f Expression: The Genesis o f  a Theory’, (London: Ph.D. 
1999), p. 144.
80 See B.L. Kinzer, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Secret Ballot’, pp. 35-7; D.C. Moore, The Politics o f  Deference, 
(Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976), p. 410.
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For Moore, Mill’s support of open voting was an attempt to maintain the influence of these 
agencies which had been growing weaker. Kinzer rebuked Moore in the following terms:
As for his comments on J.S. Mill and the ballot, Moore misinterprets in a rather
fundamental way the discussion of the question in Thoughts on Parliamentary'
Reform. Mill does assign a disciplinary function to ‘public opinion’. But he does not
here mean ‘the traditional agencies of social control’, since for Mill such would
signify the power of landlords and employers to dictate to their dependents, and he
certainly had no regrets about the weakening of that power. What concerned him
was the need to establish effective new moral agencies to counteract the tendency, as
he saw it. of electors to vote on the basis of selfish considerations now that they
81were no longer subject to dictation.
The lack of understanding about national character as an important analytic category in 
Mill's political reasoning prevents both Kinzer and Moore from assessing the question in 
its proper perspective. To do this, one must take into account Mill's belief that English 
national character was also marked by a propensity to praise public opinion, the ‘intolerant 
temper of national mind’, and thus to restrain mental freedom, in contrast to Continental 
Europe, where the main source of restriction was government.8“ In short, what he called the 
despotism of public opinion was ‘the general habit, both in opinion and in conduct, of 
making adherence to custom the rule of life, and enforcing it, by social penalties, against all
8IB.L. Kinzer, 'John Stuart Mill and the Secret Ballot*, p. 36.
82 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  P olitical Economy, (CW), III, p. 799.
51
persons who, without a party to back them, assert their individual independence’. Public 
opinion was an important influence acting upon open voting, even though, in On Liberty\ 
Mill argued that public opinion should be precluded from encroaching upon the private 
sphere of conduct.84 Mill expected the effects of public opinion on the electoral process to 
be beneficial, with voters, under the salutary pressure of public opinion, supposed to 
provide sound grounds for their choices. Hence, Mill built upon the propensity of the 
British to extoll public opinion in order to avoid selfish-spirited voting. In this way, Joseph 
Hamburger is correct to assert the following:
Mill’s wish to use shaming to improve the character of selfish and miserably 
individualistic persons is evident in his views on the ballot. Whereas earlier, in 
keeping with acceptance of orthodox Benthamism, he had been a strong advocate of 
the secret ballot, by the time On Liberty' was written his opinion had changed 
radically. Now Mill wanted voters to cast their ballots openly, in full view of their 
fellow citizens. The purpose, he claimed, was not to influence how votes were cast 
but to force voters to be prepared to explain and defend the ways they voted.^
The influence of traditional agencies of social control over the electoral process was being 
replaced by the overwhelming influence of the spirit of the age which favoured selfishness 
and standardisation. For Mill, traditional agencies could not exert the influence they used to 
have in the past because electors ‘are no longer passive instruments of other men's will -
83 Ibid., p. 935.
84 See J.S. M ill, On Liberty, (CW), XIX, p. 225.
85 J. Hamburger, John Stuart M ill on Liberty and Control. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 
173.
86mere organs for putting power into the hands of a controlling oligarchy’. Mill assumed 
that the involvement of people in local government, juries, and voluntary associations 
would bring about a civic culture that, by relying on local autonomy, would offset the force 
exerted by public opinion. Otherwise, the very public opinion supposed to purify the 
electoral process from selfishness would be converted into a new form of tyranny. Mill’s 
conception of citizenship saw a moralising potential in political participation. Larry
87Siedentop calls this idea a salutary myth and attributes its creation to Tocqueville. Mill, 
however, did not clarify how these new moral agencies would operate to prevent the forces 
of standardisation from operating unchecked, and neither did he state what role the existing 
local loyalties and hierarchies might still perform in the process. Therefore, Moore is. to an 
extent, correct to say that Mill begged the question by not articulating what was to be
o o
regarded as legitimate in these local relations. Nevertheless, this is not enough to underpin 
Moore’s idea that Mill was trying to reinforce the traditional agencies of social control, 
rather to empower new agencies. Kinzer. therefore, is correct to claim that Mill was trying 
‘to establish effective new moral agencies to counteract the tendency, as he saw it, of 
electors to vote on the basis of selfish considerations now that they were no longer subject 
to dictation'.89 Having said that, he should have recognised that Mill did not necessarily 
exclude the influence of local loyalties in the electoral process, albeit not in the way that 
Moore thinks. In fact. Mill's objective was to promote a participatory process in which the 
basic elements of the national character were used to keep society moving forward, through 
a system of contending forces. The success of such a process required the involvement of
86 J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliam entary Reform, (CW), XIX, p. 333.
87 See L. Siedentop, Tocqueville, (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 89-92.
88 See D.C. Moore, The Politics o f  D eference , p. 405.
89 B.L. Kinzer, ‘J.S. Mill and the Secret Ballot’, p. 36.
53
groups of people in local government, juries, and voluntary associations, and in the 
electoral system. For Mill, in relation to the latter, the open ballot was paramount because it 
rendered government accountable to society and individual voters accountable to public 
opinion. Nor should it br forgotten that Mill believed that deference to hierarchy was a 
general characteristic of the English people that work beyond the question of the subjection 
of the voters:
There is no hostility to aristocracy in England; the people would far rather be 
governed by their superior than by their equals. Like all other nations, they had the
partiality of habit for the institutions under which they had grown up; and the
artifices of a whole century had wrought up this partiality into one of the most
9()obstinate of prejudices.
William Stafford claims that when Mill repudiated the secret ballot it was not assumed, as it 
tends to be today, that its adoption would necessarily be conducive to social 
improvement.91 According to Stafford, Mill was trying to further public-spirited voting and 
to prevent the prevalence of selfish interests in the electoral process, which he thought 
would occur if the secret ballot were introduced. Secrecy would weaken public morality, 
whereas ‘publicity and criticism would encourage public spirit, and the advantages of this
Q -)
outweighed the dangers of bribery'. “ Mill did not, of course, have the sort of experiences 
of voting that people living in contemporary society have, but still, it is worth pointing out 
that he was acquainted with the operation of the secret ballot in, for instance, the United
90 J. S. Mill, Essays on England, Ireland, and The Em pire, (C\V), VI, p. 339.
91 See W. Stafford, John Stuart Mill, pp. 119-20.
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States, Holland, Belgium and even Australia, in some of which its sucess was recognised. 
Despite these examples, however, Mill retained his opposition to the secret ballot. He 
retained this opposition precisely because he understood that the introduction of the secret 
ballot would be bound to have a very specific impact in Britain, due to the peculiarities of 
its national character.
C.L. Ten claims that Mill defended open voting on the grounds that the public nature of the 
act would make voters justify their choices more carefully, and that he believed that the 
risks of selfish-spirited voting far outweighed those of illegitimate pressure upon voters.93 
Mill advocated a process of civic education that did not neglect the social aspects of human 
beings, and. therefore, rejected atomistic individualism. For Mill, individuality presupposed 
the capacity to continualy re-evaluate and exchange experiences with others.94 Ten is 
correct to point out that Mill saw the open ballot as a means of making people examine the 
grounds of their choices. It is reasonable to suppose that the process of discussing and 
comparing ideas makes it possible to identify errors and strengths in each point of view, 
whilst at the same time permitting the participation of individuals in the shaping of social 
institutions. However, Ten fails to see that Mill’s emphasis on the necessity of open voting 
reveals a certain disparity between his idea that individuals were not selfish beings and his 
conviction that self-interest would prevail if voting were secret. In the end, the secret ballot 
has proven not to be hindrance to debate and engaged reasoning in the voting process. But 
if one assumes that it leads necessarily to egotistic decisions, then one remains committed
92 Ibid., p. 120.
93See C.L. Ten, ‘Democracy, socialism, and the working classes', in J. Skorupski (ed). The Cam bridge 
Companion to Mill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 383.
94 See J.S. Mill, Papers on Women's Rights, (CW), XXI, p. 385.
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to a conception of individuality that is certainly not altruistic. And again, while open voting 
puts voters under the scrutiny of their fellow-citizens, it does not necessarily cause engaged 
reasoning and debate. These questions should have been explored further by Mill’s 
commentators.
Alan Ryan grasps better than most of Mill’s commentators that, for Mill, inertia, passivity, 
and timidity were vices that stultified individuality and put society at risk. Nineteenth- 
century democracy and the commercial spirit tended to further ‘an opinion whose answer to 
all social and political problems is summed up in the imperative to be like everyone else’.95 
Mill believed that this was exactly what destroyed society because the conquests of 
civilisation depended on continual assertions of individuality. On the one hand. Mill 
attributed China’s stagnation to the excessive control of human behaviour which typified it, 
and, on the other hand, he stated that Europe owed its progress to the many different paths 
that had been adopted there. The differences between nations and the individuals that made 
them up had enabled Europe to engage in a multitude of social experiments which had 
brought about progress. Ryan emphasises the fact that political education required by Mill 
involved the exercise of individuals' abilities to defend their ‘own perception of society and 
its needs’ in the face of competing perceptions. Besides, he recognises that, for Mill, the 
vote was a means ‘to defend our rights and to make our claims felt. But it is also an 
instrument of control over lives of others; when we vote we necessarily help to bring about 
the implementation of policies that bind others as much as ourselves’.96 Ryan is correct to 
see voting as including a self-regarding and an other-regarding dimension. However, this in
95 A. Ryan, ‘Two Concepts o f  Politics and Democracy: James and John Stuart M ill’, in G.W. Smith (ed), John
Stuart M ill's Social and P olitical Thought: Critical Assessm ents , 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), iii. 153.
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itself does not provide an adequate assessment of Mill’s account of the secret ballot. What 
is needed is a more judicious analysis of the relationship between the other-regarding and 
the self-regarding aspects of the secret ballot. Such an analysis will be made in the next 
section.
1.5. THE SECRET BALLOT AND THE BADGE OF SLAVERY
At face value, the most straightforward way of evaluating Mill’s account of the secret ballot 
is to examine whether or not his premise that the situation in Britain had changed in a way 
that had rendered secrecy unnecessary, or rather, detrimental to the electoral process was 
correct. Kinzer follows this strategy. He demonstrates that there exists abundant and 
compelling evidence to show that no significant changes had occurred in Britain to support 
Mill’s claim in Thoughts on Parliamentary' Reform that bribery and intimidation were 
declining. The very re-appearance of the secret ballot as a political question during the 
1850s can be attributed to the extent of the corruption and coercion that had occurred 
during the general election of 1852. In Kinzer's view, Mill failed to realise that:
The eviction of Welsh and Irish tenant farmers, whose religious and political 
sympathies ran counter to those of their landlords, was not uncommon before the 
passage of the 1872 Ballot Act. Mill also neglected to mention the difficulties 
encountered by English shopkeepers, many of whom continued to be subjected to 
pressure from customers in the fifties and sixties. Finally, he overestimated the
% Ibid., p. 154.
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ability of labourers, through the growth of trade unions, to resist effectively the 
influence of employers. In many instances workers felt they had no alternative but to 
support the candidate favoured by their employer.97
However, this sort of objection to Mill's account, though basically sound, overlooks the 
fact that Mill’s defence of the ballot in his later works undermined the premises of his own 
liberal-utilitarian discourse and revealed his lack of understanding of the very nature of the 
act of voting. Mill’s main mistake was his failure to realise that if voting is not undertaken 
in secrecy, the self-regarding dimension of the process tends to be sacrificed in favour of its 
other-regarding dimension. In fact, it is not possible to separate these two dimensions 
within the context of the electoral process. This means that Mill considered voting to be 
merely instrumental, whereby people fulfilled duties towards others, without seeing that it 
is also a channel by means by which the claims of individuals are promoted. He emphasised 
the public nature of voting in such a way that it appeared as though the choices at stake 
bore no relation to what he called the private sphere of conduct. The choosing of a 
legislature can bring about consequences that can affect many aspects of individual and 
public life, but which cannot be foreseen at the moment of election. Once it is appreciated 
that elections have a bearing on private as well as public matters, it may be considered 
prudent to keep them secret. To do otherwise is to take the risk of forcing individuals to 
conform to prevailing opinions.98 Mill's fear of mass democracy stemmed from the fact that 
the values shared by the majority might crush the idiossyncratic views of individuals in the 
minority. But open voting is likely to promote this sort of conformity, eradicating the
97 B.L. Kinzer, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Secret Ballot', p. 37. In this article Kinzer refers to an abundance o f
sources underpinning his conviction that intimidation and bribery was not declining.
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differences existing between people, since those holding opinions in disagreement with the 
majority may be intimidated against voting according to their convictions, because these 
convictions are at odds with widely-shared social norms. Individual choices may not 
necessarily be grounded in selfish motives, and yet be the target of intolerance because, for 
example, they may reveal religious convictions or personal inclinations that are not 
generally welcomed in society. Moreover, why would majorities not tyrannise minorities, 
given the opportunity provided by an open ballot? If one acepts Mill’s premise that 
majorities have a propensity to impose their way of life on minorities, one will reach the 
conclusion that there is no occasion on which such an imposition is more likely to occur 
than an election. This is because an election is the occasion in which decisions made by 
minorities can affect majorities the most. Secret voting is, therefore, an important means of 
protecting those voters who are not in agreement with the prevailing values in society.
Mill strove to promote political institutions conducive to social and individual 
improvement, and saw the creativity and idiosyncratic spirit of minorities as a main source 
of the energies needed to fuel societal development. The open ballot is at best a risk, and at 
worst a threat to the very individuality that Mill was intending to promote. Besides, the 
tendency of the British national character to extoll public opinion was a reason to support 
the secret ballot, since, if the overwhelming political force of public opinion was reinforced 
by the adoption of open voting, it might be converted into a despotic influence over voters. 
In view of this, it is reasonable to suggest that the secret ballot would have been more 
appropriate for the realisation of his democratic ideals. It is true that the open ballot is
98 See D.F. Thompson, John Stuart M ill and Representative Government, p. 98.
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closer to the Athenian spirit he extolled, but one must remember that self-cultivation was 
also a very important element of Mill’s political philosophy. In advocating open voting, his 
main objective was to make voting a morally accountable act. However, the conditions in 
which such voting would take place would merely encourage sinister influence, and thereby 
undermine the credibility of the electoral process. It is important to stress that Mill's notion 
of accountability does not lose its centrality because he gives it an inappropriate 
institutional embodiment. Mill’s emphasis on the fact that people must be free to hear what 
others have to say must then receive an institutional embodiment capable of harmonising 
the British national character with the need for individuals to cultivate experiments of life. 
Mill succeeded in showing that self-cultivation and accountability are highly important in 
serving the ends of both individual and society, but he failed to realise that the open ballot 
is not the best means to reach this end.
It has been shown above that, from the late 1850s onwards, Mill thought there was no 
significant threat to voters if they cast their votes openly. It is important to be aware that he 
saw voting as an instrument of self-defence as well. His support for women’s 
enfranchisement is based on such a conviction. However, as he did not see the problems 
noted above, he advocated open voting, believing that in so doing, he would promote 
beneficial political competition. This is clearly a consequence of Mill's propensity to be 
idealistic. He was over-optimistic when he presumed that working and middle classes were 
destined to merge in a radical party which would defeat the aristocracy. One can easily 
imagine that, when sensitive matters are at stake, open voting will affect the way in which 
people vote. For instance, many of those who support legislation tolerant to homosexuality 
might vote otherwise, in order to avoid debating the question with a potentially hostile
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public. Political campaigns are not always focused on such divisive issues, but it is not 
possible to predict what will happen as they progress. Besides, issues discussed in 
Parliament might affect very intimate aspects of the personal lives of individuals. Mill 
advocated the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts before the Royal Commission 
destined to investigate the administration and the operation of the Contagious Diseases 
Acts in 1870. These Acts authorised the compulsory medical inspection of prostitutes in 
order to prevent the spread of sexually transmissible diseases. There is no doubt that the act 
of subjecting those reputed to be prostitutes to compulsory examination and, if found to be 
diseased, to incarceration in hospital, had an extensive impact on their personal lives and on 
the lives of their families. This was the type of issue in which the expression of people's 
choices might have been improperly affected had they debated it as part of the electoral 
process." In an electoral process which relied on the open voting system, and where the 
debate on compulsory inspections of reputed prostitutes was the central issue, many would 
vote in a way which was at odds with their real wishes, in order to avoid, for instance, 
having to explain that they were protecting daughters who were or were likely to be seen as 
prostitutes.
1.6. CONCLUSION
Mill's democratic theory is a blend of modem and classical motifs. He defended that both 
participation in the political process and individual self-cultivation should be incentivated. 
This was vital to prevent the ethical, aesthetic, and mental faculties of individuals from 
being stultified. Mill’s views on the secret ballot addressed both the issue of participation
99 See J.S. Mill, Public and Parliam entary Speeches, (CW), XXIX, pp. 388-89.
and that of the further implications for individual and social life. His disapproval of the 
secret ballot in his later works was grounded on the conviction that its secrecy imparted to 
voters the sense that they had a right to make choices grounded on their private interests 
rather than a duty to promote the public interest. For him, publicity was necessary to make 
voters responsible to their fellow citizens, that is to render them accountable. Moreover, he 
believed that the voting process should be an important vehicle for debating the alternatives 
for the life of the community, and for making citizens aware of the fact that their choices 
affected other people's lives. In Britain, accountability was particularly important as a 
means of socialisation. According to Mill, the British were so lacking in social feeling that 
to render them responsible to other people was a way of making them care for matters other 
than themselves and their families.
Most of the misunderstandings over Mill’s account of the secret ballot arise from a 
disregard of the importance that national character had in his theoretical framework. 
National character was an essential element in his political reasoning, since he believed that 
institutions could be properly understood only against the background of the influences that 
shaped the character of the nation in which they operated. The two characteristics of the 
English national character he emphasised were truthfulness and a propensity to despotism 
of opinion. He tried to design political institutions which could profit from these 
characteristics. He defended the open ballot, thinking that he was making use of these 
characteristics in the best possible way to achieve his purposes. He failed, however, to 
realise that publicity could be a source of mischievous influence, as well as a security for 
accountability. His main mistake was not to grasp that, if voting were not secret, the self-
regarding dimension of the process would tend to be sacrificed in favour of its other- 
regarding dimension. He did not see that the secret vote was, therefore, more appropriate 
for protecting those voters who were not in agreement with the prevailing values in society, 
exactly those whose creativity and idiosyncratic spirit was the main source of societal 
development. Mill once said that concealment is the badge of slavery, but is there not a case 
for regarding the secret ballot as a passport to freedom?
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CHAPTER 2 
J.S. MILL, TOCQUEVILLE, AND DEMOCRACY
2.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, it will be argued that, although Tocqueville emphasised tradition and 
participation in his political thought while Mill emphasised accountability and self- 
cultivation, both favoured a civic culture that supported liberty and diversity and was 
focused on a common set of philosophical problems. The central argument is that after the 
early 1840s Mill incorporated in his thought Tocqueville's idea that, in order for democracy 
to function properly, the masses should be rendered accountable. Initially, Mill tried to find 
a power to rival the power of the masses, fearing that their despotic power would suffocate 
diversity and lead to stagnation. Later, he advocated institutions which would guarantee the 
presence of educated minorities in government, and thereby create the opposition of ideas 
that he deemed necessary to counterbarlance the power of the majority and to make 
progress possible. It will also be argued that Mill was not sufficiently clear about how 
democracy would operate in relation to the new forces of modem industrial society.
In the second section, it will be claimed that between 1835 and 1840 Mill devoted himself 
to the search for a power in society to rival the power of the masses. It will be shown that 
Mill, in the essays he wrote between his reviews of the first and the second part of 
Democracy in America, assigned the role of opposing the power of the masses to various 
institutions, such as the universities and the hereditary leisured calsses. This search for a 
power to counteract the masses reflected his acceptance of Tocqueville’s claim that the 
despotic propensities of the democratic age would stagnate society by creating an obedient 
mass sharing the same set of values. This led Mill to shift from one conception of 
democracy that enshrined the will of majorities to another that attempted to take the will of 
minorities into account as well. It will also be claimed that Mill’s new conception of 
democracy led to an awareness that the masses as well as the government should be 
accountable, because, as the major power in society, they could pose a threat to 
individuality and diversity. It will be made evident that Mill attributed a special role to 
professional administration and that he opposed sectional representation.
The third section will present an account of the relationship between Mill's and 
Tocqueville's political theories. While commentators disagree regarding the degree of 
Tocqueville’s influence over Mill, it is widely accepted that the central tenets of On Liberty 
and Considerations on Representative Government are deeply related to Tocqueville’s main 
political concerns, especially those displayed in Democracy in America. The main 
disparities and similarities that commentators see between Mill’s and Tocqueville’s 
political thought will be described. It will be shown that both Mill and Tocqueville were 
concerned with questions such as the role of political participation in the improvement of
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individuality and society, the problem of the tyranny of the majority, and the relationship 
between accountability and democracy.
The fourth section will consist in a critical commentary on the accounts of the relationship 
between Mill’s and Tocqueville’s political theories presented in the previous section. It will 
be shown that Mueller fails to appreciate that Tocqueville emphasised the role of customary 
morality while Mill emphasised the role of electoral institutions in promoting civic culture. 
Pappe is. therefore, correct to criticise Mueller, in that Mueller fails to realise that Mill 
owed his appreciation of the influence of national character over institutions to authors 
other than Tocqueville. However, it will be stressed that Tocqueville was the most 
important influence on Mill's political thought because he provided Mill with a theoretical 
framework capable of encompassing the main concerns of both Guizot and Coleridge. 
Siedentop is thus correct to say that Mill placed Tocquevillian themes at the heart of his 
political philosophy, for the question of the tyranny of public opinion, featured in 
Democracy in America, exerted an important influence over both On Liberty and 
Considerations on Representative Government. It will be argued that Lamberti correctly 
claims that Mill emphasised the role of rationally-built institutions in preventing the 
excesses of democracy in contrast to Tocqueville, who emphasised the roles of 
participation and the cultivation of local loyalties. It will also be argued that Lamberti fails 
to recognise that Mill’s criticism of Tocqueville’s explanation of the phenomenon of 
individualism in modem society is to an extent correct, because Tocqueville did not explain 
how democracy operated in conjunction with the new forces of modem industrial society. 
In the end, it is important to stress that Lamberti’s account is an illuminating one, because 
he shows that both Mill and Tocqueville were working out political philosophies which
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were destined to favour a civic culture that supported liberty and diversity, and that they 
shared a common set of central problems.
2.2. THE POWER TO RIVAL THAT OF THE MASSES
Mill’s definitive account of his concern with accountability appears in Considerations on 
Representative Government. It is important, nevertheless, to appreciate that Mill’s emphasis 
on the importance of keeping government accountable to the people was also present in his 
earlier expositions of his concept of representation. In his review of Samuel Bailey’s 
Rationale o f Political Representation (1835), Mill supported Bailey’s conviction that 
governments must be accountable because they exist to impede those who wield power 
from oppressing the rest, which would be unlikely to happen if they were left 
uncontrolled.100 Mill also agreed with Bailey that, in order to ensure that the interest of the 
ruling body was attuned to the interest of the people, it was important to give maximum 
publicity to its proceedings. As he did not think that representatives should be bound to any 
specific interest in society. Mill argued that strict accountability was essential so that 
electors could decide who should be rewarded and punished, re-elected and rejected.101 It is 
important to bear in mind that Mill’s opposition to sectional representation was also based 
on his fear that representatives acting on behalf of group-interests would tend to overlook 
the consequences of their actions for society as a whole and become unaccountable. That is 
why ‘the only interest which we wish to be consulted is the general interest, and that,
100 See J.S. Mill, Rationale o f  Representation, (CW), XVIII, p. 19.
101 Mill thought pledges should not be required from the candidates. See J.H. Bums, ‘John Stuart Mill and 
Democracy, 1829-1861'. in J.B. Schneewind (ed), Mill: A Collection o f  Critical Essays, (London: Macmillan, 
1969), p. 283.
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10?therefore, is the only one which we desire to see represented’. Accountability was, 
therefore, a central concern in Mill’s review of Bailey’s work.
In his review of the first part of Democracy in America (1835), Mill re-asserted the ideas 
that he had upheld in Rationale o f Representation, where true democracy existed only when 
a qualified governing body acted under the control of the people: ‘in no government will 
the interest of the people be the object, except where the people are able to dismiss their 
rulers as soon as the devotion of those rulers to the interests of the people becomes 
questionable'.103 Mill agreed with Tocqueville that the despotic propensities of the 
democratic age would ruin society by creating an obedient mass in which the individuals 
shared the same set of values. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville asserted that in 
America the majority held powers that far exceeded those it could possess in a monarchy. 
So, when the majority had ‘irrevocably pronounced, everyone becomes silent and friends 
and enemies alike then seem to hitch themselves together to its wagon’.104 For Tocqueville, 
genuine freedom of expression reigned in America, but there was little independence of 
mind because no one could resist the power of the majority. He thought that the tyranny of 
democratic republics struck the soul crudely because people were allowed to dissent, but if 
they dared to do so they would be treated as strangers among us.l0:' Tocqueville went so far 
as to say: ‘if America has not yet had great writers, we ought not to seek the reasons for this
' J.S. Mill, Rationale o f  Representation, (CW), XVIII, p. 45.
103 J.S. Mill, D e Tocqueville on Dem ocracy in Am erica I, (CW), XVIII. pp. 71-2.
KM A. de Tocqueville, D em ocracy in America, (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2000), p. 243.
See ibid., p. 244.
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elsewhere: no literary genius exists without freedom of mind, and there is no freedom of 
mind in America’.106
In reviewing Democracy in America /, Mill seemed to be unsure about Tocqueville’s 
description of the tyranny of opinion in America. He asserted: ‘but, without pretending 
ourselves competent to judge whether our author overstates the evils as they exist in 
America, we can see reasons for thinking that they would exist in a far inferior degree in
Europe’.107 Mill assumed that countries endowed with educational institutions and
108hereditary leisured classes were immune to such evils. Nevertheless, the degree to which 
his later works assimilated Tocqueville’s conclusions indicates that in his maturity he 
accepted the overriding power of public opinion as an evil present in Britain just as much as 
in America. On Liberty. for example, was based on the assumption that public opinion 
ruled the world.109 This confirms J.M. Robson’s claim that ‘the contribution of de 
Tocqueville to [Mill’s] thought is in truth unique, for Mill accepted the main conclusions 
and adopted them into his own system’.110 In the end. Mill praised Democracy in America 
/. saying that it was a book with which ‘all who would understand, or who are called upon 
to exercise influence over their age, are bound to be familiar’.111
In the time which intervened between the first review of Democracy in America in 1835 
and the second in 1840, the idea that it was necessary to have a power in society to rival
106 Ibid.. p. 245.
107 J.S. Mill, De Tocqueville on Dem ocracy in Am erica I, (CW), XVIII. p. 83.
108 See ibid., pp. 85-6.
109 See J.S. Mill, On Libertv, (CW), XVIII, p. 268.
110 J.M. Robson, The Improvem ent o f  M ankind: The Social and Political Thought o f  John Stuart Mill, 
(Toronto and London: University o f  Toronto Press and Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1968), p. 107.
111 J.S. Mill. De Tocqueville on Dem ocracy in Am erica I, (CW), XVIII, p. 57.
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that of the masses emerged in Mill’s thought. This recognition represented the start of a 
shift from his orthodox conception of democracy as empowering the will of the majority to 
a different one that purported to take the will of minorities into account as well. The major 
works Mill produced in this period show his concern with the tyranny of the majority.
In 1836, Mill published the essay Civilization, in which he expressed his concerns over the 
debilitating influences of the age. He believed that individuality was sinking ‘into greater 
insignificance' because the masses were becoming powerful. This was dangerous because 
genuine civilisation relied on a combination of efforts, which required a self-control and 
discipline that individuals were no longer willing to bear. Mill was amongst those who 
thought that the masses could not be prevented from acquiring power, for ‘whatever is the 
growing power in society will force its way into government, by fair means or foul. The 
distribution of constitutional power can no longer continue very different from that of real
|  i *)
power, without a convulsion’. The solution he proposed was to make the masses wiser 
by creating a power to counteract them. He called on the lettered classes to make efforts to 
facilitate the publication of first-rate literary works of whatever tendency in point of 
opinion by obtaining authorisation to publish them as quickly as possible so as to make 
their influence felt in society.113 He called for reforms in the universities to make them 
centres of free inquiry capable of generating highly cultivated minds and opposing the 
debilitating influences of the age. Mill also advocated a special role for ancient literature, 
history, and, in the area ‘of pure intellect, the highest place will belong to logic and 
philosophy of mind'. He intended to counteract the dominant tendencies of the age ‘by
112 J.S. Mill, Civilization , (CVV), XVIII, p. 127.
113 See ibid., p. 138.
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establishing counter-tendencies, which may combine with those tendencies and modify 
them’.114
In 1838 Mill published an essay entitled Bentham. This is a wide-ranging account of 
Bentham’s thought. In assessing Bentham’s political philosophy, Mill accused Bentham of 
overlooking the importance of national character in the development of institutions. Mill 
regarded this as dangerous because questions regarding laws and government ‘vary 
indefinitely, according to the degree and kind of civilisation and cultivation already attained 
by people, and their peculiar aptitudes for receiving more'.11^  Mill believed Bentham was 
wrong to assume that majorities should control society on the grounds that their interests 
coincided with that of the community as a whole. Mill grouped Bentham with those 
European reformers who were accustomed to see numerical majorities unfairly controlled 
and oppressed by minorities, and who were therefore determined to give them more 
political power. But, from Mill’s perspective, this was to allow the fate of mankind to pass 
from one form of bad government to another, which he did not believe was necessary.116 
Besides, he considered it dangerous to presume that the interests of majorities were the 
interests of society. In order for society to improve, an organised power was required to 
oppose that of the majority, and, if one deemed the interests of the majority to be those of 
society as a whole, then such an organised power would seem unnecessary. For Mill, the 
majority should be paramount, but society should guarantee permanent security for freedom 
of thought and individuality of character. This guarantee was vital if minorities were to
1,4 Ibid., pp. 135-6.
115 J.S. Mill. Bentham . (CW). X. p. 106.
116 See ibid., p. 107.
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make it possible for minorities to organise an opposition to rival the power of the masses, 
and, by generating a clash of ideas, move society forward:
A centre of resistance, round which all the moral and social elements which the 
ruling power views with disfavour may cluster themselves, and behind whose 
bulwarks they may find shelter from attempts of that power to hunt them out of 
existence, is as necessary where the opinion of the majority is sovereign, as where 
the ruling power is a hierarchy or an aristocracy. Where no such point d’appui 
exists, there the human race will inevitably degenerate; and the question, whether 
the United States, for instance, will in time sink into another China (also a most 
commercial and industrious nation), resolves itself, to us. into the question, whether 
such a centre of resistance will gradually evolve itself or not.117
In Coleridge, published in 1840. Mill accepted Coleridge’s idea that governments could 
have a positive function in society. Mill believed ‘that government ought not to interdict 
men from publishing their opinions, pursuing their employments, or buying and selling
| | g
their goods, in whatever place or manner they deem the most advantageous’. However, 
he agreed with Coleridge that government could make efforts, preferably indirectly, to 
secure means of subsistence to the people. Thus, Mill rejected the laissez-faire doctrine, 
according to which governments did best when they did nothing. He did not believe that it 
was the fault of government if every one did not have enough to eat and drink. However, ‘a 
State must be considered as a great benefit to society, or mutual insurance company, for
" 7 Ibid., p. 108.
118 J.S. Mill, Coleridge, (CW), X, p. 157.
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helping (under the necessary regulations for preventing abuse)’.1,9 Mill upheld Coleridge’s
conviction that government must be composed from the existing forces in society so as to
reflect the antagonism between the forces of permanence and those of progress. He
regarded this antagonism as important because it created a mutual check between rival
positions. However, Mill did not entirely agree with Coleridge’s doctrine of half-truths,
because he did not believe that half-truths were necessarily parts of the totality that
combined them. F.E.L. Priestley correctly states that Mill thought that there was ‘no
evidence in the history of opinion to support a belief either in the dialectic process, by
which thesis and antithesis produced a synthesis, or in half-truths which become
supplementary and form a whole’.u0 Mill praised Coleridge for having vindicated against
‘the whole eighteenth century, the principle of an endowed class, for the cultivation of
1^ 1learning, and for diffusing its result among the community'. “ He also agreed with 
Coleridge that society needed a national clerisy devoted to the diffusion of culture and 
learning among the community. This clerisy would, according to Coleridge, comprehend 
the learned of all denominations, including the sages and professors of all branches of 
science and liberal arts. Mill and Coleridge thought that this clerisy would help society to 
avoid stagnation and to improve. The role of the clerisy was educational and comprised the 
following tasks: to enhance existing knowledge: to diffuse existing knowledge throughout 
the country; and to safeguard recollections of the country’s history in order to bind the 
present with the past.122 The role Mill ascribed to the clerisy in Coleridge was the same role 
that he attributed to the hereditary and leisured classes in Democracy in America /, and to
"9 Ibid., p. 156.
120 Ibid., p. xxix.
121 Ibid., p. 150.
122 See ibid., p. 147.
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the university system in Civilization, that is, to counteract the predominant tendencies of 
the age ‘by establishing counter-tendencies, which may combine with those tendencies and 
modify them.’ K.C. O’Rourke is correct to assert that the role of the clerisy is to improve 
people’s moral and intellectual excellence:
Thus, the role of the clerisy is, of necessity, a socially active one: it is not a self- 
perpetuating elite which exists for its own sake. It must, from its very foundation, 
lead mankind and bring all to the highest possible level of intellectual and moral 
excellence: its role is, in Coleridge’s words, one of ‘raising the vulgar to the 
best'.123
In his second review of Democracy in America, which appeared in 1840. Mill praised the 
methodological achievements of Tocqueville. Mill believed that Tocqueville was the first 
thinker to treat democracy as something that ‘manifests itself by innumerable properties, 
not by some only; and must be looked at in many aspects before it can be made the subject 
even of that modest and conjectural judgement’.1"4 Mill and Tocqueville shared the 
conviction that ‘democracy, in the modem world, is inevitable; and that it is on the whole 
desirable; but desirable only under certain conditions, and those conditions capable, by 
human care and foresight, of being realised, but capable also of being missed'.123 Mill 
showed that Tocqueville believed that it was necessary to distribute public business as 
widely as possible among the people in order to prepare them for the exercise of power
123 K.C. O'Rourke, ‘John Stuart Mill and Freedom o f Expression: The Genesis o f a Theory', (London: Ph.D,
1999), p. 104.
124 J.S. Mill, De Tocqueville on Dem ocracy in Am erica II, (CW), XVIII, pp. 156-7.
125 Ibid., p. 158.
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over the legislature; it was generally also the only means by which they can be led to desire 
it.126 Mill also agreed with Tocqueville that involvement in the activities of local self- 
government, administration, and voluntary associations was essential to stimulate common 
effort and enlighten the citizen. Being involved in such activities, Tocqueville’s citizen 
realised that ‘besides the interests which separate him from his fellow-citizens, he has 
interests which connect him with them; that not only the common weal is his weal, but it 
partly depends upon his exertions’.127 For Tocqueville, American society benefited greatly 
from the involvement of its citizens in ‘the perpetual exercise of the faculties of every man 
among the people, through the universal practice of submitting all public questions to his 
judgement'.128 Mill feared no less than Tocqueville that national culture would be 
impoverished by the overwhelming pressure of public opinion for uniformity. However, 
Mill thought that Tocqueville confused the effects of democracy with those of commercial 
society. Tocqueville defined democracy as equality between citizens, ‘the absence of all 
aristocracy, whether constituted by political privilege, or by superiority in individual 
importance and social power’.129 For Mill, Tocqueville ascribed to democracy ‘several of 
the effects naturally arising from the mere progress of national prosperity, in the form in 
which that progress manifests itself in modem times'.130 So, for Mill, the main source of 
the tyranny of the majority was the tendencies of modem commercial society. The 
unfettered taste for material well-being that marked the commercial spirit led people to 
concentrate on their money-making pursuits wherever habits of self-government and 
participation were not rooted. Mill recognised that advances in prosperity, especially if due
1:6 See ibid., p. 168.
127 Ibid.. p. 169.
128 Ibid., p. 170.
129 Ibid., p. 159.
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to industrial expansion, sometimes generated a middle-class, multiplying the number of
people occupying intermediary positions in society. He did not think, however, that the
tyranny of the majority could be considered as merely a consequence of the fact that there
were more people occupying intermediary positions in society, and that there was no
aristocratic power ruling over it. In order to prove this, Mill showed that most of the
problems that Tocqueville attributed to democracy in American society also existed in
England. Therefore, they could not be attributed to democracy, understood in terms of an
equality of condition, because England as an aristocratic society did not recognise the
equality of its members.131 For Mill, the main problem that affected both the American and
the English mind was the influence of the middle classes which were dominated by money-
getting pursuits. The middle classes were predominant in America and were about to
achieve predominance in England. This was problematic because ‘whenever any variety of
human nature becomes preponderant in a community, it imposes upon all the rest of society
] ^its own type; forcing all, either to submit to or to imitate it’. Mill saw the middle classes 
as the main vehicle of the commercial spirit. For him, the middle classes were increasingly 
determining public opinion, even in matters such as literature and art. Hence, it was 
necessary to have a power to rival that of the middle classes, which would otherwise rule 
unopposed, causing uniformity and. eventually, stagnation. In relation to the social group 
that Mill judged best able to oppose the masses, he stated that, ‘there can be no doubt about 
the elements which must compose it: they are, an agricultural class, a leisured class, and a 
learned class'.133 Mill regarded Democracy in America II as the most profound book ever
130 Ibid., pp. 191-2.
131 See ibid.. p. 196.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., p. 198.
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1 ^4written on democracy. More than that, in reviewing it, Mill placed the concern with the 
tyranny of public opinion at the heart of his political philosophy. It is worth remembering 
that Mill’s first review claimed that the tyranny of opinion as manifested in America was 
unlikely to exist in England because there were educational institutions and a leisured class 
that could counterbalance the influence of the masses. In reviewing Democracy in America 
//, however, Mill now added the agricultural class as one of those elements of society that 
support views different from those adopted by the middle class opinion. The increasing 
influence of the middle classes in England led Mill to incorporate Tocqueville's concerns 
about the threats to individuality and diversity posed by the tyranny of the majority into his 
political theory. By this time, Mill had come to think that the problem affected Britain as 
well as America.
Mill’s letters written between 1835 and 1840 reflect his interest in Tocqueville’s writings. 
On 15 April 1835 Mill informed J.B. White that he had begun to read Democracy in 
America /. His first impressions were very positive because the book combined 
generalisations about the history of society with a precise exposition of the peculiarities of 
America.13'3 In a letter to A. Guilbert on 8 May 1835, Mill said that ‘de la democratic en 
amerique' is ‘an admirable book’, and asked his correspondent: ‘Can you tell me anything 
of Tocqueville? What is his history? & in what estimation is he held in France?’136 In 
September 1835. Mill sent a letter to Tocqueville expressing his gratitude for Tocqueville’s 
willingness to co-operate with the London Review, and informing him that he had nearly 
finished his review of Democracy in America J and that his review would be slightly more
134 See ibid., p. 190.
135 See J.S. Mill, E arlier Letters, 1812-1848 , (CW), XII, p. 259.
favourable to democracy than Tocqueville had been.137 Some of Mill’s other letters to
Tocqueville before 1840 enquired about his progress with the second part of Democracy in
America, and in almost all of them he flattered Tocqueville, either praising his theoretical
achievements or encouraging his involvement with British publications. On 11 May 1840,
Mill wrote to Tocqueville expressing his gratitude for a copy Tocqueville had given him of
the second part of Democracy in America. At that stage, Mill had already read the book but
deemed it necessary to re-read in order to master it. He asserted: ‘although my own
thoughts have been accustomed (especially since I read your First Part) to run very much in
the same direction, you have so far outrun me that I am lost in the distance, & it will require
1 •much thought & study to appropriate your ideas’. Besides, Mill extolled Tocqueville’s 
achievements, saying that he hfad changed the face of political philosophy by taking the 
examination of the causes of the tendencies of modem society ‘into a region both of height 
& of depth, which no one before you had entered’ and that ‘all previous argumentation and 
speculation in such matters appears but child’s play now '.139 After reading Democracy in 
America //, Mill accepted Tocqueville’s view that stagnation and immobility were the real 
dangers to democratic society as a scientifically established truth. For Mill, this was a truth 
to be defended ‘envers et contre tous with tenfold pertinacity'. At the end of the letter. Mill 
fully expressed his admiration for Tocqueville:
Though I am not a very regular correspondent you may believe me when 1 say that 
there is no living man in Europe whom I esteem more highly or of whose friendship
136 Ibid., p. 261.
137 See ibid., p. 272.
138 J.S. Mill, Earlier Letters, 1812-1848 , (CIV), XIII, p. 434.
139 Ibid., p. 434.
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I should be more proud than I am of yours. Unfortunately I have only one means of 
showing it, but that I have used freely, for your name somehow finds itself under 
my pen almost whenever I write.140
In the period between 1835 and 1840 Mill ‘put together the strands of the past with the 
filaments of the present, and it ended with the assertion of his independent position’.141 In 
accepting it as an established truth that stagnation and immobility were real dangers in 
democratic society. Mill become indebted to Tocqueville as the most powerful influence in 
the re-framing of his thought. As the tyranny of the majority was the source of that 
stagnation, because it stifled individuality and diversity, and imposed uniformity, it should 
be prevented in order to allow individuals and communities to improve. In his 
Autobiography, Mill admitted that the reading of Democracy in America I initiated his shift 
from an ideal of democracy in which there was no concern with the tyranny of majority to 
the modified form of democracy which was later set forth in Considerations on
I -PRepresentative Government. “ According to Mill. Democracy in America I caused this 
shift because it pointed out in a more specific manner than he had ever seen before both the 
excellences and the dangers of democracy. He and Tocqueville saw democracy as ‘an 
inevitable result of human progress' whose dangers should be mitigated. Mill thought that 
Democracy in America I pointed out the direction that his political theory would follow in 
the future. However, he stressed that ‘the consequent modifications in my practical political 
creed were spread over many years’.143 These modifications occurred mainly because Mill
140 Ibid.. p. 435.
141 J.M. Robson, The Improvement o f  M ankind: The Social and Political Thought o f  John Stuart Mill, p. 32.
142 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography. (CW). I, p. 199.
143 Ibid., p. 201.
changed his strategy for counteracting the tyranny of the majority. In the late eighteen- 
thirties and early forties, he aimed to establish in civil society a power to rival that of the 
masses. From the early fifties on, Mill showed a growing interest in designing institutions 
to oppose the tyranny of the majority and paid especial attention to institutions related to 
the voting process. His concern with the mechanics of voting during that period reflected 
his increasing doubts regarding the people’s ability to choose suitable representatives. Mill 
believed it to be important to organise the voting process in a way that allowed everyone to 
be equally represented: each minority by a minority, the majority by the majority. This 
resulted in a problem of accountability, because, if the educated minorities were excluded 
from government, the popular majority would rule unchecked and impose uniformity. 
Furthermore, a voting process which excluded the educated part of the population would 
tend to generate a mediocre leadership.
It is, nevertheless, important to note that, in designing institutions to prevent the absolute 
control of society by any sort of group, Mill’s intention was still to find a power capable of 
rivalling that of the masses and enabling minorities to be represented in parliament. In other 
words, though he was searching for a new answer, the problem was basically the same: as it 
was inevitable that the main force in society would find its way into government, how was 
it possible to keep such a force accountable, and thus avoid the tyranny of the majority?
It is easy to recognise Tocqueville's influence both in Mill's attempt to find in society a 
power to rival that of the masses, and in his efforts to facilitate the participation of educated 
minorities in political institutions. It is important to bear in mind that Mill’s notion of
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accountability embodied both the attempt to provide guarantees against government 
misrule, and to promote individual and social improvement.
2.3. SOME PROBLEMS REGARDING MILL AND TOCQUEVILLE
It is important to provide a detailed assessment of Tocqueville’s influence on Mill because 
this thesis assumes that both On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government 
were attempts to answer questions posed by Tocqueville. Thus, the system of democratic 
self-government that Mill proposed in Considerations on Representative Government was 
complemented by the ‘principle of liberty’ developed in On Liberty.144 The latter was 
designed to protect individuals in the pursuit of their own good in their own way; and the 
former, to provide an institutional framework that guaranteed the possibility of such 
pursuit. Mill knew that the ‘principle of liberty’ that he worked out in On Liberty in order 
to promote diversity and original thinking could not be effective if parliament contained 
only representatives of the majority. The presence of those who upheld standards different 
from those widely accepted by the masses was vital to the creation of the antagonism of 
ideas that made progress possible and rendered the majority accountable. Given that Mill 
adopted Tocqueville's idea that the tyranny of the majority impoverished society, an 
assessment of Tocqueville's influence on Mill is important in order to provide a clear 
understanding of the importance of accountability in Mill’s theory of democracy. It is. 
therefore, important to survey the main problems raised by commentators regarding the
144 See B. Baum, Re-reading Pow er and Freedom in John Stuart Mill, (Toronto: Toronto University Press,
2000), p. 271.
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relationship between Mill and Tocqueville, in order to clarify their affinities and 
differences.
When he published his tribute to Armand Carrel in 1837, Mill stated that a new political 
philosophy had arisen which was superior to those that already existed. He added that 
Democracy in America I was the highest expression of that new philosophy.146 Mill never 
retracted this opinion and, furthermore, he reiterated it in the review of Democracy in 
America //, stating that Tocqueville had established it as a scientific truth that stagnation 
was the most potent threat to democracy. Despite this, the extent to which Mill was 
influenced by Tocqueville remains a disputed question. Some commentators think that 
other authors exerted an influence on Mill that was equal to, if not greater than, that exerted 
by Tocqueville. Here, Tocqueville is deemed to be the single most important influence on 
Mill, who, nonetheless, had other long-lasting influences.
I.W. Mueller dedicates a chapter of John Stuart Mill and French Thought to analysing the 
influence of Tocqueville on Mill.146 According to Mueller, Tocqueville recognised the 
phenomenon of individualism in modem society. Individualism was a new kind of attitude 
on the part of the citizens, who pay attention to their family and friends, and willingly left 
society at large.147 Mueller points out that Tocqueville feared the stregthening 
individualism, because it raised barriers between the individuals themselves, who could
145 See J.S. Mill, Arm and Carrel. (C\V), XX, pp. 169-215. Armand Carrel (1800-1836) was a Republican 
French journalist who died in a duel on 22 July 1836. Mill considered Carrel to be the prototype o f the 
Philosophic Radical: a man o f  action and a defender o f both democracy and liberty, a combination which was 
not common in France at that time.
146 See I.W. Mueller, John Stuart Mill and French Thought, (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press. 1956), pp. 
134-69.
147 See ibid., p. 141.
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easily become victims of despotism when thus isolated from their fellow-citizens. For 
Mueller, the solutions Tocqueville presented to the problem raised by individualism were 
basically the same as those prescribed by Mill. According to Mueller, Tocqueville 
advocated ‘free institutions, particularly on the local level, to foster the active and voluntary
148participation of the individual in the life of community’. But Mueller adds that Mill 
accepted Tocqueville’s idea that it was necessary to encourage people’s participation in 
institutions that united them with their fellow-citizens in common pursuits and contributed 
to making the government under which they lived accountable for its acts. Mueller also 
believes that Mill owed to Tocqueville the idea that talent was important to democratic 
government; the conviction that political despotism occured when the masses were the sole 
source of authority in society; the notion that the majority was likely to misuse its powers 
by wronging its adversaries; and the conception that local institutions were essential to 
further civic education.149 Mueller thinks that Mill ‘was never to forget de Tocqueville’s 
warning that democracy alone could not guarantee the most important freedom of the 
individual, the freedom to develop and strengthen his best inner potentialities’.150 For 
Mueller, this is the sort of freedom that Mill intended to promote in On Liberty (1859). In 
addition. Mueller shows that in Recent Writers on Reform (1859) Mill expressed the view 
that, where a considerable degree of institutional improvement had not yet been achieved, 
reforms could not be made without the support of traditional sentiment.l>] This seems to 
accord with Tocqueville’s idea that mores were essential to the promotion of liberty.
148 Ibid.
149 See ibid.. pp. 145, 162, 155, 158-9.
L]° Ibid., p. 169.
IM See ibid., p. 186.
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Overall, Mueller assumes that Mill owed all the relevant achievements of his political 
philosophy to Tocqueville.
In H.O. Pappe’s view, the influence of Tocqueville on Mill was less than Mueller suggests. 
For Pappe, ‘there was clearly a give-and-take between Mill and Tocqueville in their 
application of the long tradition of democratic theory’.152 Thus, both Mill and Tocqueville 
owed their commitment to educating the majority and to securing expertise in government 
to the democratic tradition, rather than Mill being indebted specifically to Tocqueville for 
it. Pappe pointed out that Mill never gave up his belief in education as a prerequisite of 
democracy, although later ‘in his reaction to his father’s thought, Mill grew more sceptical 
as regards the teachability of the masses’.153 Mill, then, came to reject James Mill’s view 
that the middle classes would guide the lower ranks of society in a common political 
agenda. According to Pappe, therefore, it is incorrect to assume that Tocqueville made Mill 
aware of the importance of intellectual excellence both in government and society. Besides, 
Pappe argues. Mill disagreed with Tocqueville about the source of the tyranny of the 
majority, and never acknowledged Tocqueville as the person who made him aware of the 
threats to diversity and individuality in modem society. Pappe also points out that the 
criticism Mill levelled at Bentham for assuming ‘the uniformity of man in all times and 
places’ in Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy (1833) showed that Mill recognised the 
importance of national character for the design of democratic institutions before coming 
under the influence of Tocqueville, and so Mueller is wrong to say that Tocqueville made
l5~ H.O. Pappe, ‘Mill and Tocqueville*. Journal o f  Hisiorx o f  Ideas, 24 (1964), p. 127.
153 Ibid., pp. 127-28.
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Mill aware of this.154 In summary, Pappe thinks that Mueller does not take into account the 
influence of other authors over Mill’s thought, and mistakenly assumes that every similarity 
between Mill and Tocqueville was a result of Tocqueville’s influence on Mill. G.E. 
Varouxakis agrees with the criticism that Pappe levells against Mueller. For Varouxakis, 
Guizot’s view that European civilisation had not perished because a struggle between 
opposing forces kept it progressing, was a significant influence on Mill despite being 
largely neglected in Mueller’s account. Varouxakis describes the importance of both Guizot 
and Tocqueville for Mill’s political thought:
What happened, meanwhile, was that [Mill] had read the works of Guizot and 
Tocqueville. The former warned him in general and rather vaguely - but not the less 
decisively for this reason - that the continuous struggle between different forces and 
principles, and diversity of modes of life and thought as well as multiplicity of 
centres of power and influence, were indispensable to the preservation of Europe’s 
progressive civilisation and to its improvement. It was against this background that 
Tocqueville came almost simultaneously to warn him of the characteristic defects of 
the uncontrolled ascendancy of popular power.155
Siedentop criticises the way Mill developed the theoretical achievements of French 
liberalism. According to Siedentop. in his youth Mill upheld a sort of liberalism that paid
154 See ibid., p. 138.
155 G.E. Varouxakis. ‘John Stuart Mill on French Thought. Politics, and National Character’, (London: Ph.D, 
1995), p. 41.
85
no attention to the ways in which social organisations shape people’s mentality.156 
Siedentop acknowledge that, after becoming acquainted with the French liberals, Mill 
introduced into his political theory, and especially in On Liberty and Considerations on 
Representative Government, ‘themes from Tocqueville - the danger of centralisation, 
threats to local liberty and variety, the moralising role of politics’.157 For Siedentop, Mill 
adopted some of the conclusions of Tocqueville and other French liberals, but without 
adopting their underlying sociological method: ‘what Mill has done is introduce some of 
the conclusions of the French liberals, without introducing their premises - the theory of 
social change on which they founded their political arguments'.1^ 8 In the end, Siedentop 
believes that Mill’s allegiance ‘to the less historical model’ of British liberalism left him 
unable to address questions such as self-development and free ‘moeurs' because they 
emerged from particular social changes that Mill’s method could neither detect nor explain.
J.C. Lamberti believes that, despite belonging to different traditions, Mill’s and 
Tocqueville's political thought were complementary.1^9 According to Lamberti. Mill 
thought that Democracy in America was ‘the First instance of application of a truly 
scientific method to politics despite the fact that, therein, Tocqueville presented an 
aristocratic idealisation of the English constitutional government.160 Mill avoided dwelling 
on this minor criticism because he felt that, apart from a few ideas still tainted by an overly
156 See L. Siedentop, T w o  Liberal Traditions', in A. Ryan (ed). The Idea o f  Freedom: Essays in Honour o f  
Isaiah Berlin , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 172-3.
157 Ibid., p. 173.
158 Ibid.
159 See J.C. Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two D em ocracies , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989),
p. 188.
160 See ibid., p. 110.
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aristocratic view, Tocquevilles’s conclusions leaned towards radicalism.161 According to 
Lamberti, Mill and Tocqueville believed that, by granting rights to all citizens, democracy 
instilled a spirit of enterprise and responsibility. It was important to strengthen society by 
mobilising ‘the energies of all and not allowing men to remain isolated from one 
another’.162 If men were united, they were less likely to become victims of despotism. 
Lamberti also shows that Mill and Tocqueville believed that the fact that the American 
Constitution gave wide powers to judges was not dangerous to society. They saw no risk in 
judges basing ‘their decisions on the Constitution rather than on law’, and in not enforcing 
any law that they deemed unconstitutional. Both Mill and Tocqueville regarded the 
judiciary as a counterweight to the otherwise incontrovertible power of the people.163 They 
would not, therefore, be prepared to vest such wide powers in judges in societies where 
there was no such otherwise incontrovertible power to oppose them. In Lamberti's view. 
Mill and Tocqueville favoured representative democracy because their main concern was 
not to make people govern in a particular way, but to find ‘ways to make the people choose 
those most capable of governing, and then to give them enough power to direct affairs in 
their broad outline but not in detail and not as to means of execution’.164 But Lamberti also 
recognises differences between the two authors. He points out that Mill was far less 
enthusiastic about the applicability of the model of the New England township in England 
than Tocqueville. For Lamberti, Mill and Tocqueville saw local government as the primary 
source of political education, but Mill placed a higher value on elections than on direct 
participation. The reason for this was a simple one: Mill rated the role of rationally-built
162
163
See ibid., p. 110.
Ibid.
See ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 106.
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institutions, such as electoral ones, higher than the role of local traditions in the
implementation of democracy in society. Lamberti asserts that Mill advocated a rational
democracy in which citizens controlled their rulers but did not participate directly in
government. The implication was that people were able to judge policies, but were not fit
for the business of making them. Lamberti adds that Mill knew Tocqueville’s conception of
political education remarkably well, but nonetheless did not accept that political life had a
value in itself.165 For Lamberti, Tocqueville saw political freedom as the most important
way of combating the evils of democracy, while Mill ascribed the task of preventing the
evils of democracy to a vigorous agricultural along with a leisured class.166 According to
Lamberti. Tocqueville thought that a democratic society requires not only free institutions
but also a certain level of education and tradition of liberty in order to balance private and
public interest. The role Tocqueville ascribed to ‘towns and associations was to teach
individuals anew that they were indeed citizens, as well as to understand that private
interests and public interests are inextricably intertwined’.167 Lamberti does not accept
Mill’s claim that Tocqueville confused the ‘trend towards greater equality with other
1tendencies of modem commercial society'. For Lamberti, Mill’s suggestion that 
Tocqueville understood equality of condition as something that was different and 
dissociated from the effects of growing prosperity was wrong. In Lamberti’s account, 
Tocqueville saw them as deeply connected, because equality of condition was a 
presupposition of individualism which emerged initially as a form of corruption of 
aristocratic society, and later turned out to be a ‘childhood disorder’ of the democratic
165 See ibid., pp. 102-3.
166 See J.C. Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two D em ocracies, p. 188.
167 Ibid., p. 174.
168 Ibid., p. 183.
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experiences of modem industrial society. Lamberti believes Tocqueville was aware of the 
fact that ‘the allure of wealth, heightened by the progress of industry, always threatens to 
dissuade individuals from devoting their time and energy to their responsibilities as 
citizens’.169 Lamberti admits that Tocqueville did not fully clarify the relative importance 
of the various causes of individualism, but claims that he prescribed political freedom as 
the remedy for all of them. For Lamberti, the concept of individualism which Tocqueville 
defended is more complex than the one Mill attributed to him because it combined concerns 
about the consequences of the withering of intermediary bodies in society, the end of the 
aristocracy, and the growth of commercial and industrial prosperity. If this is correct, one 
should then ask why Tocqueville did not object when Mill said that Tocqueville ascribed to 
democracy effects that he should have ascribed to the emergence of commercial society. 
Lamberti admits that Tocqueville never answered this question. He also notes that Mill 
mentioned, as a counter-example to Tocqueville’s account, the fact that the social effects 
that Tocqueville ascribed to democracy in Democracy in America II were operating in 
England, although the latter was an aristocratic society. Lamberti thinks Mill's counter­
example is unfortunate, in that the fact that England had the good fortune to have the 
effects of democracy mingled with the heritage of aristocracy without destroying it did not 
prove that Tocqueville's account was incorrect in relation to the specific circumstances of 
American society. According to Lamberti, Mill failed to realise that Tocqueville's 
sociological model was an instrument of comparative analysis, ‘capable of revealing the 
way in which tendencies associated with one type of society can reinforce or oppose 
tendencies associated with another type of society'.170 It could be used, for example, as the
Ibid., p. 187.
170 Ibid., p. 36.
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basis for an investigation into why the English middle classes combined democratic and 
aristocratic tendencies, while in France the middle classes rejected such a combination.171 
According to Lamberti, Mill interpreted Tocqueville’s method of social analysis as if it 
‘were a blueprint for historical development, which as Mill understands it tends in one 
direction only, towards greater equality and civilisation, where “greater” is taken in almost 
a quantitative sense’.172 Lamberti regards this as misconceived because Tocqueville did not 
see advances in society as a product of a linear evolution, but rather as a result of the
173exercise of political freedom. Mill and Tocqueville had different convictions about the 
ability of democratic governments to run the administration of society, although both were 
sceptical of the people’s ability to adequately choose their own representatives.174 For 
Tocqueville. democratic governments were not suitable for European countries because 
they tended to be unstable and to spend excessively. Besides, he thought that the 
institutions of democracy tended to ‘aggravate certain inevitable defects of the democratic 
social state, particularly envy, with the result that the ablest people either shun or are 
excluded from public office’.17:1 According to Lamberti, Tocqueville portrayed Americans 
as a chosen people ‘able to tolerate democracy only because of their exceptional qualities of 
enlightenment, mores, and political education’.176 This did not mean that Tocqueville 
regarded the institutions adopted in America as the only ones or the best ones that a 
democracy could adopt.177 His social analysis allowed for comparisons which could help in 
the assessment of democratic institutions from elsewhere, but it was necessary ‘to
171 See ibid.
172 Ibid.
172 See ibid., p. 167.
174 See ibid., p. 107.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid., p. 108.
177 See ibid., p. 107.
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distinguish between what was specific to American government and what was 
characteristic of democracy in general’.178 Tocqueville did not present the institutions of 
America as a model to be indiscriminately adopted by other countries that had different 
mores and political institutions. Lamberti sees Tocqueville’s failure to point out that the 
greatest threat to liberty in France came from the government, whereas in America it came 
from society, as the main deficiency of his account of American democracy.179 Tocqueville
praised highly Mill’s reviews of Democracy in America, regarding him as the only person
180who had fully understood his work. Mill owed his awareness of the risks of centralisation 
to Tocqueville, and certainly both authors disagreed with Guizot’s view that centralisation 
had brought more prosperity and grandeur to France than local institutions could have 
offered had they been in place.181
This exposition of the various accounts of the relationship between Mill’s and 
Tocqueville’s political theory has shown that there is general agreement that the central 
tenets of On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government are closely related 
to the main political concerns of Tocqueville, especially those displayed in Democracy in 
America. There is no agreement about the degree of influence Tocqueville exerted on Mill, 
but no commentator denies the existence of such influence. An analysis of these accounts, 
in order to achieve a proper assessment of the relationship between Mill and Tocqueville. 
will be undertaken in the next section.
178 Ibid.
179 See ibid., p. 10.
180 See ibid.. p. 35.
181 See ibid.
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2.4. MILL, TOCQUEVILLE, AND DEMOCRACY
Mueller correctly affirms that Tocqueville made a great contribution to Mill’s thought by 
showing him that local institutions were vital to the promotion of civic education, that 
majorities tended to misuse their powers, and that democracy was not a sufficient guarantee 
of freedom because of its tendency to make the masses the single power in society. 
However, in relation to customary morality, Mueller fails to see that Mill attached less 
importance than Tocqueville to the support of traditional sentiments in the formation of 
political institutions. Mill did not want such sentiments to be disregarded, but he ascribed a 
more important role to rationally-built institutions in preventing the excesses of democracy. 
Tocqueville pointed out the fact that there were habits and pratices that were essential to. 
promote civic culture, in that they united people for common purposes and moulded the 
social relations. For Tocqueville, the habit of voluntary association, for example, was an 
important force operating at local level. In the township, the original political unit of 
America, voluntary associations cemented existing loyalties between people and thus 
facilitated their involvement in public matters. He thought that religious beliefs were 
similarly instrumental in strengthening the bonds of attachment between people, and 
thereby making them more united. For Tocqueville, it was ‘religion that leads to 
enlightenment; it is the observance of divine laws that guides man to freedom’.182 
Moreover, he regarded enduring religious beliefs as safeguards against the wavering tides 
of public opinion, which were likely to produce anarchy and inconstancy. Such enduring 
beliefs and sentiments were the main security against the excesses of democracy. Mill 
accepted that some of these mores were important, but in his mature thought he emphasised
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the need to create political institutions, rather than to reinforce social habits for the purpose 
of ensuring liberty. He devoted especial attention to the electoral process. Among the 
participatory institutions that Mill prescribed, the electoral were those he praised the most. 
His concern with the electoral process permeated Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, 
Considerations on Representative Government, as well as his activities as an MP. 
Certainly, if Mill had ascribed the same importance to customary morality as Tocqueville 
did, he would have gone further in recommending them. The root of the problem of 
Mueller’s account is that he does not recognise the primacy of electoral institutions in 
Mill’s theory of participation. But this is not something peculiar to Mueller. D.H.
Thompson, for example, argues that Mill’s participatory theory offered little guidance for
18 ^participation in juries, local government, voluntary, groups and trade unions. Thompson 
fails to realise, however, that Mill believed that by giving individuals a freedom to live their 
lives in their own way, and by implementing a political framework that favoured engaged 
reasoning and accountability, the habit of participation in the political system, especially in 
elections, would tend to spread to other participatory institutions of smaller scope.
Pappe is correct to criticise Mueller's failure to see that the need for expertise in 
government was not something that Mill specifically owed to Tocqueville, but something 
that both Mill and Tocqueville owed to early nineteenth-century thinkers. Madame de Stael, 
Benjamin Constant, and the so-called doctrinaires - Royer-Collard, Barante and Guizot - 
were amongst those who helped to make Mill aware of the importance of expertise in
,8~ A. de Tocqueville. Dem ocracy in Am erica, p. 42.18^ See D.F. Thompson, John Stuart M ill and Representative Government, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 1976), p. 179. For a different view see J.T. Paderson, ‘On the Educational Function o f  Political 
Participation: a Comparative Analysis o f John Stuart M ill's Theory and Contemporary Survey Research
government and showed him the need to apply a historical method to the study of society. 
Guizot, for example, argued that political issues should be taken care of by the so called 
capacities, that is the bourgeois elite, while people were gradually educated to achieve
i §4 ♦standards compatible with the responsibility that citizenship implied. Nor should it be 
forgotten that concern with expertise in government was not alien to the utilitarian 
tradition.185 Pappe is also correct in saying that Mill’s criticism, in Remarks on Bentham's 
Philosophy (1833), of Bentham’s allegiance to the abstract model of the eighteenth-century 
showed that Mill recognised the importance of national character to the design of 
institutions before he had came under the influence of Tocqueville. In this respect it is 
important to stress that Mill thought that Coleridge was amongst the influences that had led 
him to realise that ‘political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different stages 
of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different institutions'.186 While 
Mill’s criticism of Bentham for his lack of consideration for the importance of national 
character shows that Pappe is correct in criticising Mueller’s failure to do justice to the 
influence of other authors on Mill, this is not to deny that Tocqueville’s influence was
I 87strong. Mill himself evidently regarded Tocqueville as the most important influence for 
his future intellectual development because none of the other authors provided a 
sociological model for a comparative analysis grounded on a detailed account of the 
evolution of democratic institutions in France and America. This was an essential
Findings', in G.W. Smith (ed). John Stuart M ill's Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments, 4  vols., 
(London: Routledge. 1998), iii. 223-24.
184 See J.G. Merquior, O Liberalismo Antigo e Moderno, (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1991), pp. 86-7; A. 
Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World, (London: Routledge, 
1990), p. 174; L. Siedentop. ‘Two Liberal Traditions', pp. 156, 165, 172-3.
185 See F. Rosen. Jeremx Bentham and Representative Democracy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 195- 
99.
186 J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 169. See also K.C. O ’Rourke, ‘John Stuart Mill and Freedom o f  
Expression: The Genesis o f a Theory', p. 102.
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theoretical acquisition for Mill, because it permitted him to re-articulate his political 
philosophy by combining the longing for institutional reform that he had imbibed from his 
utilitarian upbringing with the other insights he had received through the late 1830s, 
especially from Guizot and Coleridge. The main contribution of the former was to show 
Mill that the persistent struggle between different ways of life and thought, as well as a 
multiplicity of influences - Germanic, Roman, and Christian - were vital to mantain 
European improvement.188 The main contribution of the latter was to convince Mill that in 
order for intellectual progress to be possible, those less endowed intellectually should be 
guided by those of higher moral and intellectual standing. Moreover, for Coleridge, this 
process of intellectual improvement required active self-cultivation and an environment in
189which varied experiences could occur.
Tocqueville forewarned Mill that, if unchecked, the ascendancy of democracy would bring 
about a society in which authority and tradition were not accepted as guides for the actions 
of the individuals.190 Tocqueville thought that centralisation and the atomisation of social 
life were processes intrinsically connected to the spreading of democracy. He believed that 
these processes left individuals isolated before the central power, since they led to the 
withering of intermediary bodies which would otherwise enable them to resist the central 
power.191 Mill knew that, deprived of the bonds that tied them to members of society other 
than their families, individuals were prone to follow the majority, because, being isolated 
they were unable to oppose prevailing trends. Thus, where democratic tendencies were not
187 See J.S. Mill, Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy, (C\V), X, pp. 9, 16-7.
188 See J.S. Mill, Essays on French History and Historians. (CW ), XX. pp. 229, 270.
189 See C. Turk, Coleridge and Mill: A Study o f  Influence. (Adershot: Averbury, 1988), pp. 188-9, 194-5.
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checked, neither the struggle between opposing forces prescribed by Guizot’s theory of 
history, nor the self-cultivation prescribed by Coleridge, was likely to take place since both 
processes presupposed diversity. Mill found Tocqueville’s historic-sociological method 
helpful because it showed how mores, laws, and institutions could help to mitigate the risks 
of democratic ascendancy. Tocqueville’s method did not provide a blueprint for history, but 
it made intelligible the combination of causes that were eliminating the intermediary bodies 
of society and threatening individuality and diversity. Tocqueville’s comparative 
descriptions of the institutions of democratic societies were thus useful in showing how to 
combine mores and political institutions so as to make individual and social improvement 
possible. Overall. Mill saw in Tocqueville’s sociology a theoretical framework that 
encompassed the main concerns of both Guizot and Coleridge and, in addition, provided a 
rich institutional analysis that enhanced Mill's understanding of democracy by making him 
aware of the need to multiply the centres of power and further local freedoms in order to set 
up safeguards against the tyranny of the majority.
Siedentop correctly asserts that Mill introduced Tocquevillian themes, such as the threats to 
local liberty and variety and the moralising role of politics, in On Libert}' and 
Considerations on Representative Government. These themes are generally associated with 
a conception of liberty that differed from that traditionally upheld by utilitarians, for whom
19°the main obstacle to general happiness was aristocratic privilege. “ It is easy to recognise 
that Tocqueville’s fear of the tyranny of the majority reverberated in On Libert}', where it
190 See J.S. Schapiro, ‘Alexis de Tocqueville, Pioneer o f  Democratic Liberalism in France', Political Science 
Quarterly, 4 (1942), p. 545.
191 See A. de Tocqueville, D em ocracy in America, p. 485.
193was included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard. In On 
Liberty, Mill argued the idea that tyranny was not restricted to acts of government, because 
society also practices tyranny against its members, leaving them with ‘fewer means to 
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul 
itself.194 For him, public opinion was the prevailing force in society and represented the 
instincts and tendencies of the masses.195 Public opinion, therefore, was the main agency of 
the tyranny of the majority and was becoming increasingly powerful because the 
institutions that could provide support for those who disagreed with the predominant values 
were being destroyed by the influences of the age.196 The main object of On Liberty was to 
protect individuality against ‘the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling’, the 
‘tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, 
and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its 
ways’.197 This echoed Tocqueville’s concern, expressed in Democracy in America, that the 
threat to minorities came primarily not from laws or public officials, but from religious, 
political and racial antipathies, and from the dispensing power of all laws. As an example 
of where this occurred, Tocqueville noted that in ‘the states where slavery was abolished, 
the Negro has been given electoral rights; but if he presents himself to vote, he runs a risk 
to his life. Oppressed, he can complain, but he finds only whites among his judges’.198 He
142 See T.H. Quaker, ‘John Stuart Mill, Disciple o f Tocqueville', Western Political Quarterly, 4 (1960). p. 
881.
193 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty.(CW ). XVIII, p. 219.
199 Ibid., p. 220.
See ibid., p. 268.
196 See ibid., p. 275.
197 Ibid., p. 220.
198 A. de Tocqueville, D em ocracy in America, p. 329.
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did not regard this as an isolated case, but as an example of an increasingly common 
situation.
That the tyranny of public opinion resulted in mediocrity was another theme present in both 
Democracy in America and On Liberty. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville stated that 
the despotism of public opinion produced ‘a crowd of like and equal men who revolve on 
themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar pleasures with which they fill 
their souls. Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all the 
others’.199 In On Liberty, Mill asserted that those whose opinions went by the name of 
public opinion were sometimes a different sort of people. In Britain they were principally 
the middle classes, and in America the white population, but ‘they are always a mass, that
7 Of)is to say, a collective mediocrity'.'" The masses were so overwhelmingly powerful that 
governments tended to become organs of their wishes. They would rise above mediocrity 
only if they let themselves be guided by a highly gifted minority.201 Mill was not arguing 
that the highly gifted minority should seize power and impose its will. Rather, he thought 
the best thing that average men could do was to pay attention to those exceptional 
individuals who were courageous enough to act differently from the masses.202 Mill 
believed that, in order to oppose such a strong tendency to similarity among mankind, 
‘nonconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely 
because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in
199 Ibid., p. 663.
200 J.S. Mill. On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, p. 268.
201 See ibid., p. 269.
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order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric’. Mill expressed his 
conviction that Europe was ‘advancing towards the Chinese ideal of making all people 
alike’.204 He mentioned the fact that, in The Old Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville 
had observed ‘how much more the Frenchmen of the present day resembled one another, 
than did those even of the last generation’.205 Mill believed that in the past people had lived 
in different ranks, while in his time people ‘read the same things, listen to the same things, 
see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same 
objects’."06 In Considerations on Representative Government, Mill showed real concern 
with the way that the representative system was then operating. He argued that it was 
important to give a fair representation to educated minorities in order to prevent the 
majority from controlling society and imposing uniformity.207 If minorities were properly 
represented, they would generate a centre of resistance which would challenge prevailing 
opinions and create the competition between ideas that was the basis for individual and 
societal improvement. Mill also hoped to avoid the emergence of mediocre leadership, 
thinking that the ‘deficiency in high mental qualifications, is one to which it is generally
-)r\o
supposed that popular government is liable in a greater degree than any other'."
In order to raise the standard of the leadership. Mill suggested, in Considerations on 
Representative Government, that the political system should be framed in such a way that 
inferior minds were brought into contact with superior minds. The superior minds would 
inspire the inferior through their more enlarged understanding, while at the same time, the
203 Ibid.
2(M Ibid., p. 274.205 t
former would benefit from the local knowledge of the latter.209 This recommendation was
made in the context of giving guidance for the composition of local bodies, but its
applicability to national government should not be overlooked. Mill wanted educated
minorities in parliament so that they could perform an educational role. This dovetailed
with the idea expressed in On Liberty that, in order to raise the masses above mediocrity, a
gifted minority should lead them. In the end, both On Liberty and Considerations on
Representative Government were responses to Tocqueville’s fear of the threat that a mass
society dominated by an unfettered taste for material well-being necessarily posed to
individuality and diversity. The main danger was that individuals, concentrating on their
own affairs and those of their families, would leave the administration of society in the
hands of a monolithic and centralised power on which they depended for everything."
This sort of power would tend to acquire the means to interfere arbitrarily in the lives of
individuals, since their control over the affairs of society would establish bonds of
dependence which would be difficult to break. In such circumstances, the more that people
were devoted to their own affairs, the more the bonds of dependence would be
strengthened. In Democracy in America and On Liberty, as well as in Considerations on
Representative Government, political education and involvement in local institutions were
1^1vital components of the well-being of society." What has been said so far is enough to 
show that Siedentop’s claim that Mill introduced Tocquevillian themes in both On Liberty
07 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 452.
208 Ibid., p. 436.
209 See ibid., p. 539.
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and Considerations on Representative Government is correct. More than that, such themes 
were at the very heart of Mill’s political philosophy.
According to Siedentop, Mill’s political philosophy is puzzling because he incorporated 
some of the conclusions of French liberalism without adopting the theory of social change 
that underpinned them.212 For Siedentop, Mill’s political philosophy thus lacks a theory of 
historical change that might have made it coherent and intelligible. There is no doubt that 
one would have expected Mill to have said more about social change, because in Mill’s 
own view the possibility of evaluating historical institutions depended on identifying the 
links between a given stage in society and the one that succeeded it. For him, every age 
provided the standard by which to interpret the coming age. In ‘The Spirit of the Age I’, 
published in the Examiner on 9 January 1831, Mill asserted that, ‘it is only in the present 
that we can know the future; it is only through the present that it is in our power to 
influence that which is to come’.213 Besides, Mill explicitly admitted that, in order to be 
properly grounded, ‘any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory 
of human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of history’.214 For him, 
however, the identification of such links was not sufficient to provide grounds to evaluate 
the progress of society. This was because such an evaluation demanded a wider theoretical 
framework that connected generalisations about history with generalisations about human 
nature.21:1 Mill’s project of a science of ethology, with the purpose of showing how the 
development of human character was modified by historical tendencies, was part of his
Government, (CW), XIX, pp. 535, 537, 538, 539 and A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 56-64, 
66-75, 487.
See L. Siedentop, T w o  Liberal Traditions’, p. 173.
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attempt to identify the relationship between the various stages of history and the 
development of the mental faculties of people.216 The identification of this relationship 
would provide grounds for the identification of ‘the institutions most appropriate to carry
 ^ 217each particular society to the next stage of progress of which it was susceptible’. Mill 
abandoned his project of an ethology, a science dedicated to discover the laws of human 
character, ‘explaining how it comes to be and how it varies from time to time and from 
place to place’.218 However, aware that his political theory needed a theory of history in 
order to render it coherent and meaningful. Mill assumed a conception of historical change 
that, although insufficient to underpin his political theory, provided him with appropriate 
tools for institutional analysis. Mill saw history moving towards an equalisation of taste and 
opinion, because the differences ‘among individuals in various classes, occupations, and 
regions are gradually disappearing, as people read the same publications, attend similar 
schools, and exercise the same political rights’.219 He believed that this increasing 
standardisation of taste and opinion favoured the power of the masses, and precluded 
deference to any sort of authority other than the authority of the majority.220 It has already 
been said that Mill opposed such a standardisation because it stifled the diversity that was 
essential to allow individuals both to choose the best way of improving themselves and to 
produce the conflicting points of view that improved society. So, for Mill, in societies 
where the influence of the the majority was unopposed, the prerequisites for improvement 
did not exist. Mill did not ascribe the historical propensity towards the equalisation of taste
~14 J.S. Mill. Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 169.
215 See J.S. Mill, A System o f Logic, (CW), VIII, pp. 911-17.
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and opinion to any single factor, but thought that it was an overall tendency of modem 
commercial society. Mill’s efforts to strengthen the role of educated minorities in political 
institutions was designed ‘to counteract the levelling of intelligence and growth of 
conformity in society’.221 His insistence on promoting competence by adopting Hare’s 
system of proportional representation in Considerations on Representative Government can 
be properly appreciated only if one understands Mill’s conception of history. Mill 
advocated Hare’s system on the grounds that its implementation would provide a fair 
representation for minorities who dissented from the patterns adopted by the increasingly
O')')
dominant majority.""" The participation of the talented candidates would be vital in 
counteracting what he regarded as the movement of history towards uniformity. Mill hoped 
that educated minorities would keep the spirit of improvement alive, which he deemed to 
be possible only through a contest for dominium between conflicting powers in society.""'
He believed that, in order to promote improvement, social institutions should be framed so
as to oppose those social inequalities that undermined the condition of individuals as 
autonomous human beings by placing them under various sorts of tyranny.224 Such 
inequalities prevented people from acquiring the means that were necessary for happiness 
and were, therefore, against the spirit of Mill’s utilitarianism.22^  Mill believed that 
differences of taste and opinion were indispensable to move society forward because they 
created the ideological opposition that keeps the flame of improvement alive. However, he 
did not accept social inequalities which deprived individuals of the basic conditions of their
"° See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. (CW), XIX, pp. 148-50: On Liberty, (CW), 
XVIII, pp. 130-2: System o f Logic , (CW). VIII. pp. 924-5.
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~24 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, pp. 258-9.
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happiness. Social justice was a standard ‘towards which all institutions, and efforts of all 
virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible degree to converge’. " In other 
words, social inequalities should be tolerated to the extent that they did not compromise the 
well-being of society, but diversity should always be promoted because it was a 
prerequisite for human improvement in general. Thus, if the levelling of social inequality 
and legal privilege was generally beneficial for society, the standardisation of taste and
7 7 0
opinion was always detrimental. For Mill, historical improvement was a complex process 
that combined the removal of social inequality and the diversification of the social 
environment. He also believed that, as societies improve, the social feelings that were 
ingrained in human nature tended to become more powerful and to make people feel 
sympathy towards other members of society. But he thought that, ‘in the comparatively 
early state of human advancement in which we now live, a person cannot indeed feel that 
entireness of sympathy with all others’.229 He assumed this was the reason why, in many 
people, selfish feelings prevailed over altruistic ones. Mill argued that the sense of unity 
between individual and society should be prominent in education and in the organisation of 
social institutions. He associated historical improvement with the continual assertion of 
individuality, opposition between contending views and centres of power in society, the 
removal of social inequalities that undermined individuality, and the promotion of altruism 
and co-operation. He believed that, in civilised societies, people were willing to make 
sacrifice of some portion of individual will and to co-operate. Where such willingness did
See F.R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom : The M oral and Political Philosophy o f John Stuart 
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not exist, society would not benefit from shared effort and the exchange of experiences
230which might otherwise lead to improvement.
There is no doubt that these ideas gave Mill some grounds by which to evaluate historical 
changes and social institutions. For example, according to Mill's theory of history, the re­
establishment of slavery in a democratic society could not be seen as an instrument for 
improvement because it represented a change that undermined individuality and, therefore, 
did not lead towards a more advanced stage of society. He did not, however, supply the 
empirical generalisations which would have related trends of history to human nature and 
which he regarded as necessary to provide the grounds for the evaluation of historical 
change. Mill disapproved of the attempt of the French philosophers to establish the laws of 
progress which would enable them to predict future events.2"1 For him. this was 
inappropriate because the science of history could offer no more than conditional
predictions about social change. As A. Ryan points out, for Mill, ‘the pattern which 
historians may have discerned in historical change can at best be only an empirical law, a 
summation of particular facts, and not a causal law at all’.232 When Mill referred to social
improvement, he mainly had in mind the development of the moral and intellectual
capacities of human beings, and not simply material progress. He was aware that
civilisation did not progress homogeneously and in every aspect of its life: ‘we do not 
regard the age as either equally advanced or equally progressive in many kinds of 
improvement. In some it appears to us stationary, in some even retrograde".233
230 See J.S. Mill, Civilization, (CW), XVIII, p. 122.
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Overall, Mill saw history as moving towards a standardisation of taste and opinion, while 
his political theory promoted popular participation in the life of society and competence in 
government in order to counteract the nineteenth-century trend towards uniformity and to 
create the conditions for self-cultivation. Mill’s theory of history was not developed enough 
to provide an all-encompassing evaluation of improvements in national cultures, but it was 
largely in agreement with Tocqueville’s idea of multiplying the centres of power, 
promoting diversity, and strengthening civic education. Regarding American society in 
particular, Mill also saw the so-called enlightened self-interest that was all-pervasive in 
America as an important medicine in curing the ills of democracy. Tocqueville defined the 
enlightened self-interest as an individual's ‘willingness to put his private interests into 
balance with everyone else’s in order to determine the collective interest of the 
community’."' He showed that Americans ‘almost always know how to combine their own 
well-being with that of their fellow citizens'.23:>
Lamberti is correct to say that Mill and Tocqueville held the same views on the role of the 
judiciary in America, on the necessity of instilling a spirit of responsibility in society, and 
on the importance of competence in government. Lamberti's claim that Tocqueville failed 
to specify that the greatest threat to liberty in France came from the government, whereas in 
America it came from public opinion, is also correct. Tocqueville's deficiency in this 
respect contrasts with Mill's insight that the enlargement of the ‘province of government’ 
prevailed in the Continental nations, while in England and America restraints on mental
M A. Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and M odem  World, p. 118. 
~35 A. de Tocqueville, D em ocracy in Am erica , p. 501.
2^ 6freedom proceeded much more from public opinion. * Tocqueville was certainly aware 
that public opinion was the main source of the threat to liberty in America, but he did not 
use his comparative method of sociological analysis to come to a precise assessment of the 
roles of both state and public opinion in threatening liberty in America and in France. 
Lamberti’s perception that Mill ascribed a more important role to rationally-built 
institutions than to traditional sentiments in preventing the excesses of democracy, shows 
how sharp his account is. Most of Mill’s political thought and parliamentary activities were 
devoted to the analysis and implementation of political institutions, especially electoral 
ones. This is not at odds with Mill’s utilitarian faith in the possibility of improvement by 
means of political reform. He believed that the spirit of liberty should be promoted through 
voluntary association, and participation in local government, juries, and trade unions. 
Nevertheless, he thought that the government should be the main agency of national 
education, because ‘the most important point of excellence which any form of government 
can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves’/  The 
electoral process, therefore, was important because it determined the configuration of the 
government. Mill advocated the adoption of electoral institutions that provided due 
representation for minorities because governments would be able to perform their 
educational role only if superior intellects were found among their members. The problem 
was that, for Mill, government was always either in the hands, or passing into the hands, of 
whatever happen to be the strongest power in society, and superior intellects were not 
amongst those who constituted the strongest power in nineteenth-century Britain.238 Mill’s 
later political thought favoured rationally-built electoral institutions because he wanted to
See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, pp. 799, 935.
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ensure the presence of superior intellects into parliament. In other words, he wanted to 
bring inferior minds in contact with superior minds, ‘a contact which in the ordinary course
of life is altogether exceptional, and the want of which contributes more than anything else
1to keep the generality of mankind on one level of contented ignorance’." The presence of 
educated minorities in parliament was essential because otherwise it would simply reflect 
the wishes of the majority, which was both dangerous and impoverishing. Lamberti is also 
correct to stress that Mill’s conception of democracy gave a central role to the mechanisms 
of accountability. For Mill, a democratic government was above all one which was 
accountable to people. Democracy, therefore, did not mean primarily ‘that the people 
themselves govern, but that they have security for good government. This security they can
->4()not have by any other means than by retaining in their own hands the ultimate control'." 
Besides, as has been shown in the first chapter. Mill developed a radical conception of 
accountability that required both that those in power could be held accountable for their 
acts, and that individuals could be held accountable before their fellow-citizens for their 
votes. Tocqueville made Mill aware that it was imperative to render the masses 
accountable, for, as the main power in society, they could threaten diversity. Lamberti is 
not correct to say that Mill treated Tocqueville's method as if it were a blueprint for 
historical development. It has already been shown in the discussion of Siedentop’s account 
that Mill did not believe that history advanced in a linear evolution. For Mill, progress was 
neither a homogeneous movement nor simply related to material achievements. He rejected 
the idea that it was possible to find causal laws of progress, and did not expect 
Tocqueville’s sociology to offer either a blueprint for history or an abstract model of
~38 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 169.
_39 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 539.
democracy by which existing democracies could be evaluated. Mill praised Tocqueville’s 
account of democracy precisely because it offered a comparative historical analysis, 
incompatible with the idea that history was predictable. Lamberti criticises Mill for not 
having realised that Tocqueville’s view that democracy was the source of the tyranny of the 
majority did not preclude Tocqueville from accepting the view that the dynamic of 
industrial society was an additional factor which diverted people from public concerns and 
favoured the tyranny of the majority. Lamberti does not accept Mill’s claim that 
Tocqueville mis-attributed effects caused by the progress of national prosperity to the 
increasing equality of conditions, and ‘bound up in one abstract idea the whole of the
7 ,  1
tendencies of modem commercial society, and [gave] them the name - Democracy’/  In 
order to determine if Mill’s claim is correct, it is necessary to appreciate the association in 
Tocqueville’s thought between democracy understood as equality, the absence of 
aristocracy, and the tyranny of the majority. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
clarified this association. He recognised that the equality of conditions brought about by 
democratic societies generated milder manners. In democracies people tended to share the 
same feelings and therefore felt more empathy for others, while in aristocratic societies the 
feelings of the higher ranks of society did not coincide with those of common people. In 
this way, ‘there is real sympathy only among those who are alike; and in aristocratic 
centuries one sees those like oneself only in the members of one’s caste’.242 According to 
Tocqueville, the bonds that linked serf and nobles in aristocratic societies were primarily of 
an institutional nature. The devotion of serfs to nobles, and the sense of responsibility that 
the nobles had towards their serfs, had an institutional rather than a personal basis. The serf
~40 J.S. Mill, Appendix B. Appendix to Dissertation and Discussions, Vol. I, (CW). XIX, p. 651.
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felt himself obliged to dedicate himself to whoever among the nobles was his chief, while
243the nobleman felt responsible for the serfs because they were within his domains. ~ For 
Tocqueville, the lack of interest in the human misery in aristocratic societies was a 
consequence of the lack of sympathy between the different ranks of society, and not a 
consequence of lack of enlightenment. In democratic societies, men were unlikely to submit 
themselves to others, but they did feel compassion when others were suffering. Sharing the 
same feelings, human beings tended to relieve the sufferings of others or, in Tocqueville’s 
words, to be mild towards them, when to do so did not require large sacrifices.244 
Tocqueville thought that equality generated love for political freedom because it rendered 
men independent and willing to criticise authorities to which they owed no special 
deference. Those who acted in an independent manner tended to prefer governments that 
they had elected, because these were a product of their will.245 The fact that, once 
governments were elected, individuals were left isolated before the central power led to
T IAtheir subjection to a paternalist controls For Tocqueville, such subjection was detrimental 
to freedom because it engendered a new kind of oppression in which citizens were 
converted into a herd of obedient sheep, totally devoted to their individual and family 
affairs and withdrawn from public life. Tocqueville had no doubt that modem governments 
could penetrate the sphere of private affairs more easily than governments of antiquity and 
the middle ages. In the Roman Empire, the emperor was powerful, but the provinces were 
administrated separately, and ‘the details of social life and of individual existence
'4‘ A. de Tocqueville, Dem ocracy in Am erica , p. 536.
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ordinarily escaped his control’.247 In the middle ages, society was very decentralised, with 
the nobility lying between the monarch and the people. Power was divided and the monarch
248was not in ‘charge of governing and administenng cities’. The aristocracy, as a 
distinctive group, was capable of defending itself against the encroachments of the 
monarch. In a modem context in which equality prevailed, it was important that people 
combined to defend their freedom, and thus avoid being forced to conform to the wishes of 
the crowd. By comparing democratic institutions in France and in America, Tocqueville 
made an important contribution to political theory. He showed that democracy had emerged
o  IQ
in America without the need to fight an already existing aristocracy/ Hence, the 
Americans were lucky ‘to have arrived at democracy without having to suffer democratic 
revolutions, and to be bom equal instead of becoming so’. ~ But in France, democratic 
institutions had emerged after a long process of erosion of the political power of the 
nobility. The French revolution was thus ‘only the completion of a long travail, the sudden 
and violent termination of a work in which ten generations of man had toiled’.251 It is 
important to understand that under the ancien regime, France was already undergoing 
centralisation. The influence of royal intendants in the administration of the provinces was 
effective despite the diversity of regulations existing at that time. This centralisation 
facilitated the later division of France by the Constituent Assembly into departments, 
disregarding the historic division of France into provinces, and behaving as if France were 
a land recently discovered.2^ 2 Tocqueville saw the advance of democracy as the key to
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understanding modem society. Democracy for him was the ‘generative fact’, the principle 
that influenced all aspects of the social and political order. This influence was disruptive 
from the beginning because it arose out of an attack on the bonds of dependence and the 
hierarchy of the previous social order." It was also disruptive because it tended to favour 
the passion for material well-being which was ‘essentially a middle class passion; it grows 
larger and spreads with the middle class’.254 As a matter of fact, Tocqueville did not deny 
that many factors were operating in favour of individualism, and consequently of the 
tyranny of the majority. He was aware that the pursuit of material well-being was one of 
them. Nevertheless. Tocqueville believed that democracy remained the ultimate cause of all 
the factors that contributed to the tyranny of the majority. This is clearly shown by his 
remark that when ‘ranks are confused and privileges destroyed, when patrimonies are 
divided and enlightenment and freedom are spread, the longing to acquire well-being 
presents itself to the imagination of the poor man, and the fear of losing it, to the mind of 
the rich’.2”  In other words, it was the impulse towards equality that emerged as a 
consequence of the increasing centralisation exercised under the ancient regime, which in 
turn had eroded the ties and loyalties of aristocratic society and had led people to be lured 
by wealth. Tocqueville seemed to think that industrialisation tended to reinforce the process 
of standardisation of tastes and opinion that emerged with the destruction of the aristocratic 
social order. However, he did not explain how democracy operated in conjunction with the 
new forces present in industrial society. Tocqueville attached great importance to mores 
and beliefs in analysing the phenomenon of individualism, but did not research the dynamic 
of industrial society itself, so as to be able to specify how it impinged on the phenomenon
See P. Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature o f  Democracy, pp. 123-4.
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of individualism. He was thus unable to explain why the effects that he attributed to 
democracy, understood as equality of condition, were operating in England, an aristocratic 
society. Tocqueville had to provide an analysis of how democracy interacted with industrial 
society in order to deal with this problem. Nevertheless, Tocqueville was sagacious enough 
to realise that, in a society where manufacturers had no responsibility for their employees 
and their dependants ‘the policy of laissez-faire, pursued by bourgeois controlled 
parliaments tended to create a capitalist despotism that would result in a revolutionary 
movement to establish socialism’.256 He foresaw that a socialist uprising might represent a 
huge threat to democracy, either by creating a new despotism or a dictatorial reaction. Mill 
also feared socialism. In his later thought he proposed small-scale socialist experiments, 
purporting to favour people's capacity, ‘of acting upon motives pointing directly to the 
general good, or making them aware of the defects which render them and others incapable
2^7
of doing so’. ~ In Mill’s view, these experiments should be rejected if they led to the 
tyranny of society over the individual. Mill’s form of socialism was intended to combine 
‘the greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw material of 
the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour’.2:>8
After considering all these points, it is clear that Lamberti’s account of the relationship 
between Mill’s and Tocqueville's political theory is illuminating: first, because he detects 
with precision the convictions shared by Mill and Tocqueville; second, because he sees 
differences between them that are not normally perceived; and third, because he makes it
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evident that their political philosophies were intended to promote a civic culture that 
supported liberty and diversity. It is true that to reach their goals, Tocqueville relied on 
tradition and participation, while Mill relied on accountability and self-cultivation. For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, what matters most is the fact that they were working 
over a common set of problems which were central to their political philosophies.
2.5. CONCLUSION
Between 1835 and 1840, J.S. Mill devoted himself to the search for a power in society to 
counteract that of the masses. Milks attempt to find such a power reflected his acceptance 
of Tocqueville's claim that the despotic propensities of the democratic age would lead to 
the stagnation of society through the creation of obedient mass sharing the same set of 
values. This represented a shift from one conception of democracy that gave unrestricted 
power to the will of the majority to another that purported to give weight to the will of 
minorities as well. Mill’s new conception of democracy built on the characteristics of his 
existing conception of democracy, such as faith in professional administration and 
opposition to sectional representation, the notion that it was imperative to render the masses 
as well as the government accountable because of the threat they pose to individuality and 
diversity. Mill explicitly attributed this shift in his thought to Tocqueville. and admitted that 
concern for minorities was lacking in Bentham’s democratic theory. It is clear that the 
influence of Tocqueville over Mill was long-lasting, for his mature works, such as On 
Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, shared the same concerns with 
Democracy in America. Moreover, Tocqueville’s influence is recognised by commentators 
on the intellectual relationship between Mill and Tocqueville, though there is disagreement
about the precise nature of this intellectual relashionship. Mill’s assertion that Democracy 
in America 1 pointed out the direction that his political theory would follow in the future 
proved to be correct. Mill believed, as Tocqueville did, that participation in local self- 
government, voluntary associations and the multiplication of the centres of decisions were 
essential in motivating people to work together for common purposes. Mill’s incorporation 
of Tocqueville’s sociological theory in his political thought provided him with a theoretical 
framework capable of encompassing the main concerns that Mill inherited from both 
Guizot and Coleridge. The clash between different points of view advocated by Guizot, and 
the self-cultivation advocated by Coleridge, were likely to occur only where institutions 
favoured diversity - Tocqueville’s method provided a basis for the understanding of the 
importance of diversity. For Tocqueville. the centralisation and atomisation of social life 
were processes intrinsically connected to the spread of democracy. He believed that these 
processes left individuals isolated before a central power because they caused the withering 
of intermediary bodies that would otherwise provide them with means to oppose the central 
power. Deprived of the bonds that tied them with members of society other than their 
families, individuals were led to follow the majority because, being isolated, they were 
unable to oppose the prevailing trends. The tyranny of the majority was thus, for 
Tocqueville, a consequence of the emergence of democracy and the erosion of aristocratic 
society. Mill judged this explanation unsatisfactory because it did not explain the way in 
which democracy operated in conjunction with the new forces of modern industrial society. 
Despite this deficiency, Tocqueville’s political theory provided Mill with relevant tools for 
the understanding of modem institutions. Mill assumed that the increasing standardisation 
of taste and opinion favoured the power of the masses and precluded deference to any sort 
of authority other than theirs. In order to counteract the tendency to standardisation, Mill
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designed institutional mechanisms which would provide a fair representation for minorities 
who dissented from the views of the increasingly powerful majority, and thereby enable 
them to act in opposition to the masses.
Thus, in the late 1830s and early 1840s, Mill aimed to establish in civil society a power to 
rival that of the masses. From the early 1850s, he showed growing interest in designing 
institutions which would oppose the tyranny of the majority, and paid especial attention to 
electoral institutions. His intention was to secure the participation of the educated few in 
the representative body, so as to raise the level of the leadership and prevent the majority 
from imposing uniformity. Mill’s ultimate intention was to render the masses accountable 
by designing electoral institutions to counteract their influence. These institutions were 
originally conceived in the early 1850s, and were a characteristic feature of his mature 
political thought. They gave concrete expression to the shift in Mill’s thought that his study 
of Tocqueville had produced in the early 1840s. The next chapter deals with Mill’s 
proposals for reform of the electoral system.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND DEMOCRACY
3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will show that the electoral mechanisms that Mill advocated from the early 
1850s onwards, namely plural voting and Hare’s system of proportional representation, 
were mainly concerned with accountability. He believed that they would guarantee the 
participation of the educated members of society in government, which he deemed essential 
in order to raise the standard of debate in parliament and prevent the majority from 
achieving absolute power. It will be argued that Mill failed to provide an institutional 
embodiment for his ideal of democracy. His conception of democracy encompassed various 
demands that were difficult to meet, and he lacked the expertise to devise an institutional 
framework adequate for it. It will also be argued that Mill was right to oppose the view that 
a centralised intellectual authority could help to improve society, and to support the view 
that improvement was the probable outcome of debate amongst those with various social 
perspectives. It will be claimed that Mill’s assumption that the minority and the majority 
were homogeneous groups, and his belief that the minority could not tyrannize the masses 
under any circumstances, were important factors in complicating his attempt to translate his
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ideal of democracy into practical institutions. Yet, it will be shown that, overall, Mill’s 
intention was to promote reforms whereby people would be encouraged increasingly to 
participate in the political process while avoiding the risk of revolutionary changes.
The second section of this chapter will show that the plural voting system which Mill 
proposed favours competence in government to the detriment of participation, because it 
alienates from the political process those who do not receive additional votes. It will be 
argued that Mill’s defence of plural voting was based on the false notion that technical 
expertise in matters of government equated to political knowledge, and that it was at odds 
with his democratic ideals.
The third section shows that Mill championed Hare’s voting system because he saw it as 
the definitive solution to the problems of representative democracy, in that, by granting 
proportional representation for minorities in parliament, it would create a centre of 
opposition that would keep the majority accountable. Mill believed that the existence of this 
tension in parliament would be enough to prevent the tyranny of the majority, so that once 
it was established, there was no longer any reason to oppose the enfranchisement of the 
working classes. It will be argued, however, that Mill failed to realize that Hare’s voting 
system was not appropriate for promoting accountability, because it entailed complex 
practical operations that rendered it virtually incomprehensible, and therefore unlikely to be 
understood and scrutinized by the average citizen.
In the fourth section, it will be shown that Mill did not succeed in translating democracy 
into electoral institutions because he lacked the expertise to devise institutions capable of
118
implementing his sophisticated democratic ideal, which combined concerns with 
participation, competence, and accountability. It will be argued that Mill was one of those 
Victorian intellectuals who saw improvement as resulting from the tension between 
intellectual excellence and the commonplaces of popular opinion. He believed that 
participation in non-electoral institutions could raise the intellectual standards of the 
masses, and prepare them for participation in the electoral process. Nevertheless, Mill was 
unrealistic both in treating the ‘educated few’ as a group of people sharing the same views 
and free from egoistic feelings, and in disregarding the possibility of the majority being 
oppressed by a minority.
The fifth section will show that Mill, fearing that the tyranny of the masses would result 
from revolutionary changes, proposed the creation of a political culture capable of 
encouraging participation and professional administration, and advocated a gradual 
reformism in which the pace of the extension of the franchise was combined with 
improvements in education. In the end, it will be stressed that the institutions he proposed 
would not have achieved accountability and would not have realised his democratic ideals.
3.2. PLURAL VOTING
In a letter to Edward Herford on 22 January 1850, Mill stated that progress was coming to a 
halt due to the low intellectual and moral states of all classes.2'^ 9 Throughout the 1850s he 
took on the task of designing an electoral system capable of providing a fair representation 
for the educated minority, because he thought this was necessary to raise the level of
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political leadership and prevent the majority from imposing uniformity. In discussion with 
Harriet Taylor, he drafted a programme of electoral reforms in 1853. The programme was 
subsequently improved and was published in 1859 under the title Thoughts on
TAflParliamentary ReformC In this work Mill advocated the introduction of an electoral 
system that required a basic level of education for the franchise and the adoption of a plural 
voting system that weighted the number of votes according to the educational level of 
citizens. He deemed those institutional mechanisms necessary for the promotion of 
participation and competent leadership. Mill believed that participation in the electoral 
process was important to train the popular mind both intellectually and morally. This is 
why he claimed that ‘all governments must be regarded as extremely imperfect, until every 
one who is required to obey the laws, has a voice, or the prospect of a voice, in their 
enactment and administration’.261 For Mill, citizens were entitled to choose those who were 
responsible for the political decisions that affected society and to have a voice in matters of 
administration. Nevertheless, he did not accept that everyone ought to have an equal voice 
in such matters. Mill agreed with the view that everyone ‘has an equal claim to control over 
his own government'.262 But he saw the power that the suffrage gave as a power over 
others, and in this case ‘the claims of different people to such power differ as much, as their 
qualifications for exercising it beneficially'^63 Mill rejected the view that every one was 
entitled to an equal claim to power over others, and accepted the view that the educated few 
should exert more power over others because they possessed more knowledge applicable to 
the affairs of the community. Based on this presumed superiority of knowledge, Mill
259 See J.S. Mill, Later Letters 1849-1873, (CW), XIX, p. 45.
-60 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography and Literary Essays, (CW), I, p. 261.
‘6I J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, (CW), XIX, pp. 322-23.
262 Ibid.
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advocated granting a greater weight to the suffrage of better-educated voters. In Thoughts 
on Parliamentary Reform, he defended the notion that the value of the vote of every person 
should be proportionate to their level of education:
If every ordinary unskilled labourer had one vote, a skilled labourer, whose 
occupation requires an exercised mind and knowledge of some of the laws of 
external nature, ought to have two. A foreman, or superintendent of labour, whose 
occupation requires something more of general culture, and some moral as well as 
intellectual qualities, should perhaps have three. A farmer, manufacturer, or trader, 
who requires a still larger range of ideas and knowledge, and the power of guiding 
and attending to a great number of various operations at once, should have three or 
four. A member of any profession requiring a long, accurate, and systematic mental 
cultivation - a lawyer, a physician or surgeon, a clergyman of any denomination, a 
literary man. an artist, a public functionary (or, at all events, a member of every 
intellectual profession at the threshold of which there is a satisfactory examination 
test) ought to have six. A graduate of any university, or a person freely elected a 
member of any learned society, is entitled to at least as many.264
Mill's conviction that educated voters should be allowed more influence in the choice of 
their representatives was mainly grounded on the belief that such persons had more 
knowledge applicable to the affairs of the community, but also grounded to some extent on 
a very low estimation of the capacity of the uneducated man. He referred to the uneducated
263 Ibid.
2W Ibid., pp. 324-5.
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as ‘superstitiously attached to the stupidest and worst of old forms and usages’, as ‘eager to 
clutch at whatever they have not and others have’, and as ‘incapable of clearly conceiving 
the rights of others’.265 Mill believed that deference to the intellectual excellence of the 
educated few was necessary in order to provide a balance between numbers and education, 
and thereby promote the well-being of society. Otherwise, the lowest on the educational 
scale would outvote the educated, and virtually exclude them from parliament. He proposed 
that adults, who had passed a test to assess their capacity in reading, writing, and 
performing basic arithmetic operations, should be enfranchised. In his view, demanding a 
very small amount of educational attainment as a condition of suffrage could prevent 
political disasters. He gave a dramatic example:
Reading, writing, and arithmetic are but a low standard of educational qualification; 
yet even this would probably have sufficed to save France from her present 
degradation. The millions of voters who, in opposition to nearly every educated 
person in the country, made Louis Napoleon President, were chiefly peasants who 
could neither read nor write, and whose knowledge of public men, even by name, 
was limited to oral tradition.266
Mill thus advocated giving greater weight to the suffrage of the more educated voters as a 
precaution against unskilled representatives.267 However, it is important to understand that 
his proposed plural voting system was motivated primarily by a concern for accountability. 
He presumed that, if extra votes were not given to the educated minority, the majority
265 Ibid., p. 327.
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would gather a considerable amount of power and be unanswerable to anyone. Controlling 
parliament without an effective opposition, the majority would tend to impose uniformity, 
which would be detrimental to the polity. For Mill, if a system of equality were introduced, 
for example, ‘under universal suffrage, the class of mere manual labourers would 
everywhere form a large majority in any electoral district grounded solely on a local 
division of the country’.268 A political system framed in this way disenfranchised the other 
members of society, and did not replicate properly the opinion prevailing in society. He 
tried to promote the involvement of the educated in politics because they were so greatly 
outnumbered by the uneducated, and, in a society in which power was passing to the hands 
of the masses, they are potential victims of tyranny. Mill thought that the plural voting 
system that he proposed was democratic because, on the one hand, it did not permit the 
majority to be outweighed by the minority; and, on the other hand, it allowed the minority 
to be represented in parliament.269 He feared the exclusion of representatives of the 
educated few from parliament, and argued that the educated few were not likely to control 
society, since their lack of identification with the values prevailing amongst the majority of 
its members would hinder them from accumulating the power that would enable them to 
control people in general. Later, however, in Considerations on Representative 
Government, Mill recognised that, although unable to control the majority, the minority 
tended to have an influence in parliament greater than their numerical strength because they 
were better able to put forward arguments and perform the role of a centre of resistance
->70
against the ascendancy of the majority/ As a matter of fact, in Considerations on
~67 See J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, (CW), XIX, pp. 326-7.
268 Ibid.. pp. 329-30.
See ibid., pp. 328-29.
"70 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, pp. 515-16.
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Representative Government, he maintained the same line of reasoning he had developed in 
Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, according to which the system of plural voting was 
necessary to preserve the educated from the class legislation of the uneducated, but must 
stop short of enabling the minority to introduce class legislation for their own benefit."
The utilitarian movement provided Mill with an historical example of a small group of 
people that had influenced society in a way that he regarded as positive. Their effectiveness 
may have also reinforced Mill’s conviction that a minority could significantly improve 
society. For Mill, the utilitarian movement did well in advocating progressive changes in 
society, especially in the fields of electoral and welfare reform. The antagonism of ideas 
between representatives of the educated few and representatives of the majority who upheld 
the values prevailing in society was essential to democracy. As representatives of different 
interests, they tended to be more willing to scrutinise each other, because they held 
opinions that were generally at odds. For Mill, this promoted accountability because, in 
checking each other, the minority and the majority were made answerable to society for 
their acts, and therefore were more likely to be controlled. Accountability is a central theme 
in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform. The main object of Mill's defence of plural voting 
system was to render government answerable to the people. If minorities were present in 
parliament, they could check the power of the majority. Accountability is also a feature of 
Mill’s defence of open voting in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform. His opposition to the 
secret ballot was based on the conviction that secrecy left electors unaccountable to their 
fellow citizens, which he deemed detrimental to society. Thoughts on Parliamentary 
Reform was Mill’s first comprehensive attempt to give an institutional answer to his
271 See ibid., p. 476.
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concern with the tyranny of the majority. His opposition to the radical tenet ‘one man one 
vote’ in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform shows that Mill was not willing to countenance 
equality in every right recognised by society. He rejected the idea that individuals were all 
equally enlightened, capable, and strong. Despite agreeing with the democratic reformers in 
having universal suffrage as an ultimate aim, he believed that inequalities must be 
recognised, because those of greater intelligence should manage public affairs:
It is the fact, that one person is not as good as another; and it is reversing all the 
rules of rational conduct, to attempt to raise a political fabric on a supposition which 
is at variance with fact. Putting aside for the present the consideration of moral 
worth, of which, though more important even than intellectual, it is not so easy to 
find an available test; a person who cannot read, is not as good, for the purpose of 
human life, as one who can. A person who can read, but cannot write or calculate, is 
not as good as a person who can do both. A person who can read, write and 
calculate, but who knows nothing of the properties of natural objects, or of other 
places and countries, or of the human beings who have lived before him, or of the 
ideas, opinions, and practices of his fellow-creatures generally, is not so good as a 
person who knows these things. A person who has not, either by reading or 
conversation, made himself acquainted with the wisest thoughts of the wisest men. 
and with the greater examples of a beneficent and virtuous life, is not so good as one 
who is familiar with these. A person who has even filled himself with this various 
knowledge, but has not digested it - who could give no clear and coherent account of 
it, and has never exercised his own mind, or derived an original thought from his
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own observation, experience, or reasoning, is not so good, for any human purpose, 
as one who has .... There is no one who, if he was obliged to confide his interest 
jointly to both, would not desire to give a more potential voice to the more educated 
and more cultivated of the two.
It is important to consider whether Mill’s advocacy of a plural voting system compromises 
his democratic ideals. His fear of a democratic despotism seems to have led him to 
compromise such important democratic notions as equality and participation. The 
democratic ethos is marked by the idea of a presumed equality amongst citizens, who are
->7 ^not subjected to any sort of hereditary deference.“ ~ Mill certainly rejected hereditary 
deference. However, it is necessary to examine whether or not his deference to intellectual 
excellence, by granting additional votes to the educated, undermined his commitment to 
democracy.
The plural voting system proposed by Mill would have been detrimental to participation. It 
is quite difficult to imagine how those whose votes would have been worth less than others 
would have been motivated to engage in the political process in a context where the passion 
for equality was becoming increasingly influential. It seems reasonable to infer that, had 
Mill’s proposal been implemented, it would have imparted to those who were not awarded 
additional votes the perception that they were not endowed with the same dignity as their
_7“ J.S. Mill, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, (CW), XIX, pp. 323-4.
~73 See L. Siedentop, ‘Two Liberal Traditions’, in A. Ryan (ed), The Idea o f  Freedom: Essays in Honour o f  
Isaiah Berlin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 153.
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97*1fellow citizens whose opinions were seen to worth more. The system Mill proposed was 
framed in an aristocratic fashion establishing several levels of citizenry in which the vote of 
the educated was of greater value than the vote of the common citizen. The perception that 
their dignity is not being respected is likely to produce either resentment or apathy and thus 
to alienate people from the political process by leading them either to resentment or apathy. 
One might argue that it is an open question whether this would be the outcome were Mill’s 
scheme to be implemented. This is not a sound objection, however, because, if each vote 
counted equally, people would be a lot more willing to be involved in the political process 
since their vote would be more influential. As a utilitarian, Mill’s commitment to plural 
voting depended on its contribution to the well being of society. If it turned out that society 
would be better served by an equal voting system, then he would need to abandom plural 
voting. One can thus infer that Mill did not take seriously the possibility of resentment and 
apathy being the consequence of plural voting, because he assumed that the tyranny of the 
majority was the main threat to general happiness. It is, therefore, fair to say that Mill’s 
defence of plural voting tended to reinforce the idea of an intellectual aristocracy in a 
period in which the longing for equality was growing stronger. In order to strengthen 
competence and create a well-qualified leadership. Mill diminished the value of 
participation as an instrument to promote civic culture and improve the masses. This seems 
to be in agreement with Mill's affirmation in his Autobiography that in the 1850s he was 
less democratic than he had been previously.27'7
"74 See P. Jones, ‘Political Equality and Majority Rule’, in D. Miller and L. Siedentop (eds), The Mature o f  
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Mill never found acceptance among politicians for his idea of giving additional votes to 
those with a superior education. He said that those who desire any sort of inequality in the
276 rpelectoral vote, did so ‘in favour of property and not of intelligence or knowledge’. The 
electoral system that Mill advocated in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform was 
problematic both because the inequality in the vote which it advocated was more likely to 
alienate than to commit people to the political process, and because it demanded the 
identification of the various grades of political knowledge in order to establish the value of 
the votes. He campaigned in favour of the establishment of a system of National Education 
precisely to make such an identification and to rank the value of people’s franchise. It 
appears, nevertheless, that Mill underestimated the difficulties involved in the process of 
establishing a standard to define the level of valuable political knowledge that citizens 
have:
Still, political issues always involve both instrumental knowledge and moral 
judgements, and those persons who have technical proficiency in particular areas 
have no unique claim to moral competence. For instance, an economist can claim 
special expertise regarding, say, how raising the minimum wage will affect the level 
of unemployment in an economy, but they have no special moral competence 
concerning if, when, and how a society should adjust its minimum wage laws. Such 
policy decisions involve judgements about risks and ends that go beyond the
">77technical expertise of economists.^
276 Ibid., p. 261.
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It is important to note that the highly educated few are not free from prejudice and class 
bias.278 Mill does not seem to have paid attention to the fact that superiority in instrumental 
knowledge does not imply superiority in moral knowledge. It may be the case that those 
having university degrees do not intend to add to the general happiness but rather to pursue 
their selfish interests. Besides, instrumental knowledge refers to expertise or knowledge 
about specific aspects of social reality, while political knowledge is concerned, among 
other things, with sensitivity to people’s expectations, strategic and tactical reasoning, the 
ability to negotiate and compromise, and a sense of opportunity. Defending plural voting, 
Mill assumed that he could measure the political knowledge that people possessed, and 
rank the value of their franchise accordingly. This is, however, groundless, because neither 
professional qualifications nor university degrees offer grounds for estimating the 
capability to choose representatives. The simple fact that someone has achieved a 
university degree or is a clergyman does not make him better able to choose a 
representative than a tradesman or a farmer, as Mill presumed. On the other hand, to 
reserve a special role for the educated in those functions of the executive branch of 
government that require considerable expertise in legal or administrative matters is 
justfiable. The technical support of experts can be valuable in various spheres of 
government, and it is especially valuable for those working in the bureaucracy.279 
Nonetheless, there is no expertise in society that offers a good enough reason why one 
should be seen as better able to vote than another. Clergymen have knowledge of things 
that tradesmen ignore, and vice versa, but to say that what one of the groups knows will
'77 B. Baum, Re-reading Power and Freedom in John Stuart Mill, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000), 
p. 264.
278 See C.L. Ten, ‘Democracy, socialism, and the working classes’, in J. Skorupski (ed). The Cambridge
Companion to Mill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 384.
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enable them to make better electoral choices is itself a political matter. Besides, one cannot 
presume that every clergyman and tradesman has the same political leanings as the other 
members of the group to which they belong. It is, therefore, up to the political process to 
settle questions regarding policies, although technical expertise has an important role in 
implementing them.
In Thoughts on Parliamentary' Reform, Mill assumed that majorities are homogeneous 
within themselves and hostages to the tastes and feelings prevailing in society. It appears 
that he believed that the overwhelmingly powerful effects of the standardization that 
marked the nineteenth-century had spared only the members of the educated minority. This
is why he also believed that the members of the educated minority were ‘a certain group of
8^0people in the society somehow not influenced by politics though engaged in politics’." 
These beliefs contradict Mill’s conviction expressed elsewhere that ordinary people would 
be ultimately able to identify and to defer to those better able to govern society if channels 
of communication and discussion were kept open. In this sense, there is a difference 
between the capacity to make decisions and the capacity to judge them.281 In On Liberty\ 
for example. Mill accepted that, although unable to formulate them due to lack of expertise, 
citizens were able to judge public decisions because they were the ones affected by them. 
So, Mill believed that the average man’s capacities could not be rated highly, but that he
~79 See D.F. Thompson, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), p. 55.
80 T. Fuller, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Transformation o f Politics in Representative Govemmment, 
Utilitarianism and On Liberty’, (Baltimore: Ph.D, 1971), p. 122.
"8I See J. Morrow, A History o f  Political Thought, (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 171-2.
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nevertheless had the capacity to ‘respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to
2R2them with his eyes open’.
Mill defended the exclusion of people unable to write, read, or count from the electoral 
process in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, alleging that they were incapable of making 
informed choices. He had already defended this idea many years earlier, based on the 
proposition that, as the press was the most important means of disseminating political 
views and general information, only those who were able to read were able to make 
informed choices." For Mill, it was wrong to allow those who lacked the information that 
would allow them to vote conscientiously to exercise power over others. This is not an 
invalid argument, providing the exclusion is temporary whilst people are educated to read 
and count." This argument appears to be associated with a sort of baseline conception of 
accountability and participation. However, the notion of baseline equality exists in Mill’s 
thought only in embryonic form. Berger elaborates upon it and applies it primarily to the 
distribution of economic goods. According to Berger, Mill’s conception of equality 
precluded inequalities that degraded individuals by putting them under the complete control 
of others, because this was to deny their status as autonomous human beings.282' This 
conception of equality can be used to explain Mill's defence of plural voting.286 In this way, 
the baseline conception of equality implied that everyone, except the illiterate, was entitled 
to a basic level of control over the government and to have an influence on its affairs. This 
was enough to respect the elector’s condition of an autonomous human being, able to make
282 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (C\V), XVIII, p. 269.
~83 See J.S. Mill, Rationale o f  Representation, (CW), XVIII, p. 31.
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choices and influence public life. Further deference, however, should be given, according to 
Mill, to those who possessed more of that knowledge which might be applied to the affairs 
of the community. So, the differentiation in the number of votes was expected to satisfy the 
claims of those who, in Mill’s opinion, were qualified to make electoral choices which 
would be more beneficial to the entire community. There is no objective means of 
determining the number of votes each person should possess. The political process is too 
complex for that. The application of a conception of baseline equality to the electoral 
process shows that Mill was trying to accommodate the goals of participation and 
competence in the same conceptual framework. Nevertheless, in his account of plural 
voting, he clearly emphasized competence to the detriment of participation.
Mill would not have favoured inequalities that implied undue power over others because 
this would undermine the autonomy that was a central value in his political philosophy. He 
advocated the plural voting system on the assumption that it would increase general 
happiness by preventing the tyranny of the majority. But he failed to perceive that equal 
voting would have better suited his intention of promoting a liberal civic culture, because it 
conveys the sense that each person partake of a common dignity. The opposition that his 
proposal faced was a clear indication that people did not regard it as beneficial. Therefore, 
it would not have increased participation and added to the general happiness if it had been 
introduced, because it would have negatively affected people’s self-respect, thus triggering 
resentment. In Thoughts on Parliamentary’ Reform, Mill intended to bring the benefits of 
trained minds to bear on government in order to avoid the threats that, in his opinion, an
~85 See F.R. Berger’s Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The M oral and Political Philosophy o f  John Stuart 
Mill, (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), pp. 159-61.
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overwhelming presence of unskilled representatives could pose to government. But he 
mistakenly assumed that this would not be possible if votes were counted equally. In view 
of this, Mill put so much emphasis on his concerns that he compromised his belief in the 
potentialities of the people and his conviction that a perfect representative system should 
grant the suffrage to every adult. This implied that once a minimum level of education had 
been achieved, there was no more reason to give different weight to different people’s 
influence on the electoral process. People who have university degrees are normally better 
able to occupy positions in government due to their expertise. However, Mill confused the 
capability of the educated to perform well in the bureaucracy with qualitative superiority in 
relevant political knowledge. This brought him close to a counter-argument to democracy, 
that is ‘that the general public is too unintelligent, ill-informed, and inattentive to public 
affairs for a form of government that gives even marginal control over its policies to the
007
mass of the people’." Mill always defended the need for competent administration. In the 
1850s, he extolled the Northcote-Trevelyan Report because it recommended the selection 
of civil servants by means of open competition. On 8 March 1854, in a letter to Harriet
Taylor, he commented that the selection of civil servants based on intellectual superiority
->88could bring extremely positive results for society." But Mill's attempt to rank the value of 
the franchise betrayed the democratic ideals which underpinned Considerations on 
Representative Government and On Liberty. Plural voting would have tended to generate 
apathy and resentment, which would prevent people from exchanging their experiences in a 
way that Mill deemed essential to produce improvements. Besides, there is no evidence that 
plural voting would have produced the sort of leadership that he aimed at. If people were
286 See ibid., pp. 159-61.
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alienated from the electoral process, there was no reason to think that they would engage in 
the task of keeping government accountable.
3.3. HARE’S PLAN FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
From March 1859 onwards, plural voting did not figure prominently in Mill's political 
discourse. He never withdrew the recommendation that it should be applied in local 
elections in order to improve the quality of representatives where talented people were
-)OQ
scarce, but he stopped recommending it for general elections." Mill read Thomas Hare’s A 
Treatise on The Election o f Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal a few weeks 
after publishing Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform. and came to the conclusion that it 
successfully reconciled popular government with respect for diversity of opinion. In Recent 
Writers on Reform (1859), Mill made highly laudatory comments on Hare’s Treatise, 
accepting that it would allow the wishes of the nation to be accurately represented by 
giving local educated minorities the opportunity to get more seats in parliament."90 Hare’s 
electoral scheme allowed candidates whose personal merits were recognised by supporters 
throughout the country to receive votes from beyond a particular locality and overcome 
hindrances created by local intolerance.291 He thus suggested that votes cast in a national 
constituency would reflect a wider range of concerns than those cast in local constituencies 
for local candidates. Mill was convinced that the political standards of parliament would 
significantly improve if Hare's system were implemented. For the rest of his life, he
288 See J.S. Mill, Later Letters 1849-1873, (C\V), XIV, p. 184.
~89 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, pp. 358-9.
_9° See J.S. Mill. Recent writers on Reform . (CW). XIX. pp. 358-9.
"91 See ibid., p. 362.
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remained an advocate of Hare’s system of representation, and consigned plural voting to 
the periphery of his political agenda.292 During the 1860s, Hare’s electoral system was a 
priority for Mill, especially in the period in which he was a Member of Parliament (1865- 
8). In point of fact. Mill used his speech on personal representation, delivered in the House 
of Commons on 29 May 1867, to extol Hare’s system."
It is important to present Hare’s system of representation before examining the case Mill 
made for it. In 1857 Hare published a pamphlet entitled The Machinery o f Representation, 
which was subsequently improved and republished in 1859 under the title of A Treatise on 
the Election o f Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal. The Machinery o f 
Representation reflected Hare's dissatisfaction with the fact that many prominent 
politicians had been defeated in elections due to their critical attitude towards the British
004 . .
government's treatment of China and the handling of the Crimean War." Opposition to the 
localism that was increasingly strong after the 1830s was the outstanding characteristic of 
the pamphlet.-9  ^ The idea that voters should be able to choose their representatives from 
amongst candidates from the entire nation is defended on the grounds that it could prevent 
representation from depending upon the whims and parochial concerns of local 
constituents. Hare was particularly critical of the boundaries of the constituencies, which he 
saw as arbitrary lines that restricted the elector to choosing candidates from his locality.
^  See ibid., p. 364.
See J.S. Mill. Public and Parliam entary Speeches, (C\V), XXVIII, pp. 176-7.
~9J See J. Hart. Proportional Representation: Critics o f  the British E lectoral System 1820-1945, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1992), p. 26.
:4r' See A. Hawkins. British Parry Polics, 1852-1886 , (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1998), p. 45.
In A Treatise on the Election o f Representatives, Hare presented his plan for electoral 
reform which was designed to promote personal representation and to make possible ‘the 
fair and adequate representation of all interests, classes and opinions’.296 His plan was 
intended to cure the infirmities of the British representative system which, in his opinion.
->97
left many electors in large constituencies virtually disenfranchised." For Hare, it was 
necessary to change the machinery of elections in order to allow virtually unrepresented 
voters to be represented. He deemed this particularly important because, among those 
unrepresented voters, there were members of the educated classes, who could make a
->Q O
valuable contribution to the political process." Hare accepted that the majority should 
prevail in elections, but should be subjected to an opposition capable of counteracting their 
wishes.299 He proposed, therefore, a system intended to balance the great influence of the 
most ignorant by providing the educated minority with due representation. For Hare, the 
boundaries of the constituencies were embarrassing restrictions from which electors should 
be freed so as to be able to find those they judged most fit for the job of representing them. 
Electoral divisions drawn on a geographical basis not only left minorities virtually 
disenfranchised, but also led to frequent calls for new reform bills, because movements of 
populations constantly disarranged constituencies. Hare also saw political parties as 
artificially created groups that hindered the formation of a qualified leadership. He thus 
favoured independent candidates in order to attract the most capable men to parliament and 
to prevent party rule. Hare believed that parties were likely to transfer political debate from 
parliament to their internal circles and to mute the real diversity of opinions. For Hare, ‘it is
J. Hart, Proportional Representation: Critics o f  the British Electoral System 1820-1945 , p. 37.
~97 See T. Hare, A Treatise on the Election o f  Representatives, Parliam entary and M unicipal. (London: 
Longman, 1959), p. xvii.
298 See ibid., pp. xvi-xvii.
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not usually the political tenet which has caused the party, but the party which has created 
the tenet’.300 In Hare’s view, disencumbered from these restrictions, electors ‘would 
employ the same care and caution as that with which they select persons to fill other 
fiduciary or vicarious offices’.301 The then existing method of election did not present the 
most distinguished men in every walk of life as alternatives for the electors to choose from, 
and hence deprived them of the possibility of choosing well-qualified candidates that would 
significantly contribute to social life.302 In Hare’s view, it was ‘beyond the power of law to 
compel men to unite for a common purpose, and labour in it with energy of will, unless it 
be one in which their nature prompts them to agree’. The political system should, 
therefore, encourage the voluntary association of persons having common pursuits and 
similar attachments and sympathies. Companionship with those who shared the same 
sentiments in political life was a powerful force which would bind together the electors of 
the country and motivate them to address public concerns. Hare stressed that the British 
people had commonly shown ‘reluctance to be arbitrarily parcelled out, formed into 
sections, and divided by metes and bounds, to correspond with a theory, and they have 
commonly cast aside, at first opportunity, such artificial limits’.304 And yet. Hare pointed 
out. voluntarily formed guilds and associations could be traced back to the early history of 
the country, and indeed caused Richard II to be jealous of their strength and independence. 
So, for Hare, the existing political system should be re-framed in accordance with the long 
and successfully held traditions of the kingdom, which preferred voluntary association for 
common purposes rather than coercive methods.
See ibid., pp. xi-xii.
300 Ibid., pp. xv, xvi.
301 Ibid., p. xxi.
302 See ibid., p. 66.
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It is important to note that Hare’s intentions to promote excellence amongst MPs did not 
lead him to oppose the extension of the suffrage. He certainly believed that the extension of 
political privileges risked the creation of additional obstacles to true representation, because 
it made minorities relatively smaller and consequently more easily outnumbered. In this 
situation, the implementation of a system that was plainly inconsistent with the exclusion of 
minorities became even more necessary.3(b As a matter of fact, Hare’s scheme neither 
opposed nor supported the extension of the franchise, but was adaptable to any extent of 
franchise. However, he stressed the point that a House of Commons which did not contain 
some members in whom the working classes had confidence and who viewed problems 
from their perspective would be grossly defective.306 For Hare, the working classes had 
been improperly excluded from the franchise and as a result were now demanding ‘a 
construction of the franchise’ and electoral divisions that, if implemented, would throw all 
power into their hands. But Hare believed that the system of representation that he designed 
could provide a balance of power. Hence, what Hare feared was the uncontrolled 
government of the numerical majority, and not the presence of representatives of the 
working classes in parliament.307
Henry Fawcett shared Mill's conviction that the set of provisions embodied in Hare's 
Treatise, were essential in dealing with the major problems related to representative 
government. For Fawcett, Hare's scheme was capable of assuring fair representation for 
minorities without infringing the rights of local majorities, of diminishing corruption, and
303 Ibid., p. 45.
Ibid.. p. 49.
305 See ibid.. p. xi.
306 See ibid., p. 43.
of reducing electoral expenses for candidates.308 Fawcett provided a summary of Hare’s 
scheme that was fundamentally faithful to it. This summary, framed with Hare’s assent, is 
instructive because it shows in a systematic manner what is scattered in the 370 pages of 
Hare’s Treatise,309 Mill thought that the summary was valuable.310 According to the 
scheme: 1) Any person could become a candidate by depositing £50 and declaring the 
constituency for which he offered himself to the Registrar-General, who would be located 
in London and would be responsible for publishing a list of the names of candidates and 
constituencies. 2) In order to vote, each elector would sign a voting-paper before one of the 
returning officers, who were responsible for superintending the examination of the voting 
papers at local level and transmitting them to the Registrar-General. The elector could 
choose a candidate or candidates who had presented themselves for any constituency, and 
write their names on the voting paper in the order in which he was desirous they should be 
returned. 3) The Registrar-General was responsible for calculating the ‘quota’ by dividing 
the number of votes returned by the number of seats. Having done this, the Registrar- 
General would list the names of those ‘candidates whose names stand first on a number of 
voting-papers equal to or exceeding the ‘quota**.311 The candidates on such list were thus 
returned to parliament. No more than the ‘quota* could be used for the return of any 
candidate except in the case of plumpers, that is votes cast for only one candidate. 4) When 
the number of candidates whose names stand first was not enough to complete the 
parliament, the Registrar-General listed the candidates whose names appeared either first or 
second in the remaining voting-papers a number of times equal to or exceeding the ‘quota’.
307 See ibid., p. 4.
308 See Fawcett. H. Mr. H are's Reform Bill: Sim plified and Explained, (London, 1860). p. 5.
309 See ibid.
310 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CVV), XIX, p. 454.
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The candidates included in this list were returned as members of parliament. As in the 
previous stage, the voting papers that contained fewest names were those which were to be 
appropriated to the return of the candidates that equalled or exceeded the ‘quota’. The 
Registrar-General would repeat this procedure as many times as was necessary until the 
parliament was filled.312
Mill adopted Hare's system of proportional representation on the grounds that it would 
involve people in the political process and favour talented candidates. Mill also expressed 
agreement with Hare's other convictions, such as non-payment of MPs thereby preventing 
people of the lowest class from devoting themselves to public affairs for merely pecuniary 
reasons: condemnation of the exclusion of women from the suffrage, because such an 
exclusion was not rationally justifiable; and diminution of the heavy burden of preliminary 
payments in order to facilitate the participation of candidates in elections.313 But what was 
of the utmost importance for Mill was that Hare’s system was able to bolster the 
educational dimension of the political process by bringing together inferior and superior 
intellects. This contact between inferior and superior intellects caused society to improve, 
but it needed to be engineered because it was not something that naturally occurred. For 
Mill, the absence of contact between inferior and superior intellects contributed more than 
anything else to keeping the generality of mankind in contented ignorance.314
311 H. Fawcett. Mr. H are's Reform Bill: Sim plified and Explained, p. 6-7.
3,2 See ibid.. p. 18.
313 See J.S. Mill. Recent Writers On Reform, (CW), XIX, pp. 367-70.
314 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 539.
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In Considerations on Representative Government, Mill argued that the inadequacy of the 
mental qualifications of officials was one of the dangers of representative government.315 
He advocated changes in the voting process because it was the means by which 
representatives were chosen and political leadership created. Hare’s institutional 
prescriptions were vital, in Mill's opinion, because they improved the voting process by 
creating electoral possibilities for voters whose votes would always be outnumbered 
locally.316 For Mill, in allowing electors from various constituencies to combine in order to 
return representatives. Hare's scheme would make proportional representation viable and 
improve the quality of politics by permitting the presence in parliament of the educated 
minority who would otherwise be suffocated by local prejudices.317 Under Hare's system, 
majorities would certainly prevail over minorities. However, Mill expected that the 
presence ‘of truth and reason in parliament', that is the presence of an educated minority, 
would counterbalance the strength of the majority. Mill thought that if Hare’s system were 
implemented, the majority would remain the strongest power in parliament, but would be 
prevented from being the sole one. Mill saw Hare’s single transferable vote as a more 
appropriate model than plural voting, but the reasoning he used to support both was 
essentially the same: to reconcile participation with intellectual excellence and
accountability. Mill admitted that, if Hare's system were implemented, he would have
 ^18considered the possibility of supporting equal and universal suffrage. Mill concluded that 
the implementation of Hare's system would remove the final barrier to the enfranchisement 
of the working classes. Kern argues that such a conclusion was at odds with Hare's
315 See ibid., p. 436.
316 See ibid.. p. 477.
317 See ibid.. p. 455.
318 See ibid.. p. 477.
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motivation to implement a new voting process.319 In Kern’s view, Hare lacked enthusiasm 
for a larger suffrage, and his plan for proportional representation was an attempt to keep 
elitist rule in Britain.320 Kern argues that Hare proposed the changes he did in order to 
retain the status quo, and that Mill merely drew a democratic conclusion from a proposal 
that was not democratic in itself. In order to assess Kern's claims, it is apposite to note that, 
just as Hare was not completely averse to the extension of the suffrage, Mill was not 
entirely supportive of equal voting. Hare would have liked to have seen the working classes 
properly represented in parliament, and was aware of the fact that support for the extension 
of the suffrage was increasing. He did not oppose such an extension, and stressed that his
^  j
system was flexible enough to accommodate it. " It is true that Hare was not a full-blooded 
democrat because he doubted the capabilities of the less instructed to choose their leaders 
under the then existing electoral system. But neither was Mill. He feared public opinion, 
which he regarded as being dominated by a commercial spirit and prone to disrespect 
minorities. Mill would have excluded from the suffrage those who paid no tax. received 
public money for the relief of poverty, or had been convicted of a criminal offence. More 
than that, he did not see equal voting as something that was intrinsically good:
I do not look upon equal voting as among the things which are good in themselves, 
provided they can be guarded against inconveniences. 1 look upon it as only 
relatively good; less objectionable than inequality of privilege grounded on
19 See P.B. Kern, ‘Universal Suffrage Without Democracy: Thomas Hare and John Stuart M ill\ Review  o f  
P olitics , 34 (1972), pp. 173-4.
See ibid., p. 176.
See H. Fawcett, Mr. H a re ’s Reform Bill: Simplified and Explained, p. 22.
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irrelevant or adventitious circumstances, but in principle wrong, because recognising
\22a wrong standard, and exercising a bad influence on the voter's mind.
The democratic conclusion Mill reached is not at loggerheads with Hare’s conclusions, as 
Kern suggests. But Kern is to an extent correct in saying that Mill and Hare saw elections 
as decision-making procedures rather than as a means of self-protection. They both 
recognised that elections were related to both decision-making and self-protection, but they 
were so focused on improving the quality of political leadership that they gave greater 
emphasis to elections as decision-making procedures. Mill assumed that Hare’s system 
would improve the quality of the representative body by bringing inferior minds into 
contact with superior ones. There is. nonetheless, an unjustified optimism about the 
creation of the national constituency. The idea that this would benefit the instructed man 
who would otherwise be stultified by the narrow-mindedness of local interests is flawed. 
Mill failed to see that, once the constituency was enlarged, the operation of political forces 
would be re-framed. This sort of change would lead those with the economic means to 
organize campaigns on a larger scale to benefit from the situation. It is difficult to 
overcome the influence of economic power where many live at or near subsistence level.
Mill recognised a problem in the mechanics of voting proposed by Hare, but he did not give 
it the attention it deserved. He knew that, according to Hare's scheme, the ‘quota' was 
established by dividing the number of valid votes by the number of seats, and that every 
candidate who got that quota would be returned.323 He was also aware that votes could be
32~ J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 478.
3:3 See ibid., p. 453.
counted only for one candidate, and that people could indicate further preferences on their 
ballot paper. If an elector delivered a voting paper containing other names in addition to the 
one which stood foremost in his preference, he might have his first-choice candidate 
returned in the first listing because that candidate had received a number of votes equal or 
exceeding the ‘quota’. It is also possible that, although receiving less votes than the ‘quota’ 
on the first count, his candidate would nonetheless be returned because his name appeared 
in the redistributed voting-papers, either in second or third place, a number of times equal 
to or exceeding the ‘quota’. In Recent Writers on Reform, Mill recognised that Hare’s 
system needed to be more precise in relation to the way in which it was determined which 
votes should be redistributed where candidates had exceeded the ‘quota’. " In 
Considerations on Representative Government. Mill recognised that ‘to determine which of 
a candidate's votes should be used for his return, and which set free for others, several 
methods had been proposed, into which we shall not here enter’.32:5 Mill never really 
addressed this problematic aspect of Hare's system. He simply stated that no serious 
objection could be made to the method. But in this he was wrong, because problems could 
have emerged from the application of Hare’s system. It is important to reflect upon two 
problematic situations. First, let it be supposed that in an election in which the quota is 
2.000 votes, candidate A, who receives 8,000 first-preference votes, must choose 2,000 
votes out of the total to be counted in his favour. Depending on wich 2.000 votes are 
chosen out of the total to complete the ‘quota', different sets of second or third preferences 
will appear in the remaining 6,000 votes. Let it be assumed that, amongst the 8,000 votes in 
which candidate A is the first preference, 4,000 contain two names, 3,000 contain three
3-4 See J.S. Mill. Recent Writers on Reform. (CW), XIX, p. 361.
325 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 454.
names, and 1,000 contain four names. The votes appropriated to A’s return will be taken 
from the 4,000, because they are the ones with fewest preferences. But, as the quota is
2,000, there is no clear provision in Hare’s system to determine exactly which set of 2,000 
votes should be counted out of the 4,000 in question. Second, let it be assumed that, in the 
same election, 400,000 electors vote to return 200 candidates. Suppose that 20 candidates 
receive between 6,400 and 7,700 single-preference votes, amounting to a total of 135,145. 
In this case, the 135,145 must be counted only in favour of the 20 candidates in question, 
because the system allows candidates to be returned with more votes than the ‘quota’ when 
these votes are single preference votes. This means that there will not be enough votes 
available to allow a sufficient number of candidates to reach the ‘quota’ and thereby fill all 
the available seats: 264.855 votes are not sufficient to fill the 180 remaining seats in 
parliament, presuming that each candidate should receive the ‘quota’ of 2.000 votes. These 
problematic, and entirely probable, situations are not provided for in Hare’s system. But the 
impropriety of the system is not limited to its lack of provision for these situations. To 
follow the determination of elections in this system, people must be able to deal with a long 
list of candidates and a complex process of counting. This means that the system would not 
be intelligible for most people, and, therefore, unable to generate the educational benefits it 
aspires to. It is also worth considering that the fewer people who understand the process, 
the fewer people are able to supervise it.
Mill incorporated various aspects of Hare's scheme in a proposed Reform Bill. The Bill 
was met with a cold reception and he was forced to withdraw it. There is no doubt that 
Hare’s notion of personal representation dovetailed with Mill’s idea of promoting 
independent thinking and action. But Mill had not been involved with the practical aspects
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of electoral politics for many years, and he was not trained in the intricacies of electoral 
procedure. Hart is thus correct in saying that Mill was overly impressed by Hare’s mastery 
of the art of devising institutions.326 Mill’s backing of Hare’s scheme was very enthusiastic. 
Even people sympathetic to the system argued that it needed modifying in order to make it 
feasible. But Mill kept on defending the system until the end of his life, without advocating 
any specific improvements.327
Mill's understanding of the relationship between public opinion and rulers represents, to an 
extent, a deviation from his Benthamite inheritance. In Bentham’s view, rulers were always 
a class potentially at odds with the people whom they were meant to represent. He argued 
that the political power of rulers should be counterbalanced by institutions familiar to the 
classical democratic tradition, such as universal suffrage, majority rule and the secret 
ballot.328 Bentham’s political theory was founded on the idea that society was divided into 
two main groups: ‘the ruling few’ and ‘the subject many'. The former was the power- 
holding class who had the means to corrupt others, and the latter was the group that did not 
have such means, but was nonetheless morally and intellectually capable of choosing its 
representatives and exercising control over its rulers. Bentham drew attention to the Public 
Opinion Tribunal as a body which applied a moral sanction to subjects and rulers: ‘at one 
point he spoke of the Public Opinion Tribunal in terms of a jury; at another, of public 
opinion itself as a system of law superior to the Common L aw '.- The Public Opinion 
Tribunal was a social force that promoted the public interest against sinister interests.
3-6 See J. Hart, Proportional Representation: Critics o f  the British Electoral System 1820-1945. p. 53.
3:7 See ibid., p. 45.
3~8 See F. Rosen, Jerem y Bentham and Representative Dem ocracy: A Study o f  the Constitutional Code, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1983), p. 13.
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Bentham did not equate the Public Opinion Tribunal with the opinion of ‘the subject 
many’. However, there is no doubt that he used it to provide security against the abuse of 
power by the ‘ruling few’. Bentham granted the electorate the power to remove 
representatives and civil servants in order to keep the ruling few accountable. Both 
Bentham and Mill favoured publicity and accountability. But while Bentham’s main 
concern was to provide securities against the propensity of the economic and political elite 
(the ruling few) to corrupt, Mill focused on preventing the majority from threatening 
diversity and individuality. This was a consequence of Mill's sociology, according to which 
the ascendancy of the middle classes and of the commercial spirit was destroying the ties of 
tradition and establishing the majority as the final authority to be resorted to by everyone. 
In Mill’s view, mediocrity was a necessary consequence of the process of standardization 
that was operating in the nineteenth-century, and public opinion was its main organ. Mill's 
support of Hare’s system of representation was intended to allow the clerisy, the intellectual 
elite, to enlighten the majority and render it accountable. Mill saw public opinion, which 
Bentham regarded as the main remedy for the infirmities of the political system, as the 
main source of its problems. Mill’s intellectual elite was designed to check the majority 
within parliament. He assumed that such an elite had the capacity to make the majority 
aware of its own limits and to convince people that they needed to follow the right path 
without being coerced into doing so. For Mill, Hare's system was superior to plural voting 
because it allowed the participation of an educated minority in parliament, without the 
necessity of allocating different number of votes, but he never said that the two devices 
were incompatible.
329 Ibid., p. 28.
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3.4. MILL’S DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS
Mill thought that the building up and the reform of institutions were processes essential to 
social life. He stated in Considerations on Representative Government that institutions 
needed to be reformed because society was not an entity that had inbuilt mechanisms which 
would produce self-enhancement.330 Its improvement depended on individual and collective 
efforts to create an institutional framework that promoted liberty and diversity, and this was 
possible only in societies where people were willing to obey the law and help with its 
enforcement. According to Mill, a democratic regime could not operate in a society where 
people refused to leave the avenging of their wrongs to the judicial system and regarded
3 31law as something designed to undermine their interests. Mill claimed that representative 
democracy was viable in Britain because the British people regarded the law as something 
that promoted their interests and should be respected. For him, the main difference between 
the situation of members of uncivilized societies and uninstructed members of civilized 
ones was that the latter were involved in a socio-political dynamic that could educate them. 
By participating in voluntary associations, juries, trade unions, and local government, they 
could become part of the national government. Believing that societies could not flourish if 
they were misgoverned. Mill ascribed particular importance to the organization of national 
government.332 His conception of democracy entailed a dispersion of the power of the 
majority by the establishment of a system of checks to counter the ‘winner-takes-alF 
political system that left the educated minority unprotected.333 Preventing the concentration
330 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, pp. 375-6.
33' See ibid., p. 377.
332 See J.S. Mill, Journal and D ebating Speeches, (CW), XXVI, p. 259.
333 See J.R. Pennock D em ocratic P olitical theory, pp. 126-7.
of power was important because it caused governments to be unaccountable.334 Mill’s 
advocacy of plural voting and Hare’s system were, therefore, intended to scatter power by 
establishing ‘the competent, educated minority as a counterforce (however limited) to the 
ascendancy of the majority in a democratic society’.335 It is important to investigate 
whether Mill failed to translate his conception of democracy into electoral institutions 
because of a lack of expertise in dealing with institutional mechanics, or whether his 
conception of democracy itself is intrinsically problematic. Mill’s democratic credentials 
are in doubt not only because he advocated plural voting, but also because he defended the 
creation of a Commission of Legislation with exclusive authority to draft bills. Its members 
were to be appointed by the Prime Minister for a fixed, but renewable, term. He believed 
that the business of legislation should be performed by trained minds capable of framing 
the provisions of a law ‘with the most accurate and long-sighted perception of its effect on 
all other provisions’.336 The Commission of Legislation could not enact laws, but could 
reject them if they were incompatible with other existing legislative provisions. Some 
critics think that this Commission would have unduly shifted power from elected 
representatives to a body of experts not chosen by the people.337 For these critics. Mill 
raised the counteracting of incompetence, both at administrative and political levels, into
the most important aspect of representative democracy, and disregarded the importance of
1 1 1 )
participation and equality. They argue that Mill developed an elitist account of 
administration and political representation which is, ultimately, based on his belief that
334 See L. Guinier, The Tyranny o f  the M ajority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Dem ocracy , (New  
York: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 3, 8.
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there were two kinds of man who were qualitatively different: the active man who devoted 
great energy to the general well-being, but refused to follow the standards prevailing in 
society, and the passive man who was devoted to living in security and to adjusting himself 
to the values accepted in society.339 Inspired by Humboldt, Mill identified the active man as 
the one who aimed at the highest development of his intellectual powers.340 The active 
character was also the one who exercised his power of detachment from existing values in 
order to generate his personal conception of the good, and because of this constituted the 
heroic model who was the subject of emulation for the passive man.341
In order to understand the role of intellectual excellence in Mill’s conception of democracy, 
especially as it was presented in Considerations on Representative Government, one should 
take into account the debate on intellectual authority which occurred around the time of the 
Reform Act of 1867, which enfranchised a significant number of the urban working 
classes.342 Matthew Arnold was the thinker most preoccupied with the question of 
intellectual authority during the Victorian period. Arnold criticised the philistinism of the 
English middle classes in his most celebrated work, Culture and Anarchy (1867). He 
equated democracy with the primacy of the animal instincts, and defended the need to 
promote a culture of the spirit in order to counterbalance the powerful influence of the 
brutality of the democratic spirit. For Arnold, the superiority of French prose was due to the 
existence of the recognised authority of the French Academy, which was responsible for 
defining intellectual standards. Walter Bagehot, in The English Constitution (1867),
338 See D. Thompson, J.S. M ill and Representative Governm ent, p. 55.
339 See T. Fuller. ‘John Stuart Mill and The Transformation o f Politics in Representative Government, 
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340 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty , (CW), XVIII, p. 261.
criticized Arnold on the grounds that a centralised intellectual authority would tend to 
stultify intellectual growth and suppress diversity. For Bagehot, the harmonious world that 
Arnold intended to create was not one that promoted improvement. Discussion and debate 
were the defining characteristics of modernity and the pre-requisites of progress. In fact, 
Mill, like Bagehot, opposed the idea of a centralised intellectual authority. Mill would have 
rejected any attempt to allow the state to control public debate. He opposed Comte's 
Systeme de Politique Positive because it suggested that an organised ‘body of teachers’ 
should exert an all-encompassing spiritual power over society. Mill regarded this as a form 
of despotism that neglected the role of liberty in the development of the community.343 It is 
interesting to note that James Fitzjames Stephen criticised Mill in Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity (1873) for neglecting the role of coercion in social life, and for encouraging 
individuality and eccentricity in a way that risked undermining society.344 For Stephen, 
Mill failed to recognise that the ‘wise minority* were the rightful masters of the ‘ignorant 
and foolish majority*, whose character could not be improved. Stephen advocated elitism 
from a utilitarian perspective, because he presumed that coercion over the uninstructed 
masses would maximise the general happiness.34:> In view of all this, one can observe that, 
if some see elitism in Mill's political philosophy, others think he is opposed to the view that 
the ‘wise minority* should rule the uneducated majority. What is clear is that, in the context 
of the Victorian debate on intellectual authority, he was on the side of those who promoted 
diversity and opposed centralized intellectual authority.
34' See ibid., p. 262-63.
342 See H.S. Jones, Victorian Political Thought, (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 2000), p. 64.
343 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography and Literary Essays, (CW), I. pp. 220-21.
344 See J.F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 66-9.
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Mill lacked confidence in the average man of democratic society, but rejected the 
conventional nineteenth-century view that aristocracies were superior to democracies in 
high mental qualifications. He saw aristocratic governments as inclined to assume unjust 
privileges, benefit the pockets of their members, foment dissensions among others to 
remain in power, and work to keep common citizens at a low level of intelligence.346 Mill 
stressed the fact that aristocracies that had shown high governing capabilities were, without 
exception, aristocracies of public functionaries trained in the affairs of the state and having 
public business as their profession. These professionals had their destinies bound up with 
the destiny of the commonwealth, a situation which forced them to perform as well as they 
could.
For Mill. Rome and Venice were the only examples of aristocracies governed with vigorous 
mental ability for many generations. Mill was extremely critical of the quality of the 
aristocratic governments of nineteenth-century Europe: ‘a great minister, in the aristocratic 
governments of modem Europe, is almost as rare a phenomenon as a great king’.347 This 
lack of confidence in aristocracies explains to an extent why he did not propose that the 
House of Lords should be seen as the main instrument for tempering the ascendancy of the 
majority of the lower House. For him, a second chamber should be tolerated only where 
strong historic antecedents made people more willing to allow it to moderate the 
ascendancy of democracy. Where these historic antecedents did not exist, a second chamber
345 See K.C. O'Rourke, ‘John Stuart Mill and Freedom o f  Expression: The Genesis o f a Theory', (London: 
Ph.D, 1999), pp. 173-87.
346 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW). XIX, p. 441.
347 Ibid.. p. 448.
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was not ‘required for this purpose, and would not contribute to it, but might even, in some 
conceivable modes, impede its attainment’.348
On the one hand, Mill did not presume that the man-in-the-street, if not deceived by 
sectional interests, would automatically aspire to promote the common good. This is a 
conviction that can be properly ascribed to Rousseau.349 On the other hand, he nurtured 
optimism in the power of education to improve the intellectual standards of the masses.3M} 
He saw education as essential to the improvement of society, but emphasized the necessity 
of avoiding uniformity in the educational process. For Mill, education comprised formal 
schooling, as well as a number of other types of social interaction which could contribute to 
the generation of active characters and be a source of renewal for society. Education had a 
necessary civic component because people understood the advantages of co-operation only
^  j
when they exchanged experiences in the public sphere. This was why. in On Liberty, 
Considerations on Representative Government and Utilitarianism, Mill associated 
education with diversity and openness to public concerns.3^ 2 He was not a full-fledged 
participatory democrat, but he argued that people should be educated and should 
increasingly participate in the political process. He cannot, therefore, be simply labelled as 
an elitist. There are. nonetheless, some unrealistic assumptions in his account of the 
relationship between education and the political process. Mill’s portrayal of the educated 
few as persons freed from the influence of the crass materialism of the commercial spirit
348 J.S. Mill. Considerations on Representative Government,(C\V), XIX, p. 516.
349 See A. Hacker. P olitical Theory: Philosophy, Ideology, Science, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1961). p. 336.
330 See J.S. Mill. Journal and D ebating Speeches, (C\V), XXVI, p. 260.
351 See D. Thompson, J.S. M ill and Representative Government, p. 16.
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and altruistically engaged in politics was founded on the dubious notion that educational 
qualification led inevitably to public spiritedness. His assumption that the educated few 
formed a homogeneous group was similarly inaccurate. The results of the general election 
of 1868, the first after the Second Reform Act, showed that voting patterns did not follow 
strict class, educational, or denominational lines.353 It is more likely that, had the educated 
minority obtained a reasonable number of seats in parliament, the individuals which 
composed it would have had different opinions about some issues and, in some 
circumstances, been motivated by egoism. Mill also failed to perceive that the educated few 
might themselves have benefited from the contribution of the other members of parliament, 
because ordinary men might also have enriched parliament with their knowledge and 
experience. The educated few are not platonic guardians who are fit to rule society because 
they know the supreme patterns of reality and others do not.354 Besides, each legislature 
addresses a different set of problems, and it is not possible to pre-determine with precision 
what kind of knowledge will be required to deal with them. Mill did not offer an accurate 
picture of reality in supposing that the political process was a school in which the educated 
few were teachers and the others were pupils.3:0
Disraeli observed that Mill was incoherent when he defended, on the one hand, devices to 
restrict the participation of workers in the political process, in Considerations on 
Representative Government; and. on the other hand, backed proposals to extend the 
franchise. Disraeli's comments, politically motivated as they might have been, highlight the 
difficulties on rendering Mill’s restrictions to participation, exposed in Considerations on
151 See A. Hawkins, British Party Politics 1852-1886. p. 134.
354 See Plato, The Republic, 484c-d and 561c.
Representative Government, compatible with other aspects of Mill’s account of democracy. 
In other words. Mill argued that societies could not improve under the control of a 
centralized intellectual authority, but rather by means of discussion and debate, that central 
government should allow communities to run local government, and that people could be 
educated and participate in the political process. Yet, despite all this, in Considerations on 
Representative Government, Mill allowed only a limited scope for citizens’ involvement in 
politics.356 Political theorists have difficulty in understanding Considerations on 
Representative Government because the account of institutions that it contains is not placed 
in the broader context of Mill’s reformism. From the mid-1850s onwards, Mill realized that 
institutional reform would not lead to genuine amelioration in society unless it was 
accompanied by enhancements in the intellectual and moral state of human beings.357 For 
this reason, fundamental institutional improvements had to be accompanied by changes in 
the beliefs and values that shaped society, because ‘it is what men think, that determines 
how they act'.358 Attempts to make wide-ranging changes in institutions would fail if they 
were based on values and beliefs which were not strongly embedded in the political culture 
of society. Mill was not mainly concerned with the technical aspects of legislation when he 
advocated a Commission of Legislation to examine if proposed legislation was compatible 
with existing legal provisions. Rather, his concern was to prevent sweeping changes in 
legislation caused by the political power of the masses, who he presumed would soon be 
much more influential in parliament. His conviction that changes in social structures must 
be paralleled by changes in mentality also influenced his support for plural voting and for
355 See J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. (CW), XIX, p. 539.
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Hare’s system. Mill was not against comprehensive institutional and social reforms in 
themselves, but he believed that unrealistic efforts to implement them rapidly produced bad 
consequences. From the early 1860s, Mill increasingly accepted that, in societies where 
representative democracy was possible, gradual reforms were more appropriate than 
revolutionary ones, because they could be achieved by means of rational debate and in a 
pacific manner. In this period, Mill moderated his support for socialism and, based on his 
reflections on the Revolution of 1848, gave more attention to the educational standards of 
the electorate. He heartily supported the Revolution of 1848 on the grounds that it was 
caused by the French authorities when they maliciously revived a decree passed in the 
period of the Revolution of 1789 to prohibit reform banquets - peaceful demonstrations in 
which people gathered for a meal and to discuss topics of public interest.3^ 9 Nonetheless, in 
Considerations on Representative Government, he assumed that the re-establishment of the 
republic with the Constitution of 4 November 1848, which extended the suffrage to the 
entire male population, facilitated the ascendancy of Louis-Napoleon. who won the 
presidential election of December 1848 with 74.2% of the votes and instigated a coup 
d'etat on 2 December 1851.360 For Mill, these events showed that the progressive extension 
of the suffrage, combined with the improvement of educational standards, would have 
served the cause of the republic better than the immediate extension of the suffrage. The 
rationale of Mill’s account of the Revolution of 1848 helps explain his electoral proposals 
in the 1860s and, particularly, his support for the Reform Act of 1867. This piece of 
legislation significantly extended the franchise. It increased the number of voters in the 
counties by 45% and in the boroughs by 135%, increasing the electorate in the UK from
158 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (CW), XIX, p. 382.
359 See J.S. Mill, Vindication o f  The French Revolution o f  February 1848, (CW), XX, p. 330.
about 1,400,000 to about 2,600,000.361 Mill’s electoral proposals reflected his fear of 
possible societal deterioration due to attempts to implement all-encompassing, but 
unfeasible, changes in political institutions. He argued, however, that the renewal of 
education and the continuous exercise of freedom could create the conditions in which 
progressive changes in institutions could safely take place. Mill supported the Reform Act 
of 1867 because he saw it as a change that could be assimilated by society and would boost 
people’s participation in politics. Despite being introduced and passed by Disraeli who was 
a Conservative, the Second Reform Act was in accord with the sort of gradual reformism 
Mill advocated during the 1860s. Disraeli was able to get the measure through parliament 
because he was flexible in allowing amendments to it, and astute in exploiting dissensions 
amongst the Liberals. He criticised Mill for incoherence, but he himself had been 
inconsistent in rejecting a less ambitious parliamentary reform bill proposed by Gladstone 
in March 1866, saying that its approval would cause the aristocracy to lose their natural 
leadership of the country.362 On that occasion, he was helped by the Liberal Robert Lowe, 
who argued that democracy would inevitably bring vulgar demagogues to power and result 
in a selfish and inefficient government such as those in France, Australia, and America.363 
The Second Reform Act significantly extended the franchise, but it cannot be seen as a 
revolutionary proposal because it left about two thirds of the male population 
unenfranchised. The newly enfranchised were primarily skilled workers in urban areas, 
whereas Mill feared the enfranchisement of unskilled workers, and workers in rural areas, 
who were largely illiterate. He believed that risks to society came not only from attempts to
360 See S. Gemie, French Revolutions, 1815-1914, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 143-44.
361 See D.G. Wright, Dem ocracy and Reform 1815-1885, (London: Longman, 1970). p. 81.
362 See D. Murphy, R. Staton, P. Walsh-Atkins, N. Whiskerd, Britain 1815-1918, (London: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1999), p. 158.
implement unfeasible reforms, but also from attempts to impede feasible ones. On 6 May 
1867, in order to prevent violence, Mill convinced the leaders of the working classes to 
transfer a meeting scheduled to be held at Hyde Park to another place. He argued that the 
government was making military preparations to prevent the meeting, and that a 
confrontation with the government could only be justified in a situation in which revolution 
was desirable, but that such was not then the case.364 He certainly did not see the Hyde Park 
riots and the other agitations which occurred in the late 1860s as immediate revolutionary 
threats to British society. Nonetheless, it was clear to Mill that revolutionary ideals were 
making inroads in British society, and that wise institutional reforms were necessary to 
improve society and render revolution unnecessary. The evolution of Mill’s ideas on 
political economy in general, and on socialism in particular, show that during the 1860s he 
was particularly concerned with the diffusion of revolutionary ideals which he associated 
with forms of socialism incompatible with freedom. In Considerations on Representative 
Government. he did not address the debate between those who favoured reform and those 
who favoured revolution, because his focus there was on political institutions. However, 
there is no reason to think that he disregarded his broader vision of the socio-historic 
context in his account of political institutions. In Mill’s thought, issues related to 
professional administration, participation, and accountability were also related to social 
justice and freedom. Mill perceived that, in order to contribute to the enhancement of 
society, institutional changes must be grounded on a balanced consideration of all these 
issues. An isolated promotion of social justice could, for example, be detrimental to 
freedom, and vice versa. The suitability of proposed changes was to be measured by their
363 See D.G. Wright, D em ocracy and Reform 1815-1885, pp. 69-70.
364 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 278.
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capacity to improve society without compromising previous achievements. Mill’s thirty- 
years’ experience as an imperial administrator had shown him that, in order to be 
successful, reforms must introduce new elements capable of overcoming the stagnant 
routine of existing institutions and, at the same time, conserve practices and values, either 
because they were essential to the well-being of society or because their alteration could 
produce turmoil.36'*'
From what has been said so far, it can be seen that, fearing revolutionary threats and 
incompetent leadership, Mill proposed cautious reforms in political institutions. Thus, in 
Considerations on Representative Government, he offered moderate scope for the 
participation of citizens in politics, not due to elitism on his part, but because he intended to 
promote the creation of a cultural atmosphere capable of buttressing bolder institutional 
changes before they could be implemented effectively. Mill’s defence of a moderate 
participatory democracy reflected his intention to create a balance of power in society, and 
not the rigid view that the ‘active character’ and the ‘wise minority’ were superior to the 
common man and, therefore, should reign over society. Mill was not an anti-democrat, but 
his conception of democracy failed to take into account the possibility of a minority 
tyrannising over the majority. He should have considered the fact that the masses, though 
growing stronger, were not the dominant power in society, so that the possibility of their 
being oppressed was a real one. Mill devised an electoral framework to allow the 
autonomous individual described in On Liberty to perform the role of enlightening the 
masses. But he overestimated both the role that an individual detached from the prevailing
365 See L. Zastoupil, ‘J.S. Mill and India", in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill’s Social and Political 
Thought: Critical Assessm ents, 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), iii. 429.
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values in society could perform in the public sphere, and the risk of a tyranny of the 
masses. In addition to this, he prescribed institutions at odds with his paramount intention 
of promoting accountability.
3.5. CONCLUSION
Mill regarded plural voting and Hare’s system of proportional representation as instruments 
to facilitate the election of educated MPs, whom he expected to enlighten parliamentary 
debate and check the ascendancy of the majority. If the model of plural voting he proposed 
had been implemented, it would have generated resentment and alienated people from the 
political process. Besides, the criterion by which votes were to be assigned was based on a 
confusion between technical expertise and political knowledge. The latter cannot be 
measured in terms of university degrees and membership of learned societies. Mill failed to 
realise that the system of representation that Hare proposed was not suitable for promoting 
accountability, because it involved complex practical operations that people in general 
would not be able to understand. There is no doubt that Mill believed that the main threat to 
society came from the masses whose main organ was public opinion. Despite this, he 
asserted that education and participation in non-electoral institutions could raise the 
standard of the masses, and prepare them for the electoral process. His proposals were not 
consistent with his democratic ideals because they compromised accountability and 
participation. But Mill was committed to democracy and intended to design political 
institutions that could prevent tyranny by creating a balance of power in society, and 
promoted increased participation of the people in politics. Fearing the possibility of 
revolutionary changes, he advocated a gradual extension of the franchise, while education
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and free debate prepared people for full participation in political life. The weakest point of 
Mill’s conception of democracy is that it failed to take into account the possibility of the 
minority tyrannising over the majority. The other errors are mainly the consequence of his 
failure to develop a coherent institutional framework to put his gradualist conception of 
reform into practice. But, in the end, Mill made a significant contribution to political theory 
because he understood that democracy requires a balance of power, without which 
accountability is an empty word, and a political culture capable of encouraging 
participation, professional administration, and education.
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CHAPTER 4
WOMEN’S ENFRANCHISEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, it will be shown that accountability is a central concern of Mill's views on 
women's issues. Believing that people must be held accountable for the consequences of 
their acts. Mill argued in favour of the recognition of the legal and moral personhood of 
women. He judged it essential both to make government accountable to women, and to 
make women accountable before society for their choices and opinions on public matters. It 
will be argued that Mill saw the enfranchisement of women as an instrument for the 
creation of an environment where they would be respected and for converting the family 
into the main locus of education for citizenship. It will be contended that Mill claimed that 
acknowledging men and women as partakers of a common dignity was vital in bolstering 
cooperation in modem societies w'hich required increasing interdependency among their 
members.
The second section will show that accountability was a concern present in Mill’s account of 
women's issues from the early 1830s, and that accountability was closely associated with
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Mill’s conception of autonomy. The central line of argument of Mill’s main texts on the 
topic, and of Harriet Taylor’s Enfranchisement o f Women, will be explored. Special 
attention will be paid to Subjection o f Women because it developed the arguments of Mill’s 
earlier texts and located them within a more comprehensive philosophical framework. It 
will be shown that, for Mill, women’s enfranchisement would produce major positive 
changes in the socio-political culture of modern societies.
The third section will describe the main arguments of some of the most important 
contemporary commentators on Mill’s account of women’s issues, and show how these 
commentators related these issues to other aspects of his political philosophy. At the heart 
of this section are the following questions: 1) Did Mill advocate women's enfranchisement 
only to remove legal disabilities, or did he see it as a means of bringing about wider socio­
cultural changes? 2) Did he think the differences between men and women were caused by 
culture rather than by nature? 3) Did he favour the idea that the marriage contract should be 
grounded on partnership? Special attention will be paid to Susan Mendus’ contribution to 
this topic because she argues that Mill's account of women's issues dovetails with his 
praise of diversity and his intention of making government accountable to the people. This 
section will provide a theoretical basis for the critical work to be undertaken in the fourth 
section.
The fourth section will evaluate the arguments of the commentators described in the third 
section in the light of the re-construction of Mill's thought made in the second section. This 
fourth section will demonstrate that most commentators have failed to situate Mill’s views 
on women’s issues in the broader context of his thought, and relate them to his theory of
163
history. This has not prevented commentators from grasping certain elements of Mill’s 
account. However, it will be argued that most of them fail to recognise the extent to which 
Mill’s concern with accountability influenced his account of women’s enfranchisement, 
and fail to perceive that he promoted the recognition of women’s legal personhood because 
this would allow them to participate in the public sphere, develop their sense of 
responsibility, and increase co-operation amongst all members of society.
The fifth section will argue that Mill believed that the regeneration of society depended to a 
significant extent on the recognition of women as autonomous human beings. He regarded 
this recognition as a matter of justice, in that the existing system treated women as inferior 
by disregarding their capabilities and leaving them unprotected in the domestic realm. Mill 
wanted to transform marriage into a relationship between equals, on the grounds that this 
would convert families into schools of co-operation and friendship. It will be further argued 
that Mill’s attempt to create a socio-political framework that enabled women to have a 
voice in public matters, and to make them responsible for their own choices before society, 
was attuned to his political philosophy, which attempted to render all citizens who acted in 
the public sphere accountable for their choices.
4.2. MILL ON WOMEN’S ISSUES
As early as the 1820s, Mill dissented from his father’s belief, expressed in Essay on 
Government, ‘that women might without compromising good government be excluded
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from the suffrage because their interest is the same with that of men’.366 Mill saw this as 
being as great an error as the idea that the interest of subjects was represented in that of 
kings.367 In the late 1820s, Mill was influenced by the Saint-Simonians who favoured a new 
social scheme that classed people according to their capacities, remunerated them according 
to their works, and altered family relations so as to establish perfect equality between men 
and women.368 He extolled the Saint-Simonians’ courage for proposing alterations in 
marriage relations in a period in which reformers tended to shy away from this question.369
In the early 1830s. Mill started his intellectual relationship with Harriet Taylor, whose ideas 
on issues related to women and socialism increasingly came to influence his political 
thought. In this period, he wrote an essay, entitled by his editors On Marriage (1832-337), 
in which he criticised the law of marriage, arguing that it reinforced the social practice of 
educating women to depend on men. It presumed that if women were not married, they had 
no useful office to fulfil in the world.3 0 Mill challenged the view that, in marriage, women 
were primarily seeking a home, because he saw no reason other than love for two persons 
to associate their existences. In his opinion, women realised that their power over men 
derived mostly from men’s sensuality, and that, unless buttressed by law and public 
opinion, marriages tended to be destroyed because the same sensuality which allowed them 
to have some control over men could lead men to a search for sexual gratification 
elsewhere. For Mill, the question at the root of the issue of women’s emancipation was the 
following: was marriage a relation between equals or between a superior and an inferior?
366 J.S. Mill, Autobiography. (CW), I, p. 106.
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He answered this question by noting that the most obvious inequality between men and 
women lay in bodily strength, but pointed out that even this inequality was becoming 
increasingly irrelevant. Most of what people deemed to be inequalities between men and 
women derived from an unsatisfactory process of female education, that left women either 
the playthings or the slaves of the men that fed them.371 Mill accordingly argued that in 
order to remedy the situation, it was necessary to educate women for economic 
independence. Unable to gain their own livelihood, they were coerced into marriage, since 
otherwise their lives would be considered to be failures. " In On Marriage, Mill said that 
the prevailing system of education failed to explain to women that the essence of 
prostitution was the delivery up of one person for bread.373 He believed that, legally 
emancipated and economically independent, no woman would be married for the sake of 
being married, and that the continuance of marriage would be dependent upon the wishes of 
the contracting parties.374 Education for economic independence was, for Mill, an important 
step towards the enfranchisement of women, and became a topic of interest for him from 
this time. Despite this, in reviewing Samuel Bailey’s Rationale o f Political Representation 
(1835). he asserted that it was not a good idea to bring forward the issue of women's 
enfranchisement in public discussion, because there was no prospect of practical 
advantage.375 Yet, in the first half of the 1830s. Harriet Taylor produced a manuscript, 
similarly entitled by her editors On Marriage (1832-33?), in which she deplored the fact 
that women were educated to gain their living by getting married, advocated access to
See ibid., p. 41.
371 See ibid., p. 42.
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375 See J.S. M ill, Rationale o f  Representation, (CW), XVIII, p. 29.
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public offices for women, and suggested that the unrestricted right to divorce might be the 
best solution for those who suffered the evils of marriage.376
In the late 1840s, Mill and Harriet Taylor collaborated on five manuscripts which their 
editors gathered under the title Papers on Women’s Rights. These manuscripts can be seen 
as the groundwork for Enfranchisement o f Women. In Papers on Women's Rights the 
disfranchisement of women was compared to old forms of exclusion and privilege, such as 
serfdom, the system of castes, and slavery.377 Mill and Harriet Taylor also suggested that, 
having distinguished themselves as writers and sovereigns, women could not be said to be
■J “70
disqualified for functions other than those related to the family. Therefore, to exclude 
women from the vote equated to ‘stamping on them the character of inferiority’. They 
shared the view that women as much as men needed to vote in order to enlarge the range of 
their experiences, and to protect their interests. Papers on Women’s Rights was marked by 
the idea that if women were confined to the domestic sphere, they would be denied the 
exchange of experiences that would allow them to improve. Furthermore, Mill and Taylor 
agreed that the participation of women in campaigns of social relevance proved that they 
could contribute significantly to the public sphere.
During the 1850s. Mill did not publish anything which addressed the situation of women, 
because he thought that his views on the issue were so ‘totally opposed to the reigning
376 See H. Taylor, Appendix A. On M arriage, (CW), XXI, p. 376.
377 See J.S. Mill and H. Taylor, Appendix B. Papers on W omen’s Rights, (CW), XXI, p. 379.
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notion, that it would probably be inexpedient to express all of them’.381 But his continuing
'lO')
interest in the subject is evident in his correspondence. In 1851, before marrying Harriet 
Taylor, Mill wrote a document in which he renounced the powers that the law conferred 
upon him, and authorized Taylor to retain ‘in all respects whatever the same absolute 
freedom of action, and freedom of disposal of herself and of all that does or may at any 
time belong to her, as if no such marriage had taken place'. ' This document, published 
under the title Statement on Marriage, has a powerful symbolic dimension. However, from 
a theoretical point of view, it added nothing new to Mill’s previous arguments. Harriet 
Taylor’s Enfranchisement o f Women (1851) was written at this time, with Mill claiming
^ 0 4that he participated in its publication only as an amanuensis. It is, nonetheless, important 
to provide an exposition of the central arguments of Enfranchisement o f Women for the 
following reasons. First, the essay summarizes Harriet Taylor’s pivotal ideas about the 
social consequences of women’s disfranchisement, and is a key to understanding the 
exchange of ideas between Harriet Taylor and Mill. It is easy to perceive the affinities 
between the Enfranchisement o f Women and their joint production, Papers on Women’s 
Rights (1847-50). Moreover, it influenced Mill's later publication Subjection o f Women. 
Second, many commentators compare Subjection o f Women with Enfranchisement o f 
Women. Hence, it is important to grasp the central concerns in order to be able to 
understand and evaluate the views of these commentators. Third, the essay represents an 
important contribution in its own right to the debate on women’s issues in nineteeth-century 
Britain.
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Enfranchisement o f Women purported to discuss women’s ‘admission, in law and in fact, to
•>q ^
equality in all rights, political, civil, and social, with the male citizens of the community’. 
Harriet Taylor wanted to inform the public that there was already a movement to promote 
the enfranchisement of women in the United States which was not only for women but 
organized by them. She argued that in admitting that everyone had an inherent right to have 
a voice in matters of government, the democratic institutions of the United States could not 
consistently deny women the right to the suffrage.386 She did not, therefore, accept that the 
‘governed’ referred to in the American Declaration of Independence, and ‘whose consent is 
affirmed to be the only source of just power, are meant for that half of mankind only, who, 
in relation to the other, have hitherto assumed the character of governors’.387 She also 
criticised the Chartists in Britain and the democrats in Continental Europe for their 
exclusion of women from their campaigns for enfranchisement, despite claiming that they 
supported universal suffrage.388 In addition, Taylor disapproved of the fact that the widely 
accepted principle that taxation should be co-extensive with representation was 
disrespected in Britain, in that unmarried women who paid taxes were not enfranchised. In 
her view, the Chartists and those who wanted taxation to be co-extensive with 
representation refused to support women’s enfranchisement because of their prejudice 
against novelty, which she presumed to be the main obstacle to the establishment of equal
TOQ
rights between men and women. In this sense, what were regarded as liberties had at one 
time been objected to on account of their novelty. Taylor saw that, due to the strong 
feelings associated with the topic, it would not be easy to ‘throw off the old rule and receive
385 Ibid., p. 395.
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the new’ in relation to the role of women in society. But she believed that equality must be 
pursued, because ‘the division of mankind into two castes, one bom to rule over the other, 
is .... a bar, almost insuperable while it lasts, to any really vital improvement’.390 For 
Harriet Taylor, the attempt to maintain that domestic life was the proper sphere of action 
for women was mistaken, because the proper sphere of action for any human being was the 
one he or she was able to attain. It was vital to allow people to exercise free choice, so that 
they could prove their aptitude by trial. In this case, ‘employments will fall into the hands 
of those men or women who are found by experience to be most capable of worthily 
exercising them’.391 Taylor believed that, were women allowed to enlarge their faculties 
through education, many of them would take up activities outside their homes. In her 
opinion, many women had already proved themselves fitted to the highest office of state, 
for instance Elizabeth I, Isabella of Castile. Maria Teresa, Catherine of Russia, Blanche, 
mother of Louis IX of France, and Jeanne d’Albret, mother of Henry IV.392 Taylor 
complained about the condition of women who were obliged to allow their husbands to rule 
over their familial concerns, even if their intellectual abilities were lower than those of their 
wives.393 She did not agree with those who opposed the participation of women in paid 
employment through fear of a reduction in wages, because she thought that the aggregate 
earning capacity of families was not likely to be diminished. When women contributed to 
the support of their families, they received better treatment from their husbands, and power 
within families was more balanced. She aimed for a society in which competition was not 
the general law of human life, and believed that neither the reward of labourers based on
170
the mechanism of supply and demand, nor the division of society between owners of means 
of production and hired labourers, would remain forever.394 Overall, she saw no sound 
argument against the enfranchisement of women and their ability to access other spheres of 
social life, and expressed her hope that the movement to enfranchise women that had 
already begun on the other side of the Atlantic would soon be initiated in Britain.395
Mill wrote Subjection o f Women, a comprehensive account of women’s issues, in 1861. It 
was not published until 1869, when Mill hoped to promote the movement in favour of 
women’s enfranchisement which was increasing in influence and had an active member in 
Helen Taylor, his step-daughter.396 Between 1861 and 1869. Mill made a considerable 
effort to support causes related to women. On 20 May 1867 his proposal to amend the 
Reform Bill so as to extend the suffrage to women was defeated, but the 73 votes recorded 
in favour of the motion encouraged him to become yet more involved with the promotion 
of the cause. On 10 June 1868 the Married Women’s Property Bill, sponsored by Mill and 
intended to permit married women to apply for protection of their earnings in case of 
desertion, passed its second reading in parliament. But Subjection o f Women remained 
Mill's most important contribution on the subject of women's social and legal status.
In Subjection o f Women, Mill argued that the then existing system of legal subordination of 
women was inherently wrong, and that it should be replaced by a system based on equality. 
He deemed this reform as essential to the improvement of mankind. In his opinion, female
393 See ibid..p. 410.
393 See ibid., p. 404.
395 See ibid., p. 415.
396 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 265.
subordination was not grounded in argument but in deep-rooted feelings, so that it was not 
easy to oppose it: ‘in every respect the burden is hard on those who attack an almost 
universal opinion’.397 Women’s subordination was thus supported by the general feeling of 
the period, whereby people ascribed to instinct the importance that they refused to ascribe 
to reason. Mill admitted that he would accept that the rule of men over women was correct 
if different kinds of social experiments had been made, and had proved that the subjection 
of women was the alternative most conducive to the happiness of the community. But this 
conclusion would only be valid if the situation in which men were subjugated to women 
had also been tested. In fact. Mill believed that the system of inequality derived from the 
the fact that in the earlier stages of human society women were found in a state of
OQO
dependence to some man, due to their physical inferiority. The institutions of marriage 
and slavery had been established when a physical subjection had been converted into a 
legal one, and these in turn had gradually been transformed into milder forms of 
dependence. Mill claimed that practices and institutions deep-rooted in people’s sentiments 
were generally regarded as ‘natural’ because ‘natural’ was synonymous with ‘customary’. 
Mill referred to Aristotle as an example of someone who had contributed to the intellectual 
progress of humanity, but had upheld unacceptable institutions such as slavery on the 
grounds that they were natural.399 Mill assumed that women were conditioned by their 
education to believe that their ideal character was one of submission, and that this implied 
that men were the only possible source of fulfilment for them. He judged, nonetheless, that 
the system of inequality between men and women was at odds with modern society, where 
people were no longer ‘chained down by an inexorable bond to the place they are bom to,
397 J.S. Mill. Subjection o f  Women, (CW), XXI, p. 261.
398 See ibid.. p. 264.
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but free to employ their faculties, and such favourable chances as offer, to achieve the lot 
which may appear to them the most desirable’.400 Mill presumed that the free participation 
of women in the sphere of political life and economic competition was necessary in order to 
establish what women were truly fit for - the ignorance concerning the laws of formation of 
character was such that it was not possible to say beforehand what the appropriate role for 
women in society might be.401
Mill deplored the fact that the law of the strongest prevailed in the marriage contract. Once 
a woman married, ‘she can do no act whatever but by [her husband’s] permission, at least 
tacit. She could acquire no property but for him; the instant it becomes hers, even if by 
inheritance, it becomes ipso facto his'.402 Besides, a woman’s authority over her children 
was a delegation from the power of her husband who had legal rights over them and, ‘if she 
leaves her husband, she can take nothing with her, neither her children nor anything which 
is rightfully her own’.403 The marriage contract granted absolute powers to husbands, who 
were not required to prove that they were fit to exercise them. The consequence was that 
domestic violence against women was frequently left unpunished. For Mill, the truth was 
that ‘even the commonest men reserve the violent, the sulky, the undisguisedly selfish side 
of their character for those who have no power to withstand it’.404 In giving the husband 
absolute powers over the wife, society took the risk that they would use such powers in a 
despotic manner. But there was another significant risk in not permiting women to become 
properly informed about public issues: they could nonetheless gain influence in public
399 See ibid., p. 269.
400 Ibid., p. 273.
401 See ibid., p. 282.
402 Ibid., p. 284.
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matters by means of relatives or friends and, ignoring the seriousness of the questions at 
stake, cause the authorities to ignore important social issues and focus on petty, concerns 
such as getting ‘her husband a title, her son a place, or her daughter a good marriage’.405 It 
was thus necessary to allow women the freedom to manage their own affairs in order to 
prevent them from meddling in the affairs of others as compensation for the impossibility 
of handling their own. Mill wanted marriage to be seen as a voluntary association in which 
it was not necessary for one party to seize total control. He deemed it appropriate to 
determine the functions of couples within families by common agreement, so that the 
sensibilities of their characters were respected.406 The functions to be performed by the 
husband and the wife should be established in a flexible manner, because in each family the 
spouses would be endowed with different capacities. Mill assumed that modern times 
demanded that marriage be ‘a school of sympathy in equality, of living together in love, 
without power on one side or obedience on the other’.407 He regretted the fact that books 
and institutions were still permeated by past views, but he heralded a future in which the 
marriage contract would not be based on the law of the strongest. Mill did not agree with 
those who intended to conserve the existing form of marriage institutions, on the grounds 
that they were in accordance with Christian teachings. Rather, Mill suggested that Christian 
values promoted both the protection of wives from brutality and the creation of an 
atmosphere of partnership within families. He did not depart significantly from the 
traditional view when he admited that, in the case of families that depended on earnings, 
‘the common arrangement, by which the man earns the income and the wife superintends
403 Ibid., p. 285.
4(M Ibid.. p. 288.
405 Ibid.. p. 290.
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the domestic expenditure, seems to me in general the most suitable division of labour 
between the two persons’.408 He judged it utterly unfair to force wives, who had chosen the 
bringing up of their families as the first call upon their time, to work outside the home.
Mill claimed that those who said that women departed from their path to happiness when 
they performed activities that were normally performed by men had the intention of 
keeping them in subordination.409 For Mill, if employments were opened up to equal 
competition, there was no risk that they would fall into the hands of females less competent 
than the average male. He thought that women had proved their capacity to perform many 
activities as successfully as men. and that it was therefore likely that some of them would 
succeed in finding paid employment if they were allowed to compete with men. But it was 
equally important for them to take part in the suffrage (municipal and parliamentary) 
because they needed the protection of the law against the oppression of their masters. In 
Mill's view, women had a bent towards the practical, and a special capacity to synthesize, 
to draw together individual cases and to draw a general conclusion, which enabled them to 
identify their mistakes with less difficulty than men. Therefore, women’s thoughts were ‘as 
useful in giving reality to those of thinking men, as men’s thoughts in giving width and 
largeness to those of women’.410 Mill stated that women’s minds were more flexible than 
men’s, but did not assume that this was a natural difference. In fact, he argued that any 
comparison between the potential of men's and women’s minds would be more accurate
4U/ Ibid., p. 295.
408 Ibid., p. 297.
409 See ibid., p. 299.
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when they had received a similar education and performed the same professional 
activities.411
For Mill, the unchecked power of husbands generated a great deal of suffering for women 
that it was wrong to overlook, and reduced the mental resources available to contribute to 
the improvement of society.412 According to Mill, women had enormous potential to make 
contributions to various aspects of social life due to their predisposition to sympathise with 
people’s needs. However, he did not see missionary activities and charity, areas in which 
women were traditionally allowed to contribute, as objects to which it was proper that they 
should direct their energies. He disapproved of the former, assuming that attempts to 
inculcate faith tended to engender religious animosity, and the latter because it discouraged 
people from self-sufficiency. However, Mill hoped that, once granted the freedom to 
choose, women would direct their sympathetic energies to more appropriate objects.413 A 
man who cared for great objects, such as electoral reform and freedom of opinion, but was 
married to a woman who paid no attention to them, would find in her an obstacle to his 
personal improvement.414 Their dissimilarities rendered them unsuitable for giving 
happiness to each other: ‘unlikeness may attract, but it is likeness which retains’.415 
Friendship and mutual encouragement in marriage were likely to occur among those who 
were similar.416 Mill believed that the involvement of women in public issues would create 
more common ground for couples and thereby improve their relationships. In this sense, 
women’s suffrage would be beneficial for both men and women. He expected that an
411 See ibid.. pp. 314, 318.
4,2 See ibid., p. 326.
413 See ibid., p. 330.
414 See ibid., p. 331.
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increase in women’s participation in the life of society would bring about the additional 
benefit of teaching all members of society to cultivate sympathy.417 Since, for Mill, a 
valuable human life presupposed freedom and responsibility, he wanted society to grant 
both to women. Free, they would pursue their own good and take responsibility for their 
acts. In summary, he argued that the participation of women in public affairs would be a 
source of regeneration for society, and that a society which denied liberty, the strongest 
desire of human nature, to half of its members could never improve.
4.3. COMMENTATORS ON MILL ON WOMEN’S ISSUES
Julia Annas argues that Mill developed an inconsistent account of sexual inequality in
418Subjection o f Women. For Annas, there are two strands of argument that can be adopted 
in order to oppose sexual inequalities: the reformist and the radical. The reformist holds 
that the legal system needs to be reformed in order to give women opportunities without 
which their desires and needs will be frustrated. This argument is utilitarian because it 
assumes that, by putting women’s dormant abilities to work, everyone will benefit. For 
Annas, this approach is compatible with many of the historically established differences 
between the sexes: ‘all that it excludes is that these differences should justify inferior 
opportunities for women in the respects in which their contribution can be recognized’.419 
In contrast to the reformist approach, the radical approach holds that there are no relevant 
differences between men and women that can justify any institutionalization of sexual
4,5 Ibid., p. 332.
416 See ibid.. p. 334.
417 See ibid., p. 336.
177
differences.420 In Annas’ view, a radical change in the relations between the sexes is 
necessary when the existing relations are based on a system that suppresses women’s 
natural impulses by inculcating submissiveness as a virtue. For Annas, Mill’s case for 
women’s liberation in Subjection o f Women mixed the reformist and the radical accounts. 
On the one hand, Mill followed the radical approach, saying that patriarchy was a mere 
consequence of women’s comparative physical weakness, that both sexes could compete on 
an equal basis, and that women only failed to express their dissatisfaction with marriage 
more often than they did due to the submissiveness inculcated by the education they 
received. On the other hand. Mill followed the reformist approach in stating that women 
had a bent for the practical, while men had a bent for abstract reasoning, that despite being 
more flexible women's minds were unable to sustain the same level of intellectual effort as 
men’s because men had larger brains, and that women’s peculiar aptitudes were destined 
merely to complement men’s abilities. Besides, Annas thinks that Subjection o f Women 
lacks the clarity found in Enfranchisement o f Women regarding the need for women to earn
i
a living in order to achieve equal standing with men. " For Annas, when the defence of 
women's emancipation is grounded on complementarity and not on equality, the result is 
the recognition that women can be good companions for men, but never that men can be 
good companions for women. Overall, Annas believes that Subjection o f Women does not 
do justice to the topic it addresses.
418 See J. Annas, ‘Mill and the Subjection o f W om en’, in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill’s Social and 
Political Thought'. Critical Assessm entsA  vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), iv. 245.
419 Ibid., p. 232.
420 See ibid.. p. 233.
421 See ibid., p. 244.
178
Mary Lyndon Shanley argues that Mill’s contemporary critics failed to realise that he 
criticized the corruption of male-female relationships from the point of view of ‘the 
normative assumption that human relationships between equals were of a higher, more 
enriching order than those between unequals’. “ Thus, inequality was not compatible with 
genuine friendship because it did not imply mutual respect, but rather subordination, which
n  ^  .
was a hindrance to people's improvement. Personal enhancement can only occur in an 
atmosphere of reciprocity, where spouses are attached to one another and enrich themselves 
by ‘acquiring the tastes and capacities of the other in addition to [their] own’. This is why
424Mill wanted marriage to be a locus of mutual sympathy and undestanding. Shanley 
argues that Mill saw the social situation of married women at that time as a form of slavery 
because their personalities were subsumed to those of their husbands.42^  Working-class 
women were prevented from receiving due compensation for their work, while middle and 
upper-class women were barred from higher education. A woman was deprived of the 
power of ‘controlling' her ‘earnings’, of ‘entering contracts’, and of defending her bodily 
autonomy by resisting unwanted sexual relations’ 426 Shanley claims that, for Mill, 
inequality between spouses was the root of social disorder.427 She argues that Mill’s critics 
also failed to grasp that his commitment to equality in marriage was a moral imperative, 
and that his acceptance of the then existing sexual division of labour was a practical
4~>omatter. " Mill favoured domestic arrangements whereby men and women moved in
4“  M.L. Shanley. ‘Marital Slavery and Friendship: John Stuart M ill's The Subjection o f  Women', in G.W. 
Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill's Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments, 4  vols., (London: 
Routledge, 1998), iv. 258.
423 See ibid., p. 258.
424 See ibid., p. 248.
425 See ibid., p. 248.
426 Ibid., p. 251.
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different spheres of activity because such was most appropriate for the then existing 
circumstances, but he would have rejected such arrangements had they proved incompatible
*170with male-female friendship in marriage. In Shanley’s view, Mill never agreed with 
those amongst his contemporaries who believed in a natural and inevitable 
complementariness between women and men. She contends, however, that he advocated a 
sort of dynamic complementariness in which gender roles would be determined according 
to the characteristics of each couple. In addition to this, Shanley states that Mill advocated 
not only changes in legislation, but also a re-education of the passions, as essential 
measures to promote the interests of the community. She assumes that Mill was unable to 
see the positive role that sex and shared parenting might play in marriage, but thinks that 
his view that the highest maculine and feminine characters were without any real 
distinction lent support to the idea that there was a basic equality within the human 
family.430
Elaine Spitz criticises Shanley’s interpretation of Subjection o f Women, alleging that 
Shanley ignores the fact that Mill’s principled opposition to telling people what they ought
4^ j
to do prevented him from proposing shared parenting. According to Spitz, since Mill was 
not a deontological moralist, he could not be expected to pronounce on the best way for 
people to behave. His feminism ‘derives its force from the primacy it gives to liberty 
(which is always a negative version of freedom, requiring the removal of external
4‘ - See ibid., p. 258.
430 See ibid., p. 256.
431 See E. Spitz, ‘On Shanley Marital Slavery and Friendship*, in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill’s Social 
and Political Though: Critical Assessments, 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), iv. 265-6.
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obstacles)’.432 Spitz believes that Mill’s main concerns in Subjection o f Women were to 
secure women’s legal rights and their economic independence, thereby allowing them to act 
as responsible moral agents.433 The lack of judicial rights and economic freedom denied 
women opportunity to pursue independently their own good. In Spitz’s view, Mill wanted 
to free women from the imposition of social conformity, but did not intend to prescribe any 
specific plan of life for them. According to Spitz, Mill would oppose the attempt of some 
contemporary feminists to prescribe certain arrangements for marriage, because that would 
amount to an undue interference in other people’s quest for their own conception of the 
good life.
Nadia Urbinati argues that Mill advocated a conception of individuality that was at odds 
with the view ‘that reason is masculine and sentiment is feminine and the latter is inferior to 
the former’.434 She believes that Mill and Harriet Taylor developed a notion of individuality 
that corresponded to the idea of 7 ’Homme en general, VHomme universeV of the Saint- 
Simonians. which comprised both sexes and all races. For Urbinati. such a notion was at 
odds with the dichotomy between feminine and masculine, which entails hierarchy and 
domination. Urbinati presumes that, in breaking the rigid distinction between masculine 
and feminine. Mill intended to promote equality as a precondition of individual free choice 
and self-determination. Therefore. Mill favoured changes in marriage legislation and 
marriage customs because he did not want the domestic system to remain a school for
432 Ibid., p. 266.
433 See ibid.. pp. 254-5.
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tyranny, but a micro-society of equals which would raise humanity to a higher condition. ~ 
For Urbinati, Mill’s critics exaggerate the importance which should be attached to the 
question of the internal coherence of Subjection o f Women, and disregarded the relevance 
of ‘the concrete support that Mill gave for the movement of social and political 
emancipation of women’.436 She stresses that Mill did not expect married women to devote 
themselves solely to the management of a household because, for Mill, when labour was a 
means of self-realisation, the decision to work was a matter of ‘free choice and personal 
abilities; but when it is a necessity, women cannot be compelled by their husbands to work 
both inside and outside their houses because this is an unjustified form of exploitation’ 437 
So, for Urbinati. the restriction Mill placed on women’s participation in the labour market 
was a way of preventing exploitation.
Susan Mendus claims that Subjection o f Women coheres with the general thrust of Mill’s 
political writings, and she rejects the reason-emotion dichotomy. She argues that Subjection 
o f Women ‘draws much of its persuasive power from the doctrines advanced in Harriet 
Taylor’s Enfranchisement o f Women'.438 Mendus sees Subjection o f Women as a political 
essay which ‘was timed to coincide with the growing parliamentary and political movement 
for the reform of the franchise and, especially, with the campaign for votes for women'.439 
However, the central concern of Mill's book was not to promote legal reform, but to 
remove inequalities that hindered the moral improvement of mankind:
435 See ibid., p. 278.
436 Ibid., p. 281.
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Again and again in these texts we find indications that John Stuart Mill and Harriet 
Taylor are urging, not legal improvement only, but a complete revision of the moral 
relationship between sexes. Their advocacy of legal alteration is subordinate to this 
and motivated by it.440
For Mendus, critics of Subjection o f Women are wrong in seeing it as a mere catalogue of 
legal disabilities suffered by Victorian women. She argues that Subjection o f Women is 
close to the tenets of present-day radical feminism. She points to two convergences 
between them. First, radical feminism holds that the existing patriarchal system pressures 
women to become sexual slaves by establishing their attractiveness to men as the most 
important criterion by which to evaluate them.441 Following an identical line of reasoning, 
both Mill and Harriet Taylor contended that women were brought up with the social 
expectation that they had no option other than to marry, and this guaranteed ‘that in 
marriage a man will get not a forced slave but a willing one’. " Second, radical feminists 
aim to transcend the supposed patriarchal dualism between reason and emotion. Mill also 
acknowledged emotion and rationality as two essential dimensions of human beings. For 
Mendus, Mill's intellectual partnership with Harriet Taylor was a successful one because 
they complemented each other. While Mill was basically a thinker, Harriet Taylor had 
intuitive insight and imagination. The claim of the contemporary radical feminist Shulamith 
Firestone for an emotional science, ‘as a corrective to the over-valuing of technology and
438 S. Mendus, ‘John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor on Women and Mariage', in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart 
M ill’s Social and Political Thought .C ritical Assessments, 4 vols.. (London: Routledge, 1998), iv. 312-23.
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its power’, is plainly consistent with Mill’s praise of imagination as a necessary 
complement to intellect, and vice versa.443
The liberal democratic tradition envisages a society where governments are accountable to, 
and social arrangements are framed so as to represent the interests of, all members of the 
community.444 For Mendus, Mill played an important role in the history of liberalism by 
showing that, in excluding women from politics, liberal societies were at odds with their 
own principles. She counts Mill amongst those who believe that democratic societies are 
superior because they deliver unity out of diversity. Mill’s conception of democracy was 
premised on the idea that people were not indistinguishably alike, and because of this, 
equality had to be pursued through the recognition of difference, otherwise society would 
degenerate into imposed uniformity.445 According to Mendus. in Subjection o f Women, Mill 
tried to show that women should not be confined to domestic concerns because this 
represented an improper limitation on the exercise of their abilities and was, as such, 
detrimental to society. She thinks that Mill wanted to reform the institutions of Victorian 
Britain to meet the claims of justice generated by the liberal democratic conscience, and 
amongst these claims the emancipation of women figured prominently.
4.4. MILL, WOMEN’S ISSUES, AND LIBERALISM
w  See ibid., p. 322.
444 See S. Mendus, ‘Losing the Faith: Feminism and Democracy’, in J. Dunn (ed), D em ocracy: The 
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Julia Annas fails to perceive that Mill saw what she calls the reformist and radical 
approaches to feminism as two sides of the same coin. He advocated reforms in the legal 
system because he regarded them as necessary to change a society that educated women for 
submission. In the first chapter of Subjection o f Women, Mill claimed that the submission 
of women was not based on reason or nature, but was a consequence of education. Besides, 
he affirmed that the then existing system of inequality was unacceptable. Annas’s view that 
Mill’s conception of complementarity between men and women undermined his radical 
credentials is not correct. The differences between women and men that Mill referred to in 
Subjection o f Women are not presented as natural properties. He clearly stated that such 
differences were related to capacities that appeared more frequently either in men or in 
women, and were very likely to be associated with the activities they performed and the 
education they received. This was why he thought a proper understanding of these 
differences would be possible only when men and women had had the same education. In 
fact, he argued that spouses with different capabilities should use these capabilities to 
promote a dynamic complementarity, and not to legitimate oppression. Hence, marriage 
should be a voluntary association in which the role of the members was defined according 
to the aptitudes of each couple. One could not assume, as Annas does, that Mill’s notion of 
complementarity amounts to subjection for wives. Annas's statement that, in Subjection o f 
Women, Mill was less emphatic in defending the need for women to earn a living in order 
to achieve an equality of standing with men than Harriet Taylor was in Enfranchisement o f 
Women is correct. Mill’s earlier essay On Marriage (1832-33?) likewise paid more 
attention to this issue than Subjection o f Women. In Subjection o f Women, he certainly 
continued to advocate the participation of women in political decision-making and in the 
labour market. However, these questions were addressed in Subjection o f Womem in the
light of broader philosophical and political concerns. For Mill, female emancipation was a 
matter of justice because ‘the system of male domination of females violates a basic 
principle of justice - reward and advantage are based on birth, not merit or personal 
exertion’.446 But he presumed that, by participating in the suffrage, women would 
contribute to a major transformation in society that would allow the emergence of a new 
pattern in the relationship between the sexes.447 Mill was not merely interested in 
discussing the legal disabilities of women, but in creating the conditions for them to be 
autonomous human beings. His persistent affirmation that the form of marriage existing at 
that time was at odds with modernity dovetails with his theory of history. As has already 
been shown. Mill believed that society was evolving towards the removal of social
448inequalities, a process that was undermining individuality. It was thus essential to 
remove such inequalities, because they discouraged social cooperation on which modem 
societies increasingly depended by weakening people’s sympathetic feelings towards other 
members of society.449 Besides, in societies in which people's social roles are not 
inexorably tied to their situation of birth, inequalities that undermined individuality were 
not accepted. So. as Mill thought that the very dynamic of modern society tended to make 
the existing form of the marriage relationship indefensible, he decided to advocate changes 
in legislation, which he saw as instrumental in unleashing the more comprehensive changes 
that he aimed at. He avoided drawing attention to these wider changes because they would 
attract opposition from those who wanted to keep things as they were. In Subjection o f 
Women. Mill combined his philosophical views on women’s issues with his political aim of
446 F.R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The M oral and Political Philosophy o f  John Stuart Mill, 
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promoting women’s participation in the voting process. This combination can be clearly 
seen in his speech of 17 July 1869 to the Gallery of the Architectural Society:
The suffrage, while it is the road to other progress, commits no one as to what other 
things progress consists of. Let us but gain the suffrage, and whatever is desirable 
for women must ultimately follow, without its being necessary at present to decide, 
or indeed possible to foresee, all that is desirable. The mere fact of claiming the 
suffrage is giving an impulse, such as never has been given before, to all proposals 
for doing away with injustice to women. Since the suffrage has been claimed, a bill 
for allowing married women to be the owners of their own property, which had been 
laid on the shelf for ten years with other uninteresting trifles, has been reintroduced 
into Parliament with good prospect of success; and the movement for higher 
education of women is spreading in all directions, with a considerable diversity of 
means, insomuch that women have a chance of obtaining a really good education 
almost as soon as men.4M)
Shanley correctly argues that some of Mill’s critics fails to realize that his defence of 
changes in legislation was not an end in itself, but a means to promote the re-education of 
the passions that could transform marriage into a relationship of friendship between equals. 
She is also accurate to say that Mill advocated a dynamic kind of complementariness 
between spouses, and not one in which the roles were fixed. Shanley clearly perceives that 
Mill was not a timid reformer, but a fierce supporter of women’s full moral and legal
449 See ibid., pp. 160-2.
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personhood at a time when they were both denied, and that he was fully conscious that the 
law was only one of the factors that moulded individuals’ characters.451 Nevertheless, she 
gives an incomplete explanation of Mill’s acceptance of traditional domestic arrangements 
and his incapacity to see the positive role that sex and shared parenting might play in 
marriage. Mill affirmed that, in some circumstances, the traditional family arrangement in 
which the wife supervised the domestic expenditure and the husband earned the income 
was the most suitable. But this affirmation should not be interpreted merely as an attempt to 
make his opinion more acceptable to his contemporaries.432 He believed that a woman was 
of more value in the eyes of the man who was legally her master when she contributed with 
her income to the maintenance of the household. However, as she was legally under his 
tutelage, and since her husband was the one who had the power to decide if and where she 
should work, the risks of abuse were immense. For example, the husband could force his 
wife to work, and leave ‘the support of the family to her exertions, while he spends most of 
his time in drinking and idleness'.453 Therefore, in conceding the value of the traditional 
marriage arrangement in this situation, Mill’s main concern was to prevent women from 
being victims of what he deemed additional exploitation. Even though Mill believed that 
the spirit of the age was unequivocally on the side of those proposing changes in the legal 
and social condition of women, he knew that such changes would not occur immediately.434 
His priority was. therefore, to campaign for women's enfranchisement, access to higher 
education, and for married women's rights to own property. He believed that these reforms 
could break the legal inferiority that was at the root of women’s subjection, and supposed
451 See M. H. Morales. Perfect Equality: John Stuart M ill on W ell-Constituted Communities, (New York and 
London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), pp. 7, 51.
4:12 See J.S. Mill, Subjection o f  Women, (CW), XXI, p. 297.
453 Ibid.. p. 298.
that, once legal inferiority was eliminated, the dynamic of society would tend to favour 
equality in marriage relationships even more strongly. His acceptance of traditional 
marriage arrangements was also a realistic recognition that the wide-scale participation of 
women in outdoor occupations would not occur immediately. At that time, it was not 
realistic to think that men could manage the household while women had employment 
outside the home. Besides, he knew that some couples would see traditional domestic 
arrangements as ideal, even in a situation in which women’s legal tutelage no longer 
existed. Mill did not believe that many couples would take this view, but felt, nonetheless, 
that he should respect those who did make that choice. As a matter of fact, Mill thought that 
once equality was an established principle, it was up to couples themselves to adjust their 
marriage arrangements accordingly.4^  Hence, Mill's acceptance of the traditional domestic 
arrangements was due in part to the need to respect those who saw it as the best possible 
arrangement, and to the unfeasibility of having men managing the household.
It is necessary to comment further on Shanley's assertion that Mill failed to see that sex and 
shared parenting might play a positive role in marriage. The conditions of the nineteenth- 
century working classes were appalling. The Ten Hours Act of 1847 limited the working 
hours for women and young persons under 18 to ten hours per day, but it was still possible 
for men to be working for twelve hours per day.4:>6 The Factory Act of 1850 reduced 
Saturday working for women and children and established breaks for meals. These two 
pieces of legislation were restricted to textile factories until 1867, when they gained general
454 See J.S. Mill, Public and Parliam entary Speeches, (CW), XXIX, p. 375.
4x5 See J.S. Mill, Subjection o f  Women, (CW), XXI, p. 298.
456 See D. Murphy, R. Staton, P. Walsh-Atkins and N. Whiskerd, Britain 1815-1918, (London: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1999) p. 191.
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application. It seems reasonable to infer that, despite recognizing that men were becoming 
increasingly domestically-minded, Mill realized that shared parenting would not be seen as 
an appealing activity for those who already worked twelve hours a day, and were educated 
to see the bringing up of the family as the first call upon women’s exertions. But the idea of 
shared parenting is compatible with Mill’s notion of marriage as a voluntary association in 
which the roles of its members were defined by agreement. He neither opposed the 
involvement of men in the bringing up of the family, nor the involvement of women in 
public affairs, because both situations made marriage relationships more meaningful by 
creating common ground between the spouses, an effect which Mill deemed to be positive 
for society.
In relation to Shanley’s belief that Mill failed to see that sex might play an important role in 
marriage, it is important to consider what follows. From early in his thought, Mill criticized 
the fact that the law of marriage was designed to keep relationships based solely on sexual 
attraction.4^ 7 He ranked intellectual pleasures higher than physical ones, but it is not correct 
to infer from this that he paid no attention to the importance of sex in the marriage 
relationship or regarded it as irrelevant to general happiness. Mill did not provide a detailed 
account of sexuality in marriage relationships because he believed that this issue was 
related to people’s private sphere of conduct which should be protected from interference
4^8from state and society. ‘ In view of the intimacy of sexual relations, Mill did not put 
forward general prescriptions about the role sex might have in married life, but presumed 
that each couple should be left to define that role for themselves.
457 See J.S. Mill. On M arriage, (CW), XXI, p. 40.
458 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty\ (CW), XVIII, p. 226.
Elaine Spitz is correct to criticise some contemporary feminists who do not realise that Mill 
would have opposed attempts to prescribe certain arrangements for marriage because such 
prescription would amount to an undue interference in other people’s quest for their own 
conception of the good life. She is also correct to assert that Mill's main concern in 
Subjection o f Women was to guarantee legal rights for women that would enable them to 
act as responsible moral agents. But it is important to keep in mind that Mill saw in his 
relationship with Harriet Taylor a paradigm of the marriage relationship. In his view, 
marriage was a sort of debating society between couples that was likely to be successful 
only amongst those whose natures were congenial and who could therefore develop a deep 
friendship. He did not intend to impose such an ideal of marriage on others, but thought 
that this was the sort of relationship that would prevail when the principle of equality 
became a reality in marriage. Besides, he hoped that, when co-operation and the sharing of 
experiences was the principle governing the relashionship between married couples and his 
children, family life would become a preparation for citizenship.4^ 9 Mill envisioned a 
democratic society in which families educated their members for freedom. That is, for Mill, 
self-government was a practice to be promoted not only in political and labour relations, 
but within families as well.460 Mill believed that the vast range of relationships that 
moulded human character should be reviewed in the light of the need to promote mutual 
respect among couples. This could happen only when there was an acceptance that both 
men and women were autonomous human beings. He assumed that society would change in 
a positive direction when families recognised the need of such an acceptance. The 
predominance of relationships based on self-respect and respect for others would be
459 See H.S. Jones, Victorian Political Thought, (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 101.
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essential in creating the atmosphere of co-operation and friendship that would lead to the 
improvement of society. Mill thought that the perpetuation of abuses of power was 
detrimental both to those who performed them and to those who suffered their 
consequences. He agreed with Plato’s idea that the tyrant’s life was impoverished because 
he could not have genuine friends, but only flatterers. Friendship presupposed a recognition 
that dignity could not exist in the context of relations of submission. This is why Mill 
adopted William Thompson’s idea that the command-obedience ethic should not prevail in 
marriage relatonships. Thompson wrote a book on behalf of women against the passage in 
James Mill’s Essay on Government, which defended women’s exclusion from the suffrage. 
Thompson influenced Mill whom he met in the early part of 1825 in the Co-operative 
Society.461 Hence, Maria H. Morales is correct to assert that:
Like Thompson, Mill exhorted men to change the selfish pleasures of the despot for 
the sympathetic pleasures of the friend, which can arise and be enjoyed only under 
conditions of perfect equality. Also like Thompson, Mill believed that until men 
cease to be despots and women slaves, social improvement will be impossible. 
Social improvement is premised on moral progress, and inequality is inimical to 
moral progress. Thus, social improvement requires equality.462
Urbinati's account has the merit of recognising: 1) that Mill wanted the domestic system to 
be a micro-society of equals, which he deemed essential to raise humanity to a higher
460 See B. Baum, Re-reading Pow er and Freedom in John Stuart Mill, (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 
2000), pp. 262-3.
461 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 129.
46' M.H. Morales, Perfect Equality: John Stuart M ill on Well-Constituted Communities, p. 147.
condition; 2) that he accepted traditional domestic arrangements, because he feared the 
possibility of women being compelled by their husbands to find outdoor occupations; and 
3) that some of Mill’s critics disregard the relevance of his support for the movement for 
political emancipation. However, Urbinati’s view that Mill and Harriet Taylor adopted a 
conception of individuality that corresponded to the idea of 7 ’Homme en general’ and 
blurred distinctions between masculine and feminine needs to be challenged. Urbinati’s 
claim that Mill believed that there was no relation between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, on 
the one hand, and biological sexuality on the other, seems to go beyond Mill’s own 
position. Despite believing that many of the so-called natural differences between men and 
women were consequences of education, he regarded the relation between ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine’ on the one hand, and biological sexuality on the other, as a topic that had yet to 
be clarified. One should avoid attributing conclusions to Mill that he had not reached. He 
thought that both men and women should be autonomous individuals, in other words that 
they should be empowered to consider their commitments and to make genuine choices.463 
Mill’s defence of equality between the sexes was grounded on the idea that character must 
derive from one's inner being, and should not be imposed from without.464 He believed that 
under the regime of equality it would be easier to estimate the differences between women 
and men, because both would have the opportunity to exercise their capabilities. When Mill 
referred to women's bent for the practical and ability to sympathise with public concerns, 
and men's bent for abstract reasoning and ability to undertake sustained intellectual effort, 
he presumed that certain characteristics were more present in one gender than in the other. 
He expected that these characteristics would be shown to a large extent to be cultural
463 See W. Donner, ‘John Stuart M ill's Liberal Feminism', in E.J Eisenach (ed). M ill and the M oral Character
o f  Liberalism, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), p. 135.
products, but he admitted that there was no basis available to establish with precision if 
they were merely cultural products, so that only more or less probable conjectures could be 
made about this subject.463 Urbinati’s claim that Mill’s conception of individuality is 
marked by an androgenous ideal seems groundless, because, for Mill, autonomy essentially 
required self-determination and did not preclude difference. Hence, Mill’s intention to 
ground family life on friendship did not entail an androgenous ideal according to which 
differences were irrelevant. Mill was cautious in his analysis of the differences between 
men and women, and this impeded him from adopting a reductionist account of women’s 
subjection, such as the one Engels presented in Origin o f the Family, Private Property, and 
the State. Engels accepted the evolutionary scheme of Lewis H. Morgan, according to 
which the monogamous family system dominated by male authority was the last stage of a 
process that began with promiscuity, and was followed by group marriage and polygamy. 
Engels added to Morgan’s account of familial relations the idea that monogamy enforced 
by law was a device to perpetuate the private property system which was the ultimate cause 
of women’s subjection. To underpin this claim, Engels alleged that familial relations before 
stable monogamy were matrilineal.466 Mill believed that the subjection of women was not a 
by-product of capitalism but a reality grounded in deep-rooted feelings and emotions which 
were present in various modes of production and stages of history. He saw the social trend 
of his time as one that did not favour the permanence of women's subjection, but favoured 
their integration in social affairs. Nonetheless, he rejected the idea of converting claims 
about differences between men and women based on empirically verifiable generalizations
4W See ibid., p. 136.
465 See J.S. Mill, The Subjection o f  Women, (CW), XXI, pp. 277-8, 304-5.
466 See F. Engels, A Origem da Famttia, da Propriedade Privada e do Estado, in Karl M arx e Friedrich  
Engels: obras escolhidas, 3 vols., (Sao Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega Ltda,1953), iii. 51-63.
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into normative conclusions about women’s and men’s inequality. Therefore, he believed it 
was unacceptable to legimate women’s subjection to men on the grounds that women were 
inferior in muscular stregth.467 Mill observed that what many deemed to be natural 
characteristics of men. such as starved emotional constitutions and overbearingness, were 
in reality socially determined traits. Hence, the normal should not be equated with the 
correct.
Susan Mendus correctly recognises that Subjection o f Women coheres with the general 
thrust of Mill’s political writings, and that in it Mill advocated the removal of inequalities 
that compromised autonomy and hindered the moral improvement of individuals. She was 
also correct in stating that Mill recognised that women were willing slaves because the 
social expectation for them to get married was very strong, and they were educated to think 
that marriage was their only path to happiness. In addition, Mendus has the merit of 
realising that Mill pursued equality through the recognition of characteristics that 
distinguished women from men. The notion of equality referred to here implied the 
recognition that both men and women were capable of making genuine choices based on 
their own conception of the good life. Therefore, paternalism and subjugation were not 
capable of underpinning relations between men and women, because both partook of the 
same human nature and should be responsible for their choices. Mill thought that rather 
than precluding diferences of tastes and opinions between men and women, equality would 
demand them. In order to understand this one should pay attention to the concept of 
individuality outlined in On Liberty. There, Mill portrayed the autonomous individual as 
being capable of deviating from the dominant values of society and of searching for
467 See M. H. Morales, Perfect Equality: John Stuart Mill on Well-Constituted Communities, p. 162.
experiments of life that fulfilled the demands of his or her uniqueness. The more an 
individual was able to identify the set of experiments that enhanced his or her inward 
potentialities, the more able he or she was to make genuine choices which corresponded to 
his or her deeper aspirations. Mill saw autonomous individuals not only as choice-makers, 
but also as engaged reasoners who scrutinised alternative ways of life in order to identify 
the one that suited them best.468 In view of all this, it is correct to assert that, for Mill, 
mental, physical, and social differences amongst human beings of both genders were not 
detrimental to society when they were consistent with relations based on mutual respect, 
but were objectionable when they entailed subjugation or paternalism. Mendus recognizes 
that Mill fought for changes in social relations, on the grounds that liberal democracies had 
allowed members of society to choose those who governed them and make government 
accountable to citizens. Mill also grounded women's enfranchisement on the fact that they 
needed it as a means of self-defence, so that their interests would not be ignored. In 
Subjection o f Women. Mill was concerned to defend women’s right to a voice in political 
matters, and to protect them from being victims of men’s despotical power. He presented 
divorce as a way of impeding the complete assimilation of the wife to the slave.469 He 
wanted the legislator to take worst-case scenarios into account, instead of assuming that 
men would always exercise power benevolently. Mill called the attention of legislators to 
the fact that marriage was not an institution designed for a selected group, and that women 
should be protected because ‘men are not required, as a preliminary to the marriage 
ceremony, to prove by testimonials that they are fit to be trusted with the exercise of
468 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty-, (CW), XVIII, pp. 261-75.
469 See ibid., pp. 285-6. Mill did not treat the question o f divorce extensively in Subjection o f  Women, but it is 
clear that he would have supported legislative change to this effect. Mill had already written in favour o f
196
absolute power’.470 But he also claimed that women’s ability to sympathise with public 
causes and to fraternise with other people would make their participation in the electoral 
process advantageous to society. In recognizing women as autonomous human beings, Mill 
upheld their right to have a voice in the administration of society and to be responsible for 
their own opinions and points of view. He wanted to change the existing situation in which 
women suffered the consequences of decisions made by governments, but in which 
representatives in parliament were neither chosen by nor accountable to them. He preferred 
to have government accountable to women, and women accountable to society for their 
choices and opinions in public matters.471
Mill's concern with accountability was present in everything he wrote concerning the social 
situation of of women. In On Marriage (1832-33?), he pointed to economic independence 
as a means of creating a balance of power within families and of making marriage a 
relationship based upon the wishes of both parties, thereby destroying the unchecked power 
of husbands. In Papers on Women's Rights (1847-50), enfranchisement was presented as a 
way of freeing women from a form of oppression that confined them to the domestic sphere 
and left them unprotected. In Subjection o f Women, Mill refined his concern with 
accountability by taking into account all the aspects he had previously considered and 
placing them in the context of a broader theory of social and personal improvement. In his 
later speeches on women's enfranchisement, accountability clearly appeared as the 
foremost concern. In the speech of 17 July 1869 at the Gallery of the Architectural Society
divorce in previous works, despite admitting that the indissolubility o f marriage had contributed in the past to 
the elevation o f the social position o f women. See J.S. Mill, On m arriage, (CW), XXI, p. 40.
470 Ibid., p. 287
471 See ibid., p. 290.
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mentioned above, Mill argued that the enfranchisement of women was a democratic 
demand attuned to the spirit of the age because it allowed them to have ‘a voice in choosing 
the persons by whom the laws are made and administered’.472 In a speech delivered on 26 
26 March 1870, at Hanover Square Rooms, Mill asserted that, if women had been 
enfranchised, Britain would not have had the Contagious Diseases Acts under which, in 
order to prevent the spreading of sexually transmitted diseases, daughters and wives of the
473poor are exposed to enforced medical inspection on the suspicion of a police-officer. Mill 
deplored the fact that those who introduced such Acts were not accountable to women, who 
had no say on their introduction, despite their drastic effect on them. He defended the 
repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts, on the grounds that they condemned prostitutes to 
arbitrary medical inspections. Had women been properly represented, the Acts would not 
have been approved. Mill pointed to women’s enfranchisement as a way of promoting 
among women ‘a more cogent sense of their special duties as citizens, and of their general 
responsibilities as concerned with the advancement of the highest moral interests of the 
whole community’.474 In a speech given on 12 January 1871 in the Music Hall, Edinburgh, 
Mill commented on the fact that while wives were frequently the real prompter either of 
what men did well, or of what men did selfishly, they were not credited for what men did 
well nor held responsible for what they did selfishly.47^  He believed that women’s power of 
cajolery was an undesirable form of influence because it rendered them unaccountable. For 
Mill, women should be enfranchised and made accountable for their choices, because
47' J.S. Mill, Pubic and Parliam entary Speeches, (CW), XXIX, pp. 374-5.
473 See ibid., pp. 388-9.
474 Ibid., p. 391.
475 See ibid., pp. 404-5.
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power must be exerted with knowledge and responsibility.476 In view of all these 
considerations, it can be seen that Mill’s concern with accountability was central to his 
writings on women’s issues. This was a consequence of the central tenet of his political 
philosophy, according to which unchecked powers were always sources of corruption. He 
frequently related marriage to slavery because, in his opinion, masters and husbands 
exerted unchecked power over slaves and wives respectively. Therefore, in promoting 
equality and mutual consideration in marriage relationships, he was trying to maximize the
477happiness of society by doubling the number of people pursuing personal excellence. 
Mill failed to perceive that his over-intellectualised relationship with Harriet Taylor could 
not be offered as a model for many people. The sort of attachments that exist between 
members of families are different from those existing between members of society at large.
478so that it is quite difficult to transform families into debating societies. Mill’s concern 
with the issue of power within families was correctly focused, because families are 
powerful agencies in the formation of people’s mentality, but he should have taken into 
account the fact that familial relations are situated primarily in the sphere of community 
(Gemeinschaft) and not in the sphere of society (Gesellschaft). In the sphere of 
Gemeinschaft, relations are marked by kinship, intimacy, cohesion, and continuity, while in 
the sphere of Gesellschaft relations are based on calculation, opposition, and pecuniary 
interest.479 But even if it is not feasible to tranform most families into debating societies, it 
is possible to improve mutual respect within them. Mill thought that the recognition of 
women’s legal and moral personhood was essential to the implemention of his liberal ideals
476 See ibid., p. 404.
477 See G. Scarre, Utilitarianism , (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 5-6.
478 See H.S. Jones, Victorian Political Thought, p. 102.
47v See R.A. Nisbet, The Social Philosopher, (New York: Paladin, 1974), p. 11
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and to the improvement of women’s treatment within their homes.480 Enfranchisement was 
an essential precondition if women were to be really represented and have the possibility of 
controlling those who governed. Their participation in the public sphere was thus a liberal 
ideal that Mill coherently advocated. The notion that the liberal differentiation between the 
private and public sphere implies the subjection of women is flatly wrong: the fact that the 
two spheres exist does not imply that women should be confined to one of them. Mill’s 
concern with the enfranchiment of women was linked to his belief that an equilibrium of 
power between couples and within families could bring about benefits for society. Mill 
believed that advances in civilisation required people to rely increasingly on one another, 
and this would be possible only in a society where human beings saw themselves as 
partakers of a common nature and a common dignity.
4.5. CONCLUSION
Mill believed that the regeneration of society depended to a significant extent on the 
liberation of women from the political and cultural obstacles to their recognition as 
autonomous human beings. He considered this recognition to be a matter of justice in that 
the existing system stamped the character of inferiority on women by disconsidering their 
merits and capabilities, and by leaving them unprotected from the tyranny of husbands in 
the sphere of the family. He supported institutional changes in order to enfranchise women 
and allow married women to own property and benefit from higher education, on the 
grounds that such changes were important in transforming marriage into a relationship 
between equals. He argued that families in which relationships were based on friendship
480 See ibid., p. 94.
and cooperation would be the main locus of education for citizenship in societies that were 
expected to have accountable governments. Mill presumed that the well-being of a society 
increased where women enjoyed liberty, because the enjoyment of such liberty minimized 
suffering and maximized the pool of available intellectual resources. He believed that 
women could introduce more altruism in the treatment of political matters and generate a 
renewal of social feeling, so as to make self-government a reality both in the family and in 
society. It was, therefore, necessary to promote an equilibrium of power within the family 
in order to promote the idea that human beings were partakers of a common dignity. This 
was important in modem societies whose members were becoming increasingly 
interdependent. In view of what has been said in this chapter, it is correct to affirm that 
Mill's stance in favour of women's enfranchisement cannot be detached from his general 
concern with accountability. He defended women’s enfranchisement as a precondition for 
women to participate in the choice of representatives and to control those who governed 
them. But he also wanted them to be responsible for their own choices and points of view 
in public matters before society, because responsibility was correlative to autonomy. In 
short, everyone who had the power to make choices had to be held accountable for the 
consequences.
201
CHAPTER 5 
J.S. MILL ON ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will show that Mill believed that democracy had an essential economic 
component. He thought that democratic societies had to promote individuality and 
accountability, but that these notions had to be understood in a broad sense, because a 
balance of power could be achieved only where political and economic powers were 
distributed equitably. Mill wished to extend the scope of participation from the political 
arena to the productive process. Mill's political economy in general, and his defence of 
socialism in particular, therefore, embodied a concept of citizenship according to which the 
flourishing of individual freedom could not be separated from the material advance of 
civilization.
The second section will show that Mill’s political economy cannot be disentangled from his 
concern to promote individual improvement and accountability. His belief that the laws of 
distribution were dependent on human will led him to allow the possibility of state
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intervention to help people to acquire the basic means of subsistence which he recognised 
as a pre-condition for citizenship. Yet, despite his intention to destroy the division of 
society between payers and receivers of wages, and to ground the economic order on co­
operative associations which emphasised partnership, Mill remained a steadfast defender of 
the role of competition in social life.
The third section will show that, in order to promote security and to prepare the working 
class for citizenship, Mill emphatically advocated state intervention to help working-classes 
families educate their children and to prevent severe inequality. He upheld the idea that the 
state must neither discourage people from struggling for their subsistence, nor attract the 
talented people to its own institutions, leaving society in general deprived of creative 
people. Since Mill did not regard socialism as a viable alternative for the near future, he 
supported reforms in order to diminish the then existing concentration of resources in the 
hands of the few, a concentration that prevented the many from exercising individual 
freedom and caused popular discontent. This section will take Principles o f Political 
Economy for its focus.
In the fourth section, it will be shown that, in Chapters on Socialism, while Mill claimed 
that small-scale socialist experiments could progressively renew the existing social order, 
he distanced himself from centralised and revolutionary forms of socialism on the grounds 
that they could not be democratically implemented. Mill contended that the system of 
property had to be changed so as to prevent the accumulation of enormous fortunes over 
several generations, and to permit large sections of the population to gain economic 
citizenship. Mill believed that socialism represented the extension of the democratic
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principle to economics, and that its implementation had to be preceded by reforms in 
capitalism which would strengthen the spirit of partnership by promoting the participation 
of workers in the productive process and in the division of its produce. In the fifth section, 
it will be concluded that Mill advanced a conception of democracy according to which the 
flourishing of freedom and the material advance of civilization in general were important 
elements of human well-being.
5.2. MILL’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
Mill built his political economy upon an acceptance of Ricardo's assumption that economic 
agents were fundamentally motivated by a desire to maximise gains. He knew that he could 
not presume that everyone matched the selfish type of character Ricardo attributed to 
economic agents. Nonetheless, Mill assumed that, considered as economic agents, human
481beings were inclined to search for the means which increase their wealth. He did not 
entirely accept Ricardo’s political economy. He rejected, for example, Ricardo’s idea that 
the natural value of a commodity was entirely determined by the quantity of labour required 
to produce it.482 He allowed that labour was essential to the production of a commodity, 
‘but it cannot be carried on without materials and machinery, nor without a stock of
48  ^necessaries provided in advance, to maintain the labourers during the production'. For 
Mill, it was thus reasonable to expect the fruits of the production to be divided between the 
workers and those who, instead of spending their money self-indulgently, invested in
481 See J.S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions o f  Political Economy, (C\V), IV, p. 321; W. Stafford, 
John Stuart Mill, (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 68 and J. Riley, ‘M ilks political economy: Ricardian science 
and liberal utilitarian art’, in J. Skorupski, (ed), The Cam bridge Companion to Mill, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 294.
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production. Unlike Ricardo, Mill stressed that the temporary market value was immediately 
determined by the relationship between supply and demand - when a commodity was in 
short supply, consumers would be prepared to pay more, and its value would rise - while
4 3 4permanent natural value was determined by the cost of production. Therefore, the
amount of wealth produced depended on the amount of capital that capitalists, by 
abstaining from consumption, have saved up to pay wages. They did this expecting to be 
rewarded by an incentive, a reward for abstinence that consisted in interest plus the wages 
of superintendence. The latter was a compensation for the capitalist’s labour in running the
48^factory, and the former a compensation for the risk of the business. ~ Mill saw production 
as a complex activity that depended more on the bodily and mental energies of human 
agents than on the natural resources available.486 The skills of workers and of those who
487superintended them were determinant aspects of productivity.
488Mill’s political economy was characterised by a revision of the doctrine of laissez-faire. 
The last major victory of the supporters of the laissez-faire principle in the nineteenth- 
century had been the repeal of the Com Laws, but from the late 1840s economic debate 
shifted to an examination of the shortcomings of the economic system, and especially of its 
distributional effects. Mill wished to make the laissez-faire principle more flexible, so that 
it could address the problems posed by the poverty of the working classes, an issue which
482 See J.S. Mill, Earlier Letters 1812-1848, (CW). XIII, p. 731.
483 J.S. Mill. Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW). II, p. 215.
484 See W. Stafford, John Stuart Mill, pp. 68-9.
485 See ibid., p. 70.
486 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), II, p. 103.
487 See ibid., p. 106.
488 See E.F. Paul, ‘J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian Influence in the Demise o f Laissez-faire\ Journal o f  Libertarian  
Studies, 2 (1978), p. 135.
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had not been a central preoccupation for his predecessors.489 He did not accept the view of 
Malthus and Ricardo that extreme social inequalities were unavoidable, but believed that 
the state could intervene to improve the social conditions of the working classes.490 Thus, 
Mill’s revision of the laissez-faire principle was grounded on the view that one could not 
assume ‘that the freedom of individuals in the economic sphere is maximised to the extent 
that state power is restricted to protecting property and maintaining security’.491 He argued 
that the state should intervene to help people overcome obstacles to individual flourishing 
such as inequalities of property, opportunities, and economic power. For Mill, this was 
justfiable because the economy was in the ‘other-regarding’ sphere, as opposed to the ‘self- 
regarding’ sphere. He wished to promote economic citizenship for people who did not have 
the basic means of subsistence and the habits of self-government which were the equivalent
4 9 0
in the sphere of economy of those he promoted in politics. "
Mill claimed that Harriet Taylor had awakened him to the fact that the laws of production 
were dependent on the natural properties of objects while the laws of distribution were 
dependent on human will.493 Given this premise, it was wrong to ascribe the necessity 
which characterized the process of production to the process of distribution. If the laws of 
distribution were man-made, they could be altered.494 Mill advocated changing the existing 
system of private property and inheritance, which he considered responsible for the poverty 
of the vast majority of the population. In the final version of Principles o f Political 
Economy, Mill renounced Ricardo’s doctrine of the wage fund, according to which there
489 See ibid., 136.
490 See J. Lajugie, As Doutrinas Economicas, (Sao Paulo: Difel, 1981), pp. 28-9.
491 B. Baum, ‘J.S. M ill’s Conception o f Economic Freedom’, History o f  Political Thought, 3 (1999), p. 494.
492 See ibid., p. 500.
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was a fixed quantity of circulating capital to pay labourers, with the consequence that if one 
group of workers managed to have their wages increased, then others would have their 
wages decreased. In contrast, Mill argued that the working classes could obtain a larger
share of overall profits by means of strikes, because decisions about investment and profit
49s #
could be affected by the relative political power of the organised classes. ~ Hence, Mill’s 
understanding of the process of distribution opened up the possibility of social engineering 
by means of wage setting.496 In Mill’s view, people excluded by accident of birth from the 
possibility of obtaining the basic conditions of life were virtually forced into 
conformism.497 To prevent this. Mill suggested that reasonably well-off societies should
*498 rpgive their people the right to a minimal level of material benefits. The demand for a 
fairer distribution of socially produced goods was in tune with the democratic spirit since a 
certain level of education and consumption was necessary for people to participate in an 
informed way in the political process. Where such preconditions were not satisfied, 
working people tended to adopt habits of indolence and conformity. It was, therefore, 
necessary to introduce measures which would enable people to overcome indolence and 
exercise citizenship:
For the purpose of altering the habits of the labouring people, there is need of a 
twofold action, directed simultaneously upon their intelligence and their poverty. An 
effective national education of the children of the labouring class, is the first
493 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography. (CW), I, pp. 254-56.
494 See E.F. Paul, ‘J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian Influence in the Dem ise o f Laissez-faire’, 141.
495 See R. Ashcraft, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Theoretical Foundations o f Democratic Socialism' in E.J. 
Eisenach (ed), M ill and the M oral Character o f  Liberalism, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press), p. 184.
496 See A. Shipman, The Market Revolution and its Limits, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 360.
497 See R. Ashcraft, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Theoretical Foundations o f Democratic Socialism ’, p. 180.
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needful: and, coincidently with this, a system of measures which shall (as the 
Revolution did in France) extinguish extreme poverty for one generation.499
Mill failed to realise that not only laws of distribution but also laws of production are to a 
certain extent influenced by human will.'^00 Nonetheless, the recognition of the distinction 
between the laws of production and those of distribution helped to distance Mill from the 
idea that the market was the sole and infallible regulator of social life, and led him to 
pursue ways of correcting the shortcomings of the laissez-faire principle. He expected that 
the growth of co-operative societies would make a significant contribution in this respect. 
Co-operative societies emphasised partnership rather than dependence, and were powerful 
instruments for elevating the dignity of workers, because they provided an environment for 
the exchange of experiences that helped to develop the practical intelligence and social 
sympathies of their members.^01
At the root of the economic problems of industrial societies, Mill identified one main 
factor: the division between payers and receivers of wages. He deemed this division 
detrimental to both parties involved.^02 On the one hand, payers of wages expected workers 
to be at their disposal as if they were their natural dependents. On the other hand, 
employees believed that their employers should respond to their increasing demands, and 
that they should perform the minimum possible work in return for their wages.^03 This kind 
of relationship bred hostility, and sooner or later would be intolerable both to employers
498 See J. Riley, ‘M ill's political economy: Ricardian science and liberal utilitarian art', p. 316.
499 J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy. (CW), II, p. 374.
MK) See E.F. Paul, ‘J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian Influence in the Dem ise o f Laissez-faire', 139.
501 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 792.
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and employees. The impropriety of such a relationship derived from the fact that it was 
grounded on a theory of paternalism, which Mill thought was no longer accepted in the 
advanced countries of Europe. Influenced by the socialist ideals of the nineteenth-century, 
workers refused to rely on the higher ranks of society for protection. According to Mill, 
workers were taking ‘their interests into their own hands, and are perpetually showing that 
they think that the interests of their employers are not identical with their own, but opposite 
to them'.504 Mill thought that this attitude was justified because events had shown that the 
so-called protectors were ‘the only persons against whom, in any ordinary circumstances, 
protection is needed’.507* In addition to this, he claimed that the division of societies into 
payers and receivers of wages compromised economic efficiency, because employees 
tended not to do their best in the fulfilment of their duties, since they were not reaping the 
benefit of their exertions.7*06 This produced the additional inconvenience of rendering it 
necessary to withdraw some workers from direct involvement in the productive process in 
order to superintend the work of others who, if left unchecked, might behave dishonestly.7*07 
But Mill had faith in the influence of the spirit of association and partnership gradually to 
make economic relations less conflictual. The growth of co-operative associations would 
establish the ascendancy of the moral sentiments of co-operation over the selfish
S()8sentiments, and consequently diminish unfairly earned inequalities.' Mill believed that co­
operative associations could multiply the intellectual and physical energies devoted to the 
economic process by reinforcing the perception that the interests at stake were common. He
M)2 See ibid.. p. 896.
503 See ibid., p. 767.
5(M Ibid.. p. 762.
505 Ibid.. p. 761.
506 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Econom y, (CW), II, pp. 204-5.
507 See ibid.. p. 110.
308 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy. (CW), III, p. 793.
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thought that the multiplication of such energies would renew capitalism.509 Mill expected 
that such a renewal would be based on the prevalence of practices of profit-sharing, not 
only in very restricted branches of industry, but throughout society.510 The association of 
labourers and capitalists in the sharing of profits would have the merit of obtaining a 
stronger commitment from the employees, who would see their wages depended upon their 
exertions. Profit-sharing would foment a sense of responsibility and self-respect in 
labourers that was in itself a source of personal achievement. Beyond this, Mill believed 
that profit-sharing would be superseded by associations of labourers, with collective 
ownership of the capital and equal power to influence decisions regarding management.^11 
Joint ownership was ultimately the most desirable form of association because it did not 
require workers to pay a ‘tax' for the use of capital, but allowed them to accumulate 
capital.512
Mill, then, presumed that co-operative associations of capitalists and workers would evolve 
into co-operative associations composed just of workers. The socialist society which Mill 
envisioned was one in which co-operatives of workers would compete among themselves. 
He believed that worker co-operatives would prevail because they were better able to fulfil 
the democratic aspirations of modern times. Freed from the owner-worker relationship that 
made them work for the benefit of the possessors of capital, labourers would be stimulated
509 See B. Baum. ‘J.S. M ill’s Conception o f Economic Freedom', p. 494. Mill uses expressions such as the 
system ‘o f individual agency' and the system ‘o f freedom o f commercial intercourse' to refer to capitalism. 
‘Capitalism’ is the word used in this chapter to describe the socio-econom ic system based on private 
ownership and free trade. It is not a term favoured by Mill: nonetheless it expresses what he intended to 
convey when using the expressions previously mentioned.
510 See ibid., pp. 769-74.
511 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 775.
5,2 See C.L. Ten. ‘Democracy, socialism, and the working classes’, in J. Skorupski (ed). The Cambridge
Companion to Mill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 385-6.
to do their best.513 Mill thought, nonetheless, that the private system of production would 
remain in place for a certain time until people achieved the basic moral and intellectual 
qualities that would enable them to live successfully in socialist societies.514 Moreover, 
Mill envisioned the piecemeal implementation of socialism, because he wanted to be sure 
that it would neither threaten individuality nor drastically upset people’s settled 
expectations.^ Despite being optimistic about socialism in Principles o f Political 
Economy, Mill defended the need to wait for voluntary socialistic experiments to come into 
existence in order to evaluate more accurately the viability of the system.^16 His preferred 
form of socialism, consisting of co-operatives, entailed neither the abolition of private 
property nor absolute equality in the means of living.1'17 Mill believed that competition was 
important for society even in a socialist system. He saw the process of antagonism and 
friction that marked competition as a stimulant to people’s capacities and as a safeguard 
against mental idleness. Competition demonstrated to people that they needed to be as
^ 1 0intelligent and active as their rivals.' Competition produced inconveniences, he was 
prepared to admit, but he judged that it prevented greater evils, for ‘wherever competition is 
not, monopoly is’, and monopoly ‘in all its forms, is the taxation of the industrious for the 
support of indolence, if not plunder.'^19 Besides, Mill contended that competition among 
producers could lower the price of goods and even generate higher wages where the labour 
market was not overstocked. The stimulus to development caused by that confrontation of 
opinions in the political sphere, was mirrored by competition in the economical sphere.
^  See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 775.
:' 14 See C.L. Ten, ‘Democracy, socialism, and the working classes", p. 393.
:'15 See J. Riley, ‘M ill’s political economy: Ricardian science and liberal utilitarian art’, p. 317.
516 See E.F. Paul, ‘J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian Influence in the Demise o f Laissez-faire’, 141.
517 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), II, p. 203.
518 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, pp. 795-6.
5,9 Ibid., p. 794.
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Competition, therefore, was an important component of Mill’s notion of economic 
democracy. He believed that the participation of individuals in the economic sphere had 
important educational effects, and contributed to people’s improvement as much as their 
participation in the political process.'"
Mill's ideas on economic matters cannot be disentangled from his concern to promote 
individual improvement and accountability. When he examined different models of society, 
his concern was whether they were likely to promote autonomy. Mill was quite open to new 
ideas, but at the same time took a critical attitude towards them. He criticised communists 
for not offering solutions to the problem of how to apportion work to the strength and 
capacities of individuals, and stressed that the nominal equality of labour was a great 
injustice because all people were not equally fit for all labour. “ In Principles o f Political 
Economy, Mill stated that he was not convinced that communism was consistent with the 
spirit of pluralism and intellectual competition that he deemed vital to promote human 
improvement.'^22 Despite this, he did not come to a definitive conclusion about communism. 
His ideal of society was that of a stationary state, in which an adequate distribution of 
wealth allowed individuals to live in a secure environment and devote themselves to higher 
pursuits, and not one which furthered economic growth.  ^ Jonathan Riley is correct to say 
that Mill’s ideal of a stationary state is problematic because it is based on a perfectly 
competitive market of small-scale producers, while an efficient economy requires many
5~° See W. Donner, The Liberal Self: John Stuart M ill's M oral and Political Philosophy, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 208.
r>21 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), II, p. 206.
522 See ibid., p. 209.
523 See J. Riley, ‘M ill’s political economy: Ricardian science and liberal utilitarian art', pp. 314, 326-7.
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combinations of input present only in larger scales of production.524 Nevertheless, Mill’s 
wish to create a secure environment in which people devoted themselves to higher pursuits 
shows that he saw economic growth as a means of furthering the development of 
individuality, and not as an end in itself. From this conviction, Mill inferred that, left 
unencumbered, market economies could transform human beings into mere links in the 
chain of production, and when this occured, human dignity was destroyed, and democracy 
and autonomy became empty words. In order to prevent this, he argued that in certain 
circumstances state intervention was desirable.
5.3. STATE INTERFERENCE AND DEMOCRACY
Mill argued that practices which departed from the principle of laissez-faire should occur 
only when there were overriding reasons in support of them. There were situations in which 
government would be obliged to perform acts which would be left to private agents, if they 
were advanced intellectually to recognise the need of co-operation with others in order to 
perform them with success.525 Mill did not ground the principle of laissez-faire on natural 
rights, but on experience - that is on ‘a series of instrumental assessments that government 
activity is to be rejected over a certain broad range of issues because it produces certain 
undesirable effects’.5"6 For him, the inferiority of governmental to private agency in 
commercial and industrial activities had been proved by practical experience, and could be 
explained by the inferior interest which government had in the outcome of such
524 See ibid., p. 294.
5-5 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 970.
5-6 E.F. Paul, ‘J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian Influence in the Demise o f Laissez-faire', Journal o f  Libertarian  
Studies, 2 (1960), p. 146.
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activities.527 In the same way, the market economy was preferable to other alternatives 
because it had proved itself the best means of providing society with cheap commodities of 
good quality. But Mill did not think that any general theory was capable of establishing
528beforehand those areas in which state intervention might be desirable/
Mill distanced himself from the position of extreme non-interventionism and assumed a 
more flexible approach to the principle of laissez-faire. His approach was grounded on the 
principle that, as the economic laws of distribution were not natural phenomena, 
government could intervene to prevent severe levels of poverty, which were detrimental to 
society. But it is essential to understand that Mill’s overriding concern for individual 
improvement and accountability guided his account of the relationship between state and 
society. On the one hand, he supported the view that personal improvement required liberty 
of thought and association for individuals, and that the state should not interfere in these 
issues. On the other hand, he argued that autonomy was realised through public life, and 
required a social environment not only where criticism and debate was possible, but also 
where access to education and other goods was possible as well. For Mill, the failure of the 
state to help people achieve the basic means of subsistence led to unacceptable levels of 
inequality. Moreover, he believed that the main problem in the future would be to ‘unite the 
greatest individual liberty of action, with an equal ownership of all in the raw material of 
the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour’.^ 29
See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Econom y, (CW), III, pp. 942-3.
528 See ibid., p. 937.
5~9 J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, p. 238.
Education was one area in which Mill deemed state intervention particularly necessary. He 
argued that the intervention of the state to help working-class parents to educate their 
children was the single most important item of public policy. He thought that elementary 
instruction should be made accessible to all, either gratuitously or at a small expense, 
because it was the basic requirement to enable human beings to live in society.530 Its 
absence caused both the children and the community in which they lived to suffer the tragic 
consequences of ignorance. Consequently, Mill contended that the state should impose on 
parents the legal obligation of giving elementary instruction to their children. However, he 
insisted that government must neither have the monopoly of education nor induce people to 
prefer its teachers.531 Governmental interference in education should follow the general rule 
according to which people should avail themselves of means other than those prescribed by 
the government to fulfil the ends that the government had ordained.532 Mill deemed the 
education of the children of the working-classes important in order to raise their intellectual 
and moral status, and to make them understand that their interests were interrelated with 
those of society as a whole.533 He believed that the future well-being would depend to a 
large extent on the degree to which working people were transformed into rational 
beings.534 It would be particularly important to combat English workers’ improvidence by 
educating them and providing them with the professional instruction without which they 
would not develop their capabilities.535
530 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, pp. 948 -9 .
531 See ibid., p. 150.
532 See ibid., pp. 938 -9 .
533 See C.L. Ten, ‘Democracy, socialism, and the working classes’, p. 384.
534 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 763.
533 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), II, p. 108.
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Mill also advocated state interference in order to extinguish extreme poverty amongst the 
working classes, and to allow them the possibility to appreciate the value of comfort, 
without which it would be impossible to educate them.536 The education of workers should 
stimulate their intellectual capacities and lead them to self-help.337 Those who were 
starving needed help more urgently than anyone else. However, it was crucial that, in 
guaranteeing all persons against absolute want, the condition of those who benefited from 
relief should not be made equal to or better than that of those who provided for themselves. 
This would discourage people from struggling for their own subsistence. Mill argued that 
the elimination of poverty would be possible only with strict rules of poor-law 
administration, so that the beneficiaries of the relief had a strong incentive to do without it 
if they could.338 Hence. Mill supported the changes introduced by the New Poor Law of 
1834, which in principle did not provide outdoor relief to the able-bodied poor, although in 
some cases provided it to the infirm, and established a central Poor Law Commission to 
supervise the scheme.339 Relief payments before the Act of 1834 were made from poor 
rates levied in the parish and were wed to supplement the low wages. Based on the view 
that such relief tended to promote idleness, the New Poor Law granted relief only to those 
who entered locally-run work houses, where basic food and shelter were provided in return 
for work. These places were intended to be unattractive, so that the poor would choose to 
help themselves rather than enter a workhouse. In addition to this, the New Poor Law 
prohibited those who entered the workhouse from exercising political rights.340 Mill 
presumed that the introduction of measures to educate people, combined with measures to
536 See ibid., p. 374.
537 See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 961.
538 See ibid.
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extinguish extreme poverty, would raise the standard of public opinion and qualify 
everyone for effective participation in public life.
At this juncture, it is important to reflect upon governmental interference in the light of 
Mill’s conception of democracy. He thought that competition and confrontation were 
sources of moral and technical improvement because they led human beings to activate 
capacities that would otherwise remain inactive.541 But the competition Mill envisioned 
could only occur where there was an institutional and social framework that allowed it to 
happen. For Mill, there was no security against political slavery in societies where 
intelligence was not diffused amongst the governed; and the diffusion of intelligence could 
only take place where extreme poverty was not prevalent.^42 Governments were not 
accountable where there was neither a sphere of individual freedom nor the minimum 
conditions of subsistence for the whole of the population. One must pay attention to the 
relationship between Mill’s concerns with social inequality on the one hand, and his 
concern with self-improvement and accountability on the other. Illiteracy and extreme 
poverty placed people under the control of others, and rendered them incapable of being 
informed and responsible citizens. But Mill did not want to promote social equality to the 
detriment of liberty. He rejected state interference destined to impose homogeneity, and 
instead hoped to provide education and subsistence for the people, and thereby secure for 
them the opportunity to pursue their own good in their own way.
539 See C. Cook, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Nineteenth Century' 1815-1914, (London and 
New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 120-1.
M0 See T.H. Marshall, Cidadania, Classe Social e Status, (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1967), p. 73.
541 See N. Bobbio, Liberalismo e D em ocracia, (Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1988), pp. 26-30.
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Mill ascribed an important social role to associations of workers, such as trade unions, 
because they were ‘the indispensable means of enabling the sellers of labour to take due 
care of their own interests under a system of competition’.543 He opposed, for two main 
reasons, laws which forbad workers to associate to raise wages. First, they prevented 
members of the working classes from obtaining higher wages in situations in which the 
number of workers available in the market had diminished. Mill deplored the fact that a 
legislature of employers in France had passed legislation designed to keep wages low, when 
wages were tending to increase due to the fact that the number of workers had been 
diminished by pestilence.544 For Mill, ‘such laws exhibit the infernal spirit of the slave 
master, when to retain the working classes in avowed slavery has ceased to be 
practicable'.^ Second, they prevented the working population from benefiting from the 
educational effects of participation. Only by participating in combined action could they 
understand, for example, that the fundamental cause of low wages was the level of demand 
and supply of labour, and not merely the law that prohibited them from taking part in 
combined action.'^46 Therefore, to deny the sellers of labour the right of association 
amounted to preventing them from taking due care of their own interests, and deprived 
them of an important source of personal development.547
Attempting to promote distributive justice within capitalism. Mill supported various sorts 
of government interference, for instance: 1) building and maintaining lighthouses; 2) 
preventing children from being overworked; 3) establishing buoys for the security of
54' See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, pp. 943-4.
543 Ibid., p. 932.
544 See ibid., p. 929.
545 T. ; ,
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navigation; 4) organizing public charity; 5) running joint-stock companies; 6) regulating 
concessions to monopolies in industry; 7) providing support for the education of the 
children of the working classes; 8) aiding workers thrown out of work due to the 
introduction of machinery.548 It is thus wrong to assert, as Howard Holloway does, that Mill 
supported a minor enlargement of government intervention in society because he cared 
more the for middle classes than for the working classes.549 Some clarification is, 
nevertheless, necessary in order to specify the nature of the intervention that Mill 
advocated. He neither wanted this intervention to be permanent nor intended to transform 
the organs responsible for them into branches of the central government. He believed that, 
were this to happen, ‘not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the 
legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name’.550 In 
appointing and paying the people who would control all aspects of life, the central 
government, would be able to impose its despotic will over society. For Mill, the risks of 
tyranny would be aggravated if ‘intelligence and talent are maintained at a high standard 
within a governing corporation, but starved and discouraged outside the pale’.551 In this 
case, there would be no rival power to criticise the government and those who were 
oppressed by government would be left no one to resort to.552 In view of this, state 
intervention, even when occurring outside the private sphere of conscience, must be 
avoided when: 1) individuals were likely to perform the action in question better than 
government; 2) the involvement of people in performing such an action was vital for their
;46 See ibid.. p. 932. 
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548 See E.F. Paul, ‘J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian Influence in the Dem ise o f Laissez-faire', pp. 146-8.
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mental education, such as involvement in jury trials; 3) when the intervention gave 
unnecessary powers to the government.353 It is clear, therefore, that Mill did not favour the 
granting of an excessive number of functions to government. He anticipated Weber’s fear 
that the increase of state bureaucracy in complex societies stifled creativity by attracting 
talented people to government and leaving the rest of society in a situation of semi­
slavery.x34 Centralization of power was detrimental for society, in Mill’s opinion. Hence, he 
criticised the propensity of some countries of Continental Europe to place a small number 
of ministers in control of the whole of the public business, and favoured the division of 
functions between central and local government. The latter should be responsible for the 
detailed implementation of policies, while the central government should hold them 
‘accountable for the results of their acts rather than for the acts themselves'.333 Mill 
regarded the Railway Board and the Poor Law Commission as models for the central power 
bodies which should superintend the activities of other agents, but did not control their 
activities in detail.336 Thus, society would benefit the most if information and supervising 
power were concentrated in the central government, and the handling of problems were left 
to local authorities.
Mill was aware that governments were not the only sources of abuse of power. He pointed 
to the fact that sometimes private companies monopolized certain activities and were less 
responsive to people’s complaints than the government.337 In order to prevent such abuses, 
government should grant licences for a limited time and oblige companies to comply with
552 See ibid., p. 940.
553 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, pp. 305-7.
554 See R. Bellamy, Liberalismo e Sociedade M odem a , (Sao Paulo: Editora Unesp. 1994), p. 52.
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prescribed conditions of quantity, quality, convenience, and rates of fares for the services 
they provided.558 Such intervention was indispensable in the instance of those companies 
which operate in fields in which the government had a duty to guarantee that services were 
being properly delivered. Mill stressed the fact that gas and water companies, for example, 
failed to compete because they were few in number and could easily make agreements not 
to compete.5:>9 But he was convinced that the proper use of regulatory and superintending 
power by local authorities could successfully address the problems posed by such 
monopolies. Despite this, in London, which had no unified local government but only 
parochial authorities, Mill proposed a Body of Commissioners appointed by the central 
government to superintend and regulate the system of water supply.7*60 Mill, however, did 
not want the state to carry out too many of the functions of society. He allowed for a 
limited number of authoritative interventions, but more often favoured non-authoritative 
interventions; that is, interventions designed to inform and advise, while leaving people free 
to use their own means of pursuing an object of general interest.7*61 There were certainly 
tensions between individual freedom and state intervention in Mill's thought. For example, 
Mill undermined individual freedom by arguing that the state could adopt compulsory birth 
control measures, and even forbid marriage, on the grounds that it was a mischievous act to 
cause of someone to exist who had the prospect of a life of wretchedness.7*62 But Mill was 
more emphatic in defending authoritative interference by the state in order to prevent such 
things as the unlimited accumulation of private property, because he regarded such
W6 See ibid., p. 940. 
xS7 See ibid., p. 956.
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accumulation as an interdiction of other people’s exercise of individual freedom. He 
believed that democratic self-government could not be a reality without a distribution of 
opportunities that would secure economic freedom for all. Hence, he regarded proposals in 
relation to education, land reform, poor laws, factory acts, and economic legislation as 
complementary to negative freedom, for the reason that people could not develop their 
inner potential if security, and to a certain extent, equality did not exist.563 Mill believed 
that self-cultivation could strengthen individuals’ mental powers and empower them to alter 
society and shape their future.2'64 But, despite being powerful sources of social 
transformation, mental faculties operated in a historical context that to an extent influenced 
them, so that it was possible to say that the relation between self-cultivation and historicity 
was a mutually constitutive one.
Mill deemed it necessary to establish a flexible relationship between government and civil 
society so as to prevent despotism and extreme social inequality. But he ultimately saw co­
operatives as the main source of economic regeneration for society. He expected that the 
diffusion of co-operatives of capitalists and workers would be a step towards the 
establishment of co-operatives of workers, in which their members would both collectively 
manage the enterprise and own the capital. But even in these circumstances, competition 
between co-operatives would be necessary in order to provide the managers with the 
incentive to promote efficiency.2'62' Mill is accused of being excessively optimistic in 
relation to the possibility of making the transition from capitalism to socialism. But in fact
562 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty\  (CW), XVIII, pp. 304-5.
563 See O. Kurer, ‘John Stuart Mill on Government Intervention’, in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill's 
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he knew that the system of private property would continue for a considerable period, 
because society lacked the moral and intellectual qualities that would make socialism a 
viable alternative.566 In Chapters on Socialism, Mill expressed his conviction that socialism 
was not viable in the short term.
5.4. MILL’S CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM  AND DEMOCRACY
Mill conceived of democracy not as a simple form of government, but as a complex form of 
social organization.567 He saw socialism as the application of the democratic principle to 
the realm of the economy, so as to create an equitable society. Mill attributed many of the 
problems of nineteenth-century society to the fact that class relations were based on 
dependence and not on partnership.568 In order to solve these problems, he maintained in 
Chapters on Socialism the same conviction he had maintained in Principles o f Political 
Economy - that is, the merging of employers and employees in a system of co-operatives. In 
Chapters on Socialism, he also insisted that limitation of population and the widespread 
provision of basic education were pre-conditions to the introduction of a social arrangement 
where misery and degradation were abolished. But, in the third edition of Principles o f 
Political Economy (1852). he was much more strongly committed to socialism than in 
Chapters on Socialism. In the latter. Mill was more preoccupied with promoting the reform 
of capitalism than with promoting socialism. Mill favoured a form of socialism in which 
co-operatives competed in the market, and in which all who worked were shareholders.
564 See E.J. Eisenach, ‘Mill and Liberal Christianity', in E.J. Eisenach (ed), M ill and the M oral Character o f  
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This moderate form of socialism, proposed in Chapters on Socialism, was not to be 
immediately introduced, but to be brought about in a distant future.
Socialism emerged in the wake of the Industrial Revolution as a reaction against ‘an 
individualism most marked in the use, and abuse, of private ownership of productive goods 
in industry’.7,69 Most socialists think that the means of production should be socially owned 
in order to allow an equal division of the goods produced. They want to see society 
engaged in the task of protecting its weaker members. In Chapters on Socialism, Mill 
praised socialists such as Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, who wanted to multiply small- 
scale socialistic experiments and progressively renew the social order, gradually 
superseding the system of private property. Fourier wanted society to be organised in 
‘phalanxes', that is in rural co-operatives of approximately 1,800 members. He proposed 
that each person should receive ‘minimum subsistence for work done and the surplus to be
S 70divided between labour, capital and talent’. Fourier opposed industrialism and advocated 
a return to nature as a solution for the problems of humanity. In contrast to Fourier, Owen 
had an industrialist mentality. He prescribed a system of administration that was autocratic 
and paternalistic, but which had proved its efficiency in the New Lanark Mills in Scotland. 
In A New View o f Society', Owen claimed that character was formed by the environment. 
Therefore, the problems of society were not rooted in individuals but in social structures. It 
was, therefore, necessary to improve conditions of sanitation, education, and the housing of 
workers in order for society to advance. Despite the differences between their conceptions
567 See R. Ashcraft, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Theoretical Foundations o f Democratic Socialism ’, p. 175.
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570 Ibid., i., p. 320.
of socialism, Fourier, Owen, and Mill shared the belief that changes in society must be 
gradual and not controlled by a central authority. Mill was critical of socialists ‘who want 
the central government taking possession of private property and managing the totality of 
the resources of the country’.371 He opposed the centralist type of socialism on the grounds 
that a social scheme could not be adopted without first having proven its capacity to 
implement standards of social life superior to that of the system which it was intended to 
replace. He proposed that socialism should be implemented on a small scale, so that it
S7?could easily be abandoned if it proved detrimental to society.' This form of socialism 
required the shared ownership of the instruments of production and the division of the 
social produce according to rules publicly laid down by the community.' ' It was, therefore, 
compatible with the private ownership of consumables, and with the exclusive right of each 
to his share of the produce. In Chapters on Socialism, Mill criticised communism as a 
centralised form of social organization that risked undermining the improvement of society 
by ignoring the diversity of capacities among people and granting everyone equal earnings 
without reference to their contribution to production. He was also critical of several aspects 
of socialist rhetoric. Mill disagreed with those who defended socialism on the assumption 
that the wages of common workers in Europe were diminishing. He recognised that wages 
were insufficient to supply the necessities of working people, but emphatically affirmed 
that they were slowly increasing. Mill reinforced the approach to competition that he 
outlined in Principles o f Political Economy by portraying it as a security for cheapness as 
well as a mechanism to render people accountable for what they produced. Besides, he 
deemed competition important in enhancing individuals’ capacities and placing them on the
571 J.S. Mill, Chapters on Socialism, (CW), V, p. 737.
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path of improvement. In addition to this, Mill disagreed with those who believed that the 
equal division of the social produce would significantly improve the average wage.574 Such 
a belief was, in his view, based on the false idea that capitalists received an unfairly large 
share of the capital of the country, whereas he judged that what they received corresponded 
to the anxiety they suffered and the skill they applied in the existing market conditions.' 
Mill did not intend to campaign for socialism by making false accusations against 
capitalism. He asserted that socialism was better able to meet the demands of a truly 
democratic society than capitalism. But, as he did not think that the pre-conditions for the 
implementation of socialism were in place, he preferred to concentrate his efforts on 
promoting reforms to existing society. He thought that the working classes would use such 
means as the press and public meetings to change the property regime.576 The Reform Act 
of 1867 gave those who lived on weekly wages in Britain the possibility of exerting a great 
influence on legislation. Mill assumed that the newly enfranchised voters would engage in 
attempts to reform the current property regime because they were not beneficiaries of the 
status quo.'77 But he thought that these reforms would be beneficial not only for the newly 
enfranchised voters but for society as a whole. Undoubtedly, Mill defended the principle 
that property should be taken from people, with due compensation, when the public interest 
required it. The final sections of Chapters on Socialism were designed to show that the 
notions of property held throughout history were as variable as all other creations of the 
human mind. Mill has sometimes been accused of being unclear in his approach to 
property. On the one hand, he praised the educative effects that the diffusion of property
573 See ibid., p. 738.
574 See ibid., p. 736.
575 See ibid., p. 735.
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bring about. On the other hand, he saw common ownership of the means of production as a 
final solution to the problem concentration of wealth.578 But, ultimately, Mill intended to 
introduce legislation to make possible the expropriation of landed property when it was
7^9
required to increase productivity and prevent an excessive concentration of property.' He 
judged the inheritance of property to be detrimental to the public good because it 
concentrated wealth. Mill wanted to frame the system of property in a way that prevented 
those degrees of inequality which represented a threat to individuality. He believed that it 
was not appropriate to resort to natural rights or historical laws to define the appropriate 
characteristics of the property system.7*80 He opposed Herbert Spencer’s idea that policies of 
redistribution must be avoided in the name of the sanctity of property. Spencer supported 
the view that the only function of government was to defend citizens against internal and 
external aggression. He argued that the legislation of the 1860s, designed to protect 
workers, betrayed liberalism because it was paternalistic and disrespected the freedom of 
contract.7*81 For Spencer, it was important to respect freedom of contract because the 
advance of civilization was proportional to the decrease of the influence of government in 
society. The increase of state influence warped the process of natural selection which 
determined that those better able to survive did so, and instead brought about bureaucracy,
Q^-)
which was intrinsically corrupt. “ Property and the free market were, in Spencer’s 
understanding, institutions to be preserved in their purity. In contrast to Spencer, Mill
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thought that failure by the state to act might be as detrimental to society as excessive 
intervention. The concentration of wealth through accumulation across generations was one 
factor which prevented large sections of the population from achieving economic 
citizenship. Therefore, expedients to disperse property were essential. Mill regarded huge 
concentrations of property as inimical to liberty because they created a concentration of 
power, which led to oppression. Most importantly, he did not regard the right of inheritance 
as a necessary consequence of the notion of private property. In his view, it was not 
correct to assume that the property of those who died without making a disposition of it 
during their lifetime should pass to their children and nearest relations. This might be best 
in some circumstances, but should not be established as a legal presumption. As a rule, he 
argued that the state should grant a provision to secure the subsistence of the children of 
those who died without leaving a will, and use the surplus to supply the general purposes of 
society.584 The right of bequest was a different issue because each person had the right to 
give to any other person whatever they can produce or obtain in a fair market. Therefore, 
Mill's account of property can be seen as a neo-Lockean one because it ‘makes a 
straightforward appeal to thrift, industry and risk-taking as grounds for rewards’.' ' This 
appeal explains Mill's contrasting views about taxation of inheritance and income. He 
opposed progressive taxation of income on the grounds that it penalised those who worked 
harder, but supported progressive taxation of inheritance on the grounds that those who 
benefited from it were not the same people as those who had worked to produce it. The 
essential principle of property was ‘to assure to all persons what they have produced by
See J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Econom y, (C\V), II, p. 218.
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their labour and accumulated by their abstinence’.' Thus, for Mill, since land was a raw 
material not produced by labour, the proprietor of land must be someone who was able to 
improve it, otherwise there were no grounds for recognising his or her ownership. In order 
to further human improvement, the institution of property must change because human
587beings were driven by motives which were not the same at all times.' Therefore, schemes 
of property rights should be flexible in order to allow people to experiment in their search
588for happiness.' Mill’s notion of property was intended to prevent extreme inequalities and 
parasitic behaviour and to promote love for work, an active mentality, and a balance of 
power. It was thus consistent with the idea that human flourishing demanded not only 
negative freedom but positive freedom as well.
Mill ultimately evaluated economic systems according to their capacity to secure freedom
c o g
to all people under ‘no restriction but that of not doing injury to others’.' In view of this, 
Richard J. Ameson claims that, despite Mill’s sympathetic approach to many aspects of the 
socialist critique of the property system, he was sceptical in relation to socialism because he 
saw it as a threat to individual liberty. Ameson is aware that Mill presented the choice 
between capitalism and socialism as a question to be settled in the future. Nonetheless, in 
Ameson's opinion, Mill presumed that socialism would increase the influence of collective 
decisions over individuals and augment the interdependence amongst them in a way that 
would be bound to restrict individual freedom.'^90 Arneson alleges that Mill’s presumption 
is wrong because interdependence is a phenomenon present in privately-owned complex
J.S. Mill. Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), II, p. 227.
587 See J. Gray, ‘John Stuart Mill on the Theory o f Property', p. 255.
588 See ibid., p. 255-56.
589 J.S. Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, (CW), III, p. 978.
229
modem industry and there is no evidence that it amounts to a restriction of individual 
freedom.591 He also avers that Mill’s fear of a homogeneous working classes tyrannising 
over the rest of society is groundless. For Ameson, the homogeneity of the working classes 
was based on solidarity against the employers. Hence, if socialism were introduced, such 
solidarity would come to an end, because there would be no employers to make it 
necessary.2'92 Moreover, Amerson argues that there is no reason to expect exceptionally 
different effects from socialism in the realm of economic freedom because, both in 
capitalism and in the form of socialism Mill advocated, consumer demand determines what 
is produced.2193 Ameson is certainly correct in claiming that Mill had reservations in relation 
to socialism, fearing that it could pose a threat to individual freedom. However, Ameson is 
wrong in thinking that Mill saw the augmentation of interdependence in socialism as the 
source of a threat to freedom.2194 Since the publication of Civilization (1836). Mill had 
affirmed that the advance of civilization depended on the capacity of human beings to act 
together for common purposes. Interdependence considered in itself was, therefore, a good 
thing because it facilitated co-operation. In Chapters on Socialism, Mill feared a threat to 
freedom emanating from centralised and revolutionary forms of socialism, in which the 
state was a bureaucratic monster which allowed no opposition. Realising that such forms of 
socialism were becoming popular, he advocated the reform of capitalism and hoped for 
more favourable conditions in the future for the implementation of a decentralized form of 
socialism.
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Mill’s attitude towards socialism, as outlined in Chapters on Socialism, demands further 
clarification. Here, Mill addressed matters related to socialism and co-operatives which had 
emerged subsequent to his debates with the Owenites in the late 1820s. In the late 1830s, he 
expressed doubts about the possibility of co-operatives carrying forward the operations of 
industry independently of individual capitalists, but admitted that they could be important 
sources of education for the working classes.7,95 In the mid-1840s, Mill placed his chief 
hope for harmonising, at the same distant date, the interests of workers and employers in 
co-operative work and partnership.596 In the 1850s, he viewed co-operative work as a 
source of regeneration for society and reconsidered the unsympathetic tone of the first 
edition of Principles o f Political Economy in relation to socialism. In a letter of 23 August 
1858 to Frederick J. Fumivall, he said that the progress of co-operatives was slow because 
altruistic moral feelings were lacking.'^97 In the 1860s, Mill showed greater sympathy 
towards the co-operative cause, judging it essential to elevate the social dignity of those 
who worked with their own hands.598 In a letter of 25 September 1865 to John Boyd 
Kinnear, Mill contended that the growth of co-operation and the merging of labourers and 
employers into one class were important means of preventing hostilities between them.7'99 
From these considerations, one can infer that Mill supported practices of co-operation from 
the 1840s and co-operative socialism from the early 1850s. Even in Chapters on Socialism, 
Mill continued to defend co-operative practices as antidotes to paternalistic doctrines and as
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essential in promoting workers’ independence. Nevertheless, in the last years of his life, 
Mill recognised that the growth of workers’ co-operatives was taking place at a pace that 
was below his expectations, because the spirit of partnership was not rooted deeply enough 
in society to permit socialism to flourish. He held that, without the ascendancy of moral 
feelings of co-operation, the form of socialism he supported could not be adequately 
implemented. First, those who owned productive units would object to their division among 
others and their transformation into co-operatives. Second, free-riding and bad management 
could easily prevail under a form of socialism in which the spirit of altruism was absent. 
Assuming that society was not ripe for socialism, Mill’s objective in Chapters on Socialism 
was to promote profit-sharing and land reform. As the economic and educational situation 
of the working classes was slowly improving. Mill thought it was worthwhile to advance 
reforms in capitalism. His reservations in relation to the immediate implementation of 
socialism were thus based on concerns which centred on both freedom and economics. 
Moreover, in Chapters on Socialism, Mill tried to draw support away from the 
revolutionary forms of socialism which aimed to change society quickly.600 Mill believed 
that those who wanted to change society at a single stroke ‘must have a serene confidence 
in their own wisdom on the one hand and a recklessness of other people’s sufferings on the 
other’.601 His criticism of revolutionary socialists was based on the fact that they intended 
to subvert the existing social order, blandly assuming that their new order would solve the 
problems that the old failed to address.602 Mill favoured reform because revolution implies 
wide-ranging changes in society and unpredictable consequences.603 Therefore, those who
600 See J.S. Mill, Chapters on Socialism, (CW), V, p. 738.
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supported revolutionary change in order to implement socialism were relying on untested 
beliefs.604 Mill’s method of social reform anticipated what Karl Popper termed ‘piecemeal 
social engineering’. The idea behind this is that gradual reforms can be democratically 
debated and controlled by society. This is why Mill’s proposals for reforms in public 
health, industrial schemes, and the judicial system were less ambitious than those of 
Bentham and other utilitarians.60^  Both Mill and Popper believe that democratic institutions 
are necessary to render governments accountable and to allow conflicts to be solved by 
critical reasoning and persuasion instead of by violence.606 Mill expected these democratic 
institutions to be present in the kind of socialism at which he aimed. Nevertheless, he 
stressed the need for co-operative practices within capitalism, because he saw no possibility 
of a secure transition to a democratic form of socialism in the near future. Mill disagreed 
with the defenders of centralised forms of socialism in relation to the nature of class 
conflict. He did not assume that class conflict generated a dynamic that necessarily evolved 
towards a classless society. Mill contended that it was necessary to strengthen the spirit of 
partnership and co-operation in capitalism because they were pre-conditions for socialism. 
The strengthening of altruistic feelings within capitalist society would make possible the 
gradual implementation of a socialist society. Gradualism was thus a central characteristic 
of Mill’s approach to socialism, because he thought that it is not feasible to generate a 
democratic society based on revolutionary change. In 1848, both Mill and Marx argued for 
changes in capitalism in Principles o f Political Economy and Communist Manifesto
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respectively. They both pointed to contradictions and problems in capitalism, but they 
proposed different solutions:
Both envisage the emergence of a system in which the employer-employee relation 
would be non-existent. Yet they differed vitally in their prognostications concerning 
the manner in which the ultimate goal would be reached; whereas Marx, as is well 
known, believed that the passage would be marked by a violent rupture, Mill’s guess 
was that it would be a gradual transition.607
Despite Mill’s interest in promoting economic democracy, he was cautious in proposing 
social change because he believed that political action should respect, to a certain extent at 
least, pre-existing habits and sentiments.608 However, he did not reject in all circumstances, 
the use of violence to promote change. Mill thought that violence was justifiable where 
governments tyrannise people by denying them the use of peaceful means of 
communicating opinions, and where there was no legal means of redressing grievances.609 
He added to these conditions the likelihood that the insurrection would be successful in the 
short and in the long run. He criticised the 1830 Revolution in France, alleging that its 
military success was not based on adequate preparation for a future good government.610 
Mill, on several occasions, showed support for the legitimacy to violence in resolving 
political conflicts. In the American Civil War, he thought the North was obliged to use 
force to crush the rebellion promoted by the South, because the South supported slavery
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which he deemed a terrible form of oppression.611 In the French Revolution of 1789, he saw 
violence as the only means available to revolutionaries in extirpating the large amount of 
evil accumulated over the centuries in French society.612 Mill also deemed the use of 
violence acceptable in the 1848 Revolution in France, and admitted that the co-operative 
experiments that occurred at that time pushed him in the direction of socialism 613 But he 
saw no case for resorting to violence to implement socialism in Britain, because the 
dynamic of British society permitted changes to be gradually implemented. Mill presumed 
that, if the masses - the group he deemed capable of achieving unchallengeable power in 
the mid-nineteenth century - used violence to establish socialism, the outcome would be 
terrible. There was a reason for this: the production of sudden, violent, and wide-ranging 
change in society required a massive use of power that led either to the total annihilation of 
other political forces or to a continuous conflict fuelled by bitter resentment and revenge. 
The revolutionary changes that occurred in the twentieth-century seem to show that Mill 
was correct in predicting that the ruling group of a new order abruptly implemented against 
settled expectations must increasingly concentrate power in its own hands in order to 
counter the fierce opposition of those who have lost property and power. This is why 
revolutionary changes normally lead to dictatorship. It is interesting to note that in his 
revolutionary theory, Marx contended that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be 
necessary after the overthrow of capitalist society in order to oppose the counter­
revolutionary movement of the bourgeoisie and to consolidate the establishment of the new 
order. In Marx's view, socialism was the first stage in the transition from capitalism to
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611 See J.S. Mill, The Contest in America, (CW), XXI, p. 136.
6I' See J.S. Mill, The Close o f  the Session in France, (CW), XXIII, p. 453.
613 See J.S. Mill, Autobiography, (CW), I, pp. 240-41.
235
communism, and in which society was still marked by some characteristics of the market 
economy. The dictatorship of the proletariat should continue, according to Marx, from the 
moment of the seizure of power up to the moment of the withering away of the state and the 
abolition of class distinctions. Therefore, once exploitation had ended, the coercion of the 
proletarian dictatorship would be rendered unnecessary, and would disappear.614 In Critique 
of the Gotha Programme, written in 1875, Marx advocated the need for the dictatorship of 
the proletariat as opposed to the existing dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. However, he had 
anticipated this view in Class Struggle in France (1850), which showed that the possibility 
of overcoming capitalism and implementing an alternative model of society was being 
debated in some circles in the mid-nineteenth century. Mill was not familiar with Marx’s 
writings but. in Chapters On Socialism, he criticised ideas concerning revolutionary change 
in society that have a considerable similarity with those of Marx. There was a level of 
optimism in Marx’s philosophy of history that exceeded by far anything that could be 
found in Mill. The so-called scientific socialism of Marx was grounded on the presumption 
that the internal contradictions of capitalism, which were expressed in the class struggle 
between bourgeoisie and proletariat, would push society towards the abolition of class 
distinctions. Hence, reasonable course of action for the proletariat was to organise itself in 
order to overthrow the ruling class, and thus perform the role of the midwife of history. 
There was a considerable degree of determinism in Marx’s philosophy of history. Hence, 
Marx was able to justify the dictatorship of the proletariat on the grounds that it would 
further the movement of history towards communism. Marx offered no detailed description 
of the communist society he envisaged, but he expected it to be democratic and beneficial
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to human flourishing. The very notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat implied the 
suffocation of diversity, which was at odds with Mill’s idea of human flourishing. The truth 
is that Mill wanted to prevent drastic inequality in the socio-economic sphere without 
undermining political liberty, whereas Marx saw political liberty as a superstition.61 ^  Mill’s 
political economy was designed to be applied in political systems that promoted 
participation in a broad sense.616 For Mill, by participating in elections, voluntary 
associations, and juries, people acted in a public capacity and ‘guide their conduct by aims 
which unite instead of isolating them from each other’.617 He averred that those who cared 
for nobody but themselves and were not able to sympathise with others were condemned to 
unhappiness, while those who cultivated public spirit ‘retain as lively an interest in life on 
the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health'.618 Mill’s advocacy of civic virtues 
complemented his advocacy of a private sphere of conduct, in that he assumed that the 
exchange of experiences in the public sphere could help people to cultivate their own 
individuality. Therefore, there was no contradiction between self-cultivation and public 
spiritedness. A liberal-democratic civic culture required the existence of voluntary 
associations which would establish relations between individuals and strengthen their spirit 
of co-operation. These types of associations were unlikely to exist in centralised forms of 
socialism.
Mill's concern with democracy was at the heart of his political economy. He believed that 
the participation of people in the economic sphere was as beneficial to society as their
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participation in the political process. Moreover, he revised the doctrine of laissez-faire by 
allowing the state to provide basic education and to prevent those inequalities that led to the 
submission of some individuals to others. Mill wanted society to help the working classes 
to achieve a basic level of subsistence and education, because he thought that otherwise 
they would not be authentic citizens capable of making the informed choices that 
democratic societies demanded. Therefore, he linked self-government with economics, in 
that he assumed that democracy could not subsist where economic opportunities were not 
well distributed. He regarded the diffusion of intelligence amongst the governed as the best 
antidote to political slavery, but he knew that in many circumstances political slavery was 
caused by economic dependence and wretchedness. Mill supported the organisation of 
workers to increase wages and obtain other benefits on the grounds that it was important 
that their social condition and civic education be improved. However, Mill judged that 
ultimately it was necessary to overcome the division of society into payers and receivers of 
wages, because such a division was grounded on a relation of dependence that produced 
class hostility. He defended a type of market socialism, a decentralised system of worker 
co-operatives competing among themselves, as a solution to this problem. He believed that 
competition should exist in socialism, because competition was necessary to prevent 
idleness and monopoly. Mill moderated his defence of socialism, in Chapters on Socialism, 
fearing the increasing popularity of centralised and revolutionary forms of socialism that 
posed a threat to freedom, and believing that moral feelings of co-operation were not 
sufficiently rooted in society to allow socialism to be successfully implemented. In 
Chapters on Socialism, he favoured land reform and profit-sharing as necessary steps to 
improve the situation of the working classes and prepare them for the implementation of 
socialism in the distant future. For Mill, economic democracy presupposed economic
freedom, the absence of massive concentrations of wealth, and the existence of 
intermediary bodies in society. He favoured the creation of various centres of power in 
order to eliminate the possibility of tyranny both in the political and in the economic 
sphere. The idea of having intermediary bodies which would operate to counterbalance the 
power of the state and prevent despotism was not one Mill invented. Montesquieu, for 
example, believed that the power of the clergy and of the nobility was essential in 
preventing the despotism of princes. Tocqueville stressed the importance of religious, 
ethical, scientific, industrial, commercial, and political associations in fomenting public 
spiritedness and independence in American social life.619 For both Tocqueville and Mill the 
formation of associations was important in preventing individuals from becoming impotent 
before the power of the state. However, Mill expressed concerns not only in relation to 
political despotism, but also in relation to social despotism. He saw co-operatives of 
workers, co-operatives of consumers, and unions as intermediary bodies based on voluntary 
association and designed, above all, to prevent economic despotism, which was as much a 
threat to individuality as political despotism. Mill’s account of economic democracy was 
marked by a preoccupation to prevent the control of society by private monopolies. He was 
not a leveller, however, and presumed that once primary education and subsistence were 
accessible to everyone, people would be prepared to participate fully in the life of 
democratic societies, and this in turn would favour the diversification of tastes and opinion 
and the reduction of economic inequality. In defending a positive agenda for the state, Mill 
intended to minimize inequality due to birth which he deemed an artificial barrier to 
people’s improvement. However, he was not a paternalist, but a radical who believed that
619 See N. Bobbio, Teoria Geral da Polftica . pp. 331-33.
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personal responsibility should be a characteristic of all classes.620 In point of fact, Mill 
believed that freedom and economic democracy were essential to the well-being of society. 
This was why he asserted that good social arrangements were those which ‘make the scale 
turn in favour of equality, whenever this can be done without impairing the security of the 
property which is the product of personal exertion’.621 Mill marshalled a utilitarian 
argument against drastic economic inequality: it distorted the market place and created 
luxury and snobbishness in one spectrum of society and envy and resentment in the other. 
A society marked by severe inequality could not provide security for its members, which 
was a very important social utility and one of the most vital interests of human beings.622 In 
the end, Mill anticipated the twentieth-century notion that democracy is a social concept 
and not merely a political one.
5.5. CONCLUSION
It was a characteristic of the thought of Locke and of the Scottish Enlightenment that the 
state could be a threat to individual freedom and an embarrassment to the productive 
process. In the nineteenth-century, this view, and in particular the fear of tyranny, 
continued to influence many of those who wished to restrict the activities of government. 
Mill shared such a fear but did not see the state as the only possible source of oppression. 
He was aware that private monopolies were sometimes less responsive to people's demands 
than governmental ones. He also regarded the concentration of economic power as 
dangerous to society because it destroyed the autonomy of those who were obliged to sell
6-0 See P. Schwartz, The New Political Economy o f  J.S. Mill, p. 195.
6-1 J.S. Mill, Vindication o f  the French Revolution o f  1848, (CW), XX, p. 354.
their labour at any price. Such a concentration of economic power had to be avoided, 
because not doing so would condemn individuals to conformism and servility, which Mill 
deemed to be fundamentally opposed to human dignity. Although recognising the necessity 
of state intervention to combat severe poverty and illiteracy, Mill wanted such intervention 
neither to discourage private initiative nor to overcharge the state. Mill aimed at a socialist 
society in which co-operatives would compete in a free market and individuals would 
devote themselves to noble intellectual pursuits. He accepted, nonetheless, that such a 
society should be preceded by reforms in capitalism that would alter the system of property, 
prevent undue accumulation of wealth across generations, and promote the participation of 
workers in the productive process and in the division of its produce. In the end. Mill 
advanced a conception in which the flourishing of individual freedom could not be 
separated from the creation and distribution of wealth.
6"~ See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, p. 259.
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CHAPTER 6 
MILL ON UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, it will be shown that Mill believed that the exercise of people’s deliberative 
powers was inextricably linked to their happiness, so that an advance in the use of critical 
reasoning would lead to an increase of well-being in society. Mill believed that the practice 
of critical reasoning would permeate social life only if debate and discussion were 
institutionalised. The realisation of the values attached to his conceptions of utility, 
autonomy, and democracy ultimately depended, therefore, on such institutionalisation. 
Democracy could function satisfactorily only if diversity existed in society, and if no 
agency in society was strong enough to exercise an all-encompassing power. The existence 
of a balance of power in society was important not only to Mill’s account of political 
institutions, but also to his account of ethics.
The second section will to show that Mill’s conception of utility is sharply differentiated 
from that of the neo-classical economists, in that Mill saw utility as a moral category and
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not as a strictly economic category which reduced the value of goods to their ability to fulfil 
desires. Mill’s utilitarianism was grounded on a conception of human beings as social 
animals, who had a sense of dignity that permitted them, when not misguided, to identify as 
the highest pleasures those pleasures associated with strengthening their deliberative 
powers and with their capacity to socialize. Mill argued that education should be used to 
strengthen these social feelings, and thereby encourage the diffusion of an altruistic 
mentality in which moral agents saw the happiness of others as being as valuable as their 
own. This section outlines Mill’s view that virtue and justice were sub-classes of utility, 
which was the ultimate foundation of morality.
In the third section, it will be argued that Mill did not present a developed account of how 
overall utility should be calculated because he believed that, once political institutions were 
structured to promote public debate and respect for minorities, society would reach a 
consensus about which activities would permit the experience of higher pleasures. He 
believed that such a consensus would tend progressively to eliminate political conflicts, and 
he inferred that such a consensus would come about because of his Socratic belief that 
knowledge necessarily led to correct moral decisions.
The fourth section will render it evident that Mill failed to consider the possibility that 
people’s higher capacities of imagination and reasoning might be used to inflict harm on 
society, in that he believed that intellectual advances necessarily made people more 
altruistic. Mill failed to establish a clear-cut differentiation between private and public 
actions, but offered some important indications of when society should interfere in people’s 
lives. Despite not having provided a complete account of the relationship between freedom
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and utility, Mill did recognise the importance of liberty both for the enhancement of 
individuality and for social progress. He stressed the importance of freedom as an intrinsic 
part of human happiness, and demanded a diversified social environment in which people 
had opportunities to find the way of life they believed most suitable for them.
In the fifth section, it will be argued that Mill’s ethical discourse was consistent with his 
defence of gradualism in social change. Mill opposed the idea that that there was no good 
reason to preoccupy oneself with the limits of power because the will of governors 
corresponded to the will of the governed. For Mill, it was essential that democratic societies 
possessed institutions that prevented uniformity and allowed governments to be removed 
from office when acting against the will of the governed.
The concluding section will show that Mill inextricably connected the happiness of society 
both with the advance of critical reasoning and with the possibility of eliminating or 
weakening the process of standardisation which he identified as a feature of the nineteenth 
century. He believed that democracy ultimately depended on the institutionalisation of 
debate in society, which was possible only where no single power was able to control 
society as a whole.
6.2. MILL’S CONCEPTION OF UTILITY
At the very beginning of Utilitarianism, Mill stated that moral speculation had not 
progressed sufficiently to solve the controversy regarding the criterion of right and
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wrong.623 Disputes regarding the foundations of morality divided the thinkers of his time as 
it had divided Socrates and the Sophists. In Utilitarianism, Mill’s intention was to present 
the philosophical grounds for the principle of utility, and to show that the prevailing 
understanding of utilitarianism was a gross misconception.624 For Mill, the question of the 
foundations of morality could not be ‘proved’ in the ordinary meaning of the term. This 
was why he said that any thing which ‘can be proved to be good, must be so by being 
shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof’.625 Thus, the first 
principle of morality could not be proved in a direct and strict sense, but could be proved in 
a general sense. Therefore, to prove in this context was to offer reasons for the conviction 
that certain actions or rules were conducive to something admitted to be good. The 
possibility of offering such reasons created grounds for a rational debate on the ultimate 
principle of morality, which Mill deemed important in order to prevent ethics from 
becoming a mere source of corroboration of the dominant feelings in society.
The notion of utility Mill worked out in Utilitarianism differs from the notion of utility 
currently used in the Field of economics, where utility designates the properties that things 
have to satisfy individual desires.626 To value things based on their utility is to value them 
according to the need people have of them. This meaning of utility is based on the 
conceptions of the marginalist (i.e. neo-classical) school of C. Menger and L. Walras, who 
attributed the value of goods not to the cost of production, as did the classical economists, 
but to subjective factors. It is the fact that people demand the goods in question that 
establishes their value, and not the objective properties of the goods considered in
6-3 See J.S Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, p. 205.
624 See ibid., p. 208.
625 Ibid., pp. 207-8.
themselves. The marginalist school is criticised for having formulated a new conception of 
economic science that portrays economic agents as those who maximise satisfaction and 
minimise effort. Such a conception is intended to free the study of economics from the 
moral concerns present in classical economics, and thereby to create a ‘purely scientific’ 
economic theory in which mathematical models have a central role.627 The opponents of 
this ‘purification’ regard it as an attempt to legitimise unhindered forms of the market 
economy, based on the view that self-interest is the main force moving society. Many 
contemporary commentators equate utilitarianism with the notion of utility developed by 
the neo-classical school. This is wrong for two main reasons: first, because the utilitarians 
were among the thinkers who demanded state intervention in order to prevent the negative 
consequences produced by an unconstrained market economy; second, because the 
utilitarians used the word utility as a moral category and not as a strictly economic category 
which values goods according to their ability to fulfil desires. It is worth noting that Mill 
wrote Utilitarianism precisely to combat the idea that utilitarianism favoured selfishness, 
insensitivity to aesthetics and attachment to physical pleasure. He dedicated a significant 
part of Utilitarianism to opposing those who thought that utilitarianism advocated the 
pursuit of degrading forms of pleasure. He pointed out that utilitarianism was a moral 
philosophy based on the conviction that pleasure and avoidance of pain were the only 
things desirable as ends, and that things were desirable when they were pleasurable in 
themselves or were a means of promoting pleasure or avoiding pain. Mill emphasised the 
point that pleasures which satisfied human beings were more elevated than those which 
satisfied animals, because human beings had more sophisticated faculties. He assigned
626 See J.J. Goux, ‘Utility: Equivocation and Demoralisation’, Discourse, 23.3 (2001), p. 4.
6~7 See J. Lajugie, As Doutrinas Economicas, (Sao Paulo: Difel, 1981), pp. 66-8.
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more value to intellectual pleasures than to mere bodily ones, because the former were 
more permanent and therefore better able to fulfil people’s desire for happiness. Mill 
presented utilitarianism in the following manner:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and
6og
the privation of pleasure. "
Mill argued that the principle of utility recognised that some sorts of pleasures were more 
desirable and valuable than others. He considered it inappropriate to judge pleasures based 
solely on quantity. But what made one pleasure more valuable than another? Mill argued 
that one pleasure was superior to another when those acquainted with both pleasures either 
1) preferred one of them even when they knew that its enjoyment would be accompanied 
by a greater amount of discontent than the enjoyment of the other; or 2) rejected the 
possibility of resigning the enjoyment of one of them for any quantity of the other.629 In any 
case, the ultimate criterion used to evaluate pleasures and pains was the suffrage of those 
who were familiar with them.630 Mill contended that people would choose pleasures that 
employed their higher faculties, rather than contenting themselves with physical pleasures, 
because people had a sense of dignity which allowed than to understand that higher 
pleasures were necessary to their true happiness. He argued that when men and women
6-8 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism , (CW), X, p. 210.
629 See ibid., p. 211.
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pursued lower pleasures they did so from infirmity of character.631 In fact, Mill claimed that 
people became addicted to lower enjoyments because they had not been exposed to a milieu 
where they might have gained familiarity with higher pleasures. He claimed, moreover, that 
it was the higher pleasures which were truly compatible with the elevated demands of 
human dignity:
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, 
it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the 
comparison knows both sides.632
Mill portrayed utilitarianism as a moral system that demanded nobleness of character 
because it aimed to maximise not the agent’s own happiness, but the overall amount of 
happiness. The rules grounded on the principle of utility were intended to secure a happy 
existence for all human beings, that is one in which the enjoyment of a variety of pleasures 
outweighed the suffering of transitory pains. Mill believed that indigence and poor 
education were the main factors preventing people from attaining the happiness that would 
otherwise be within their reach. The cultivation of elevated human faculties occured only 
when people cultivated sympathy for the collective interests of mankind.633 Hence a social 
environment in which altruistic feelings were widespread tended to favour the general 
happiness because it allowed people to be enriched by the experiences of their fellow
630 See ibid., p. 213.
631 See ibid., pp. 212-13.
632 Ibid.. p. 212.
633 See ibid., p. 212.
citizens. Mill thought that the all-encompassing power of education and public opinion 
should be used to convince every individual that their personal happiness was inextricably 
linked to the happiness of all. He expected that the development of an altruistic mentality 
would lead the moral agent to be an impartial spectator who considered his own happiness 
and the happiness of others equally. Based on this expectation, Mill affirmed that:
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of 
utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, 
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.634
Mill criticised those opponents of utilitarianism who thought that the doctrine required 
moral agents to keep the general interest of society in mind whenever they performed an 
action. He thought that these critics confused the utilitarian rule of action with the motives 
possessed by individuals. Thus, one ‘who saves a fellow-creature from drowning does what 
is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble’.633 
As a system of ethics, utilitarianism offered a standard for people to test their actions 
against. The test of utility ‘is to be applied, not to specific questions, but to the whole 
system of rules or codes of conduct’.636 Nonetheless, utility neither determined people’s 
motives nor demanded that they had their minds constantly fixed upon the welfare of 
society at large. Utilitarianism required a constant focus on the general happiness only from 
those whose actions had an extensive influence over society. As far as people in general 
were concerned, it required them to act in such ways as to benefit those around them and
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not to harm others. Mill, therefore, did not advocate a straightforward appeal to the 
principle of utility to judge each human act. The establishment of moral obligations might 
be based on secondary principles derived from the previous experience of mankind, and the 
principle of utility appealed to when conflicts between those subordinate principles took 
place. For Mill, the ethical improvement of mankind depended on the continual adjustment 
of secondary rules of conduct to the principle of utility, which remained the supreme 
criterion of morality. This was why Mill argued that the will of God could be accepted as a
f\'Xlcriterion of morality only if it satisfied the demands of utility. ‘ He accepted, nevertheless, 
that the complexity of human nature made it necessary, as was the case with other ethical 
systems, to provide room for exceptions from the secondary rules.638
In his investigation of moral phenomenon, Mill recognised that people tended to regard as 
self-evident the moral standard that was accepted by the dominant opinion in society. 
People’s sentiments indicated to them that they were bound to do certain things and not to 
do others, but they did not relate moral obligations to any sort of general principle. Moral 
theorists, however, had to make explicit the standard by which they judged moral 
obligations, because they could not ignore the question of the foundation of morality. Mill 
pointed out that systems of morality, including utilitarianism, relied on both external and 
internal sanctions. The external sanctions were the fear that people had of condemnation 
from other people or from God, and the hope of favouring those with whom they 
sympathised, whereas the internal sanction was a painful feeling affecting people’s minds 
when they violated moral duties. Intuitionists claimed that this painful feeling was innate
636 J. Gray, Hayek on Liberty, (London: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 96.
637 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, p. 222.
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and derived from the consideration people had for the interests of their fellow-creatures. 
Mill thought that these moralists correctly perceived the link between the moral feeling and 
the happiness of others, but failed to see that the moral was acquired by the influence of a 
variety of factors on the character of the individual. He claimed that the utilitarian principle 
was founded on the social feelings of human beings, which inclined each one of them to 
unity with the other members of society.639 The influence of these feelings progressively 
established an equal consideration on the part of each for the interests of all, the deepening 
of social ties, and the strengthening of the spirit of co-operation. Mill argued that education 
should be used to inculcate the principle of utility in people’s minds and, as a result, 
contribute to the diminution of the influence of selfish feelings in society.640 He saw the 
social feelings of mankind as the ultimate sanction of utilitarianism, because they were not 
perceived as something ‘despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute 
which it would not be well for them to be without’.641 Mill thought that these feelings 
would possess the social force of a religion if they were buttressed by education and 
encouraged by public opinion.
Mill recognised that questions about the first principles of conduct were questions about 
what was desirable, and that these principles could be proved in the ordinary sense of the 
word. To prove, in the context of the utilitarian morality, was to offer reasons, which 
consisted in showing that rules were conducive to something desirable. Hence, Mill 
concluded that the fact that each person desired happiness, so far as he or she judged it
638 See ibid., p. 225.
639 See ibid., p. 231.
640 See ibid., p. 233.
641 Ibid., p. 212.
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attainable, proved that happiness was desirable, and the fact that each person’s happiness 
was a good for himself or for herself proves that the general happiness is a good to the 
aggregate of all persons.642 He claimed, nonetheless, that this did not mean that things other 
than happiness might not be desired in themselves, for happiness was made up of a variety 
of elements, of which ‘each of them is desired in itself, and not merely when considered as 
swelling an aggregate’.643 Virtue, for example, might be desired both as a means to 
happiness and as a part of happiness. In any event, a desire for virtue or for other objects in 
life was equivalent to thinking of them as pleasant; and an aversion to them was equivalent 
to thinking of them as painful. Therefore, for Mill, the fact that the desirability of virtue 
could be established only by resorting to considerations of pleasure and pain provided 
reasons for people to accept the principle of utility as the foundational criterion of 
morality.644
Mill is accused of having committed two fallacies: first, the naturalistic fallacy, the error 
involved in saying that the term ‘desirable’ has the same relation to the term ‘desired’ as the 
term ‘visible’ has to the term ‘seen’; and second, the fallacy of composition, the error 
involved in saying that the happiness of everyone is good for all because each individual's 
happiness is good for that individual.645 In his attempt to ‘prove’ utilitarianism in the fourth 
chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill appeared to hold that a value judgement (what is desirable) 
followed deductively from a purely factual statement (what is desired). Mill did not, 
however, make this move. Mill repeatedely stated in Utilitarianism that a strict ‘proof of
642 See ibid., p. 234.
Ibid., p. 235.
M4 See ibid., p. 237.
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the principle of utility was impossible.646 What he in fact intended to argue was that there 
existed no moral faculty capable of supplying an ‘a priori’ general ethical principle, so that 
one ‘can only find out what is desirable by seeking to find out what is actually desired’.647 
Thus, Mill did not equate desirableness with desiredness, but was simply asserting his 
ethical naturalism when stating that ‘the sole evidence it is possible to produce that 
anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it’.648 He argued that no human being 
would insist that the aim of his or her life was to be unhappy, so that the pursuit of 
happiness was already a ‘common denominator which binds men together’.649 He thus left 
the task of showing that people behaved otherwise to his opponents. This did not mean, 
however, that Mill believed that each individual actually saw the happiness of all as a good, 
but he certainly thought that in a well-ordered society the general happiness would be a 
good to the aggregate of all persons.
Mill identified the notion of justice as one of the major obstacles to the recognition of the 
principle of utility as the criterion of right and wrong. He acknowledged that human beings 
had natural feelings of justice, but stressed that such an acknowledgement did not mean that 
he accepted the view that justice was the ultimate criterion of morality.650 Mill identified 
the main conceptions of justice and unjustice in order to examine their suitability as the 
ultimate criterion of morality: 1) it was just to respect the legal rights of other people, and
^ S e e  D.D. Raphael, ‘Fallacies in and about M ill's Utilitarianism', in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill's 
Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments, 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), i. 52.
646 See R.F. Atkinson, ‘J.S. M ill's “Proof" o f the Principle o f Utility', in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill’s 
Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments, 4  vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), i. 64.
647 E.W. Hall, ‘The “Proof’ of utility in Bentham and M ill’, in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill’s Social and 
Political Thought: Critical Assessments, 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), i. 27.
648 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (C W ), X, p. 234.
649 T. Fuller, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Transformation o f Politics in Representative Government,
Utilitarianism and On Liberty’, (Baltimore: Ph.D, 1971), p. 183.
unjust to disrespect them; 2) it was just to give to each person what he or she deserved, and 
unjust not to do so; 3) it was just to keep promises, and unjust to break them; and 4) it was 
just to be impartial, and unjust to show favour or preference to one person over another.651 
He detected problems in each of these conceptions. 1) Justice could not be equated with 
legality because it was universally admitted that legal rights might belong to people who 
ought not to have them. This implied that existed a criterion other than legality whereby 
one could judge whether people ought or ought not to have certain rights. 2) If justice 
depended on desert, the real criterion of morality was that which established what 
constituted desert. 3) The keeping of promises could not be regarded as the ultimate 
criterion of morality because it was widely accepted that promises could be broken in 
certain circumstances. 4) Impartiality was instrumental in solving moral issues, but it was 
not in itself a standard of morality. A tribunal must be impartial in order to award a 
disputed object to one or other of two contending parties, but impartiality was not the 
standard by means of which disputes were resolved. Besides, preference and favour were 
not always censurable.
After examining these conceptions of justice. Mill concluded that justice was a criterion of 
morality subordinate to that of utility. He observed that, based on one conception of justice, 
one person could defend, for example, the notion that the produce of labour should be 
equally shared; while another person could claim, based on a different conception of 
justice, that those who produced more should receive a larger share in the distribution of the 
produce. He also referred to the fact that it was universally acknowledged to be just that a
See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, p. 240. 
6M See ibid., pp. 241- 44.
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merchant should charge all customers the same price for the same article, while virtually no 
one would advocate this criterion of justice to taxation.652 In Mill’s view, the conception of 
justice referred to in cases such as these provided no solution to the problems presented, 
which he argued could be solved only by appealing to the principle of utility. Nonetheless, 
demands of justice stirred up powerful feelings because they implied ‘something which is 
not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from 
us as his moral right’.653 Justice related to duties that one might be obliged to fulfil, but not 
to acts which people judged should be performed, but which could not be exacted as an 
obligation. Mill explained that sentiments of justice were powerful because they were 
rooted in the impulse of self-defence and the feeling of sympathy. The impulse of self- 
defence led people to retaliate against any harm done to themselves, while the feeling of 
sympathy led them to broaden the desire of revenge towards acts that were harmful to 
society at large.654 Thus, the idea of justice presupposed a rule of conduct and a sentiment 
that sanctioned it, but what was at stake, in the end, was the compliance of people to rules 
that were essential to the general well-being. In view of this, justice could be seen as branch 
of utility:
I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and 
incomparably the most sacred binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name for 
certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being 
more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for 
the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be the essence of the
652 See ibid., p. 254.
651 Ibid, p. 247.
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idea of justice, that of right residing in an individual, implies and testifies to this 
more binding obligation.655
Obligations of justice were correlative to rights, which arose from the importance that 
society attached to preserving the conditions necessary for life in community. Rights 
existed in order to establish an institutional framework which secured people’s expectations 
of living without being harmed by others and enjoying an equal claim to all means of 
happiness. In the final analysis, Mill argued that ‘justice’ represented such moral 
requirements as ‘stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of more 
paramount obligation than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some 
other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of 
justice’.636
6.3. REFLECTIONS ON MILL’S CONCEPT OF UTILITY
Bentham argued that pleasure was comprised of a number of dimensions, namely intensity, 
duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent. Nonetheless, he insisted that, 
whatever its source, no pleasure was intrinsically better than any other.657 Mill disagreed 
with Bentham, in that he identified the existence of qualitative differences among pleasures. 
Mill’s qualitative account of pleasure made the task of measuring general utility more 
complicated in that it offered no possibility of a straightforward arithmetical approach to
0 4 See ibid., p. 248-9.
655 Ibid., p. 255.
656 Ibid., p. 259.
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the calculation of pleasure and pain. However, Mill’s version of utilitarianism still required 
an estimation of overall utility, as well as the identification of higher pleasures, which were 
instrumental for the improvement of individuals and societies. Utilitarianism is commonly 
perceived as an ethical system that has an aggregative dimension because it presupposes 
that overall utility is calculable.658 Mill showed how to differentiate between higher and 
lower pleasures precisely because he judged such differentiation essential to the process of 
estimating general utility. He followed Plato’s idea, according to which different types of 
pleasure corresponded to the exercise of different human faculties.659 Plato and Mill both 
believed that the more one exercised one’s higher faculties, the more one enjoyed higher 
pleasures.660 But Plato grounded his account of pleasure on the notion that human beings 
were essentially psyche, that is spiritual entities, and only accidentally physical beings. In 
this sense, intellectual pleasures were superior to physical ones because they were 
associated with what human beings really were, while physical pleasures were associated 
with the body, that is a non-essential component of human beings. Mill’s commitment to 
empiricism prevented him from adopting Plato’s anthropological premise, although he did 
accept some of its consequences. One can legitimately question whether or not Mill’s 
adoption of Platonic notions led him to smuggle ‘into his liberal theory a teleological 
conception of human fulfilment, framing it in utilitarian terms, so that what people desire is 
identified with the end of humanity which reason enjoins us to realize’.661 If this was the 
case, then Mill’s agreement with Bentham was merely verbal. But before reaching a
^  See J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation, J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart 
(eds), Collected Works o f  Jeremy Bentham, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 38-40.
6^ 8 See G. Scarre, Utilitarianism, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 14-18.
659 See Plato, The Republic, 580d and 583a.
660 See B. Gibbs, ‘Higher and Lower Pleasures’, in G.W. Smith (ed), John Stuart M ill’s Social and Political 
Thought'. Critical Assessments, 4 vols., (London: Routledge, 1998), i. 162-3.
661 R. Bellamy, Rethinking Liberalism, (London and New York: Pinter, 2000), p. 30.
conclusion regarding Mill’s faithfulness to the Benthamite tradition, it is worth noting that 
he related happiness mainly to ‘the energetic exercise of intelligence, imagination and skill, 
and the practice of the moral virtues’.662 Mill grounded the superiority of intellectual 
pleasures on the fact that they strengthened the outstanding human faculty namely, that of 
sympathy with the entirety of society. The lower pleasures were considered passive because 
they tended to confine individuals to their immediate interests, while the superior pleasures 
impelled individuals to all sorts of experiments beyond the perspective of a narrow self- 
interest. Familiarity with important events of history, the achievements of art, and facts 
relevant to society, led individuals to see themselves as part of humanity as a whole.663 
Ultimately, the higher pleasures were preferable to the lower ones because they refined the 
character of individuals by increasing their sympathy for their fellow citizens and allowing 
them to benefit from the experience of others. Thus, individual enhancement depended on 
the cumulative development of the community.664 Mill saw individual enhancement as a 
consequence of the unique potential of human beings to make decisions, change things, and 
be conscious of their capacities and limitations.66'^  But he stressed the point that the exercise 
of analytic reasoning was not the only way to lead one to sympathise with mankind. He 
also argued that one could sympathise with mankind by taking inspiration ‘from those who, 
as poets or artists, can clothe those feelings in the most beautiful forms, and breathe them 
into us through our imagination and our sensations’.666
662 B. Gibbs, ‘Higher and Lower Pleasures’, p. 164.
663 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, pp. 216-17.
664 See D. Habibi, ‘J.S. M ill’s Revisionist Utilitarianism’, The British Journal fo r  the Historx o f  Philosophy, 1 
(1998), p. 107.
665 See ibid., p. 97.
666 J.S. Mill, Essays on Philosophy and The Classics, (CW), XI, p. 150.
The claim that higher pleasures helped to create a sense of oneness amongst human beings 
by leading them to exercise their deliberative capacities did not eliminate the need for the 
hedonic calculus. Despite Mill’s translation of the Platonic account of pleasure into the 
language of empiricism, the calculation of general utility in his qualitative utilitarianism 
relied, ultimately, on the word of experts. This does not appear to offer a clear solution for 
those who need to estimate the general happiness. It has been claimed that Mill made 
readers ‘puzzled over how one is to assess and measure quality and how it is to be 
compared with and balanced against quantity’.667 However, the problem is not that Mill 
offered no criterion to evaluate pleasures, but that he did not thoroughly address the 
implications for the hedonic calculus of the adoption of a qualitative account of pleasure. In 
order to understand why Mill did not examine the implications of his conception of 
utilitarianism for the hedonic calculus, it is necessary to look in more detail at his moral 
theory.
In the first chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill claimed that Socrates defended utilitarianism 
against the popular morality of the so-called Sophists.668 This is certainly a controversial 
claim, but it has the merit of calling attention to the relationship between the moral 
conceptions of Mill and Socrates. Socrates is the father of the western philosophical 
conception of individuality. For him, the individual was a rational being and, because of 
this, able to make genuine choices and be responsible for them. Socrates adopted a type of 
moral intellectualism according to which knowledge was the criterion by which the 
morality of human actions should be judged. Hence, he argued that an action was right
667 W.H. Shaw, Contemporary' Ethics: Taking Account o f  Utilitarianism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 43.
668 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, p. 205.
when it was performed with a correct knowledge of reality, and wrong when it was 
performed out of ignorance.669 In assuming that once people knew what was good they 
would try to pursue it, Socrates linked moral reform to intellectual enlightenment.670 He 
argued that moral choices had to be preceded by a reflective attempt to recognise what was 
right and wrong, because, in the end, virtue was derived from knowledge and vice from 
ignorance. Socrates regarded self-examination as essential in freeing individuals from 
prejudice, by which he meant ungrounded beliefs. Socrates applied a question-and-answer 
(dialectic) method in his intellectual disputes, with the aim of ridding people of false 
knowledge. The point was to pursue truth through discussion. In the context of the Socratic 
method, dialogue was not a point-scoring competition between opponents, as it was to the 
Sophists, but a means to gain understanding of the human soul. The first stage of Socrates’ 
dialectic method was intended to help debaters identify their own inconsistencies and those 
of their opponents.671 This destructive stage made them aware of their ignorance, which 
was a prerequisite for the acquisition of genuine knowledge. The second stage was intended 
to give birth to knowledge. Socrates saw his role in life as that of an intellectual obstetrician 
who assisted people in delivering the truth from their souls, and in putting their ideas and 
ways of life under the scrutiny of reason. He developed an optimistic moral theory, which 
was grounded on a strong confidence in the role of reason. For him, human beings asserted 
themselves by exerting their deliberative capacities. This idea was similarly pervasive in 
Mill’s works. In Considerations on Representative Government, Mill argued that one of the 
most important roles of government was to secure a social framework in which citizens
669 See J. Coleman, A History o f  Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity, (London: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 65.
670 See ibid., p. 67.
671 See G. Reale, Historia da Filosofia Antiga, 5 vols., (Sao Paulo: Edi^oes Loyola, 1995), i. 310-16.
could develop their moral capacities by exercising their power of deliberation.672 In The 
Subjection of Women, he criticised the exclusion of women from the public sphere on the 
grounds that it deprived society of their talents and impeded them from enhancing their 
rational-deliberative powers.673 In On Liberty, he praised the active character, the choice- 
maker whose main trait was the possession of a developed capacity for deliberation.674 In 
Principles o f Political Economy, he advocated the creation of co-operatives of workers on 
the grounds that this gave them the opportunity to increase their deliberative powers by 
participating in administration.675 In Utilitarianism, he expressed confidence in people’s 
powers of deliberation when they lived in an environment that made enriching social 
exchanges possible for them. When the atmosphere in which people lived offered only 
lower stimuli, their capacity for nobler enjoyments died away. Mill defined ‘infirmity of 
character’ as the lack of a capacity to experience elevated pleasures.676 He was confident 
that, if members of society had the opportunity to act according to high-minded ideals, they 
would tend to make choices which were compatible with such ideals. Mill was not 
proposing a deterministic conception of the relationship between human beings and the 
social circumstances in which they were situated. However, he believed that the existence 
of a diversified and elevated intellectual environment would stimulate human beings’ 
higher faculties, and allow them to discover the path to self-fulfilment. For Mill, it was not 
circumstances that forced individuals to made right choices, but rather individuals who 
make right choices when the circumstances put them in a position to appreciate what 
pursuits or activities would engage their higher faculties. Thus, both Socrates and Mill saw
672 See above, Chapter III, pp. 148-51.
673 See above, Chapter IV, pp. 199-200.
674 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, pp. 262-64.
675 See above, Chapter V, pp. 208-11.
knowledge as fundamental to the morality of human action. Mill assumed that, when 
human beings were endowed with knowledge, they would act according to it. This explains 
his unwavering belief in education in a broader sense, that is both in the sense of formal 
schooling and in the sense of the whole set of formative influences that surrounds 
individuals.677 Mill wanted people to pursue the sort of experiences that would provide the 
most suitable stimuli for their personal search for happiness. Nevertheless, he accepted that 
certain kinds of ‘goods’, such as freedom to deliberate and express opinions, proper 
nourishment, and access to basic education, were constitutive parts of happiness, so that 
their absence compromised the personal well-being of individuals as well as that of 
society.678 In this respect Mill’s conception of happiness was different from that of 
Socrates, who understood it as an internal harmony, derived from the control of reason over 
the appetites. Mill adopted the Aristotelian thesis that social arrangements were vital either 
in encouraging or in hindering the natural inclination of human beings to self-realization. 
Mill saw the goods mentioned above as objective prerequisites for the existence of a 
genuine sociability, which rendered the long-term development of people’s deliberative 
capacities viable.679 These deliberative capacities were an objective part of happiness 
because there could be no happiness where human beings were not able to make choices 
that were in accordance with their conception of the good.
Mill linked the higher pleasures to the exercise of those capacities which enabled 
individuals to sympathise with their fellow citizens. He would never have agreed with the
676 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, pp. 212-13.
677 See J. Carlisle, John Stuart Mill and the Writing o f  Character, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1991), p. 147.
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idea that the superior pleasures could be disconnected from the use of the higher faculties. 
Robert Nozick referres to an ‘experience machine’ in which people, floating in a tank with 
electrodes attached to their brains, are stimulated so that they feel they are exercising their 
superior faculties by doing sublime things, such as making friends or writing a novel.680 
Mill would not have accepted that pleasures derived from experiences of this sort could be 
considered as higher pleasures, for he would have regarded them as a mechanical response 
to stimuli, and not the outcome of the use of rational human faculties. Mill said that true 
happiness arose when people used their elevated faculties.681 In a letter of 12 January 1834 
to Thomas Carlyle, he explicitly argued that the ultimate end of utilitarianism was to make 
people develop what was best in themselves.682 He pointed to political deliberation and the 
study of cultural artefacts as examples of activities that were associated with the superior 
pleasures.683 Without involvement in activities such as these, people’s lives could not be 
other than unsatisfactory. It is important to clarify the way in which Mill, in his account of 
pleasure, linked mental states to particular activities. Let it be supposed that one guest at a 
hotel has eaten a delicacy in order to satiate his hunger, and that another guest at the same 
hotel has also eaten the same delicacy in order to write an article for a magazine 
specialising in gastronomy. In Mill’s view, the pleasures at stake are not equivalent because 
they are related to different sorts of activities. The first guest was merely satisfying a bodily 
necessity, while the second guest was exercising practical reasoning by examining the 
qualities of the delicacy and deciding whether or not to recomend it. In view of this, Mill 
would not have had any difficulty in affirming that the pleasures enjoyed by the second
679 See D.O. Brink, ‘M ill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1992), pp. 89, 94.
680 See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 42-3.
681 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, pp. 210-11.
682 See J.S. Mill, Earlier Letters 1812-1848, (CW), XII, pp. 207-8.
guest were superior to those enjoyed by the first, because the second guest employed his 
higher faculties. Mill was aware that a being possessed of higher faculties required more 
elevated experiences to be happy. Hence, he affirmed that ‘it is better to be a human being 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied’.684 The comparison between the dissatisfaction of Socrates and the satisfaction of 
the pig is crucial for an understanding of Mill’s ethical theory. Socrates was aware of the 
fact that he was able to scrutinize his own convictions and behaviour in order to discover 
the mode of life best able to fulfil his aspirations as a human being. His dissatisfaction 
should be understood as a consequence of his search for the truth about himself, which does 
not necessarily afford immediate answers to the problems addressed. Nonetheless, Socrates 
knew that bodily pleasures were ephemeral, while the intellectual were durable. The 
allusion to the pig and to the fool was designed to show that, if people opted for physical 
enjoyments and not for intellectual ones, it was because they ignored intellectual pleasures. 
Mill thought that people should prefer Socrates’ dissatisfaction to the contentment of the 
pig, because Socrates’ dissatisfaction was a means of achieving higher levels of happiness, 
while the contentment of the pig implied accommodation to lower pleasures and the stifling 
of capacities. The dissatisfaction was not preferred in itself, but only because it provided a 
potential means to greater happiness. Mill’s preference for Socrates’ dissatisfaction was not 
necessarily an anti-hedonistic claim.685 D. Habibi, however, has alleged that Mill retreated 
from hedonism when he admitted that happiness was one end amongst a plurality of other 
categorical ends.686 This equates to saying that Mill abandoned utilitarianism through the
683 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism , (CW), X, pp. 215-16. .
684 Ibid., p. 212.
685 See D.D. Raphael, ‘Fallacies in and about M ill’s Utilitarianism', p. 57.
686 See D. Habibi, ‘J.S. M ill’s Revisionist Utilitarianism’, p. 283.
admission that pleasures are incommensurable. Isaiah Berlin offers a paradigmatic 
interpretation of Mill as a thinker who broke with the models of both the classical period 
and the Enlightenment, developing the view that freedom to choose is the characteristic that
687differentiates human beings from the rest of nature. For Berlin, the image Mill created of 
human beings as fallible, subjected to almost unlimited changes and unable to complete 
their search for truth and happiness, was not compatible with the possibility of establishing 
standards to measure the general happiness. Mill’s conception of individuality implied that 
freedom to choose should be seen was a value that is independent from utility. Those who, 
like Berlin, interpret Mill in this way presume him to be a liberal thinker who failed to 
perceive that utilitarianism was in conflict with the real foundations of his own philosophy. 
In contrast to Berlin, Vinit Haksar argues that Mill’s moral theory is perfectionist in that it 
aims at promoting certain kinds of human excellence, rather than at maximising 
happiness.688 There are passages in Mill’s works that can be used to justify interpretations 
of Mill both as a liberal and as a perfectionist. However, he never stated himself that he had 
ceased to be a utilitarian. Utilitarianism was not written as an academic treatise, but to 
correct the perception of the wider public who saw utilitarianism as an ethical system based 
on a simplistic psychology which portrayed people as self-centred hedonists.689 The fact 
that the essay was not aimed at an academic audience does not mean that it is contradictory 
and unsystematic, although there are clearly some aspects of Mill’s moral theory that are 
insufficiently developed. Despite this, it is not difficult to appreciate that, in Utilitarianism, 
Mill advanced a type of ‘objective’ utilitarianism. As has been shown above, he associated
687 See I. Berlin, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Ends o f Life’, in J. Gray and G.W. Smith (eds), J.S. Mill On 
Liberty in focus, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 160.
688 See V. Haksar, Liberty, Equality and Perfectionism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 233.
689 See D. Habibi, ‘J.S. M ill’s Revisionist Utilitarianism’, p. 109.
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happiness with objective activities such as the freedom to exercise one’s faculty of reason, 
aesthetic delight, and access to the basic means of subsistence. Mill assumed that these 
activities were rooted in the social nature of human beings, which were important in 
promoting the true interests of man as a progressive being.690 If these activities are 
associated with higher pleasures, then the identification of them would be helpful in 
calculating general happiness. Hence, one may ask why did Mill content himself with a few 
scattered references to these activities, instead of offering a detailed description of them, 
and providing a criterion by which to measure them and facilitate the task of estimating the 
general happiness?691 The answer is as follows: Mill believed that, if social institutions 
were structured so as to secure public debate and respect for minorities, society would 
come to recognise that the fundamental activities of social life were those which prompted 
sympathy and cooperation, that is those activities which he associated with the higher 
pleasures.
Instead of specifying ways of calculating the general utility, Mill tried to encourage the 
emergence of a socio-political framework that would promote the recognition of higher 
pleasures by engaging people in the communication of experiences which they had found to 
be conducive to self-enhancement. He assumed that, once such engagement was a reality, 
the problem of calculating the general utility would be drastically simplified due to the fact 
that, having become familiar with activities associated with the higher pleasures, people 
would come to prefer them. This did not mean that pleasures were of a higher order 
because competent judges preferred them, but that ‘competent judges provide us with our
690 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, p. 224.
691 See D. Habibi, ‘J.S. M ill’s Revisionist Utilitarianism', p. 101.
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most reliable access to those things that are objectively valuable’.692 He thought that the 
clash between a cultured minority and a philistine majority would lead to the triumph of 
utilitarianism, providing the political framework prevented the virtual disfranchisement of 
minorities. Hence, the advance of utilitarianism depended on the retreat of the forces that 
favoured uniformity. Mill concluded that it was more important to promote social change, 
so as to encourage the acquisition of happiness for all, rather than to resist change in order 
to retain the status quo.
Mill saw utilitarianism as capable of offering ‘the only standard which, once 
acknowledged, holds out the possibility of progressive development as well as the prospect 
of continued order’.693 He saw discussion not as a source of chaos, but as a means of 
generating public spiritedness.694 Mill recognised that an underdeveloped state of mind 
produced a distorted perception of the merits of various types of pleasure and prevented 
people from sympathising with all the other members of society. But he believed that the 
dynamic of debate would increasingly lead people to recognise the objective nature of the 
higher pleasures and to contribute to significant improvements over time. The organization 
of society, based on rational debate, would progressively secure for all members of society 
an ‘equal claim to all means of happiness except in so far as the inevitable conditions of 
human life, and the general interest, in which that of every individual is included, set limits 
to the maxim’.695 Mill saw this movement towards the recognition of the utilitarian 
standard not as something inevitable, but as a tendency that would be strengthened by the
69_ D.O. Brink, ‘M ill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism’, p. 80.
693 T. Fuller, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Transformation o f Politics in Representative Government, 
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social feelings inherent in human nature. He accepted that those who were in advance of 
their time might recognise the superiority of the utilitarian standard, but stressed that the 
majority would achieve such awareness only when critical reasoning became deeply rooted 
in the very fabric of society. In the ordinary course of affairs, people’s actions were based 
on secondary rules derived from the previous experience of mankind. Mill expected them to 
resort to the utilitarian principle either when there were conflicts between secondary rules 
as applied to specific cases, or when there was no rule available. His optimism in relation to 
the increasing acceptance of the principle of utility combined the Socratic belief that, once 
aware of the superiority of certain values, people would act in conformity to the conviction 
that the advance of knowledge would lead to a better world. Mill expected that, confronted 
with the utilitarian standard, the secondary rules and the’ beliefs that underpinned them 
would be reformulated.696 In view of this, he looked forward to the emergence of a new era 
in which the orderliness of society was secured by the institutionalisation of debate and the 
confrontation between different points of view. Mill did not think that the higher activities 
and the pleasures associated with them could be identified and measured only in the future, 
but he did think that the principle of utility would be fully grasped and widely accepted 
only after the transitional era in which he lived, an era in which there was a lack of 
agreement about moral values. In fact, he performed a utilitarian calculation when, for 
instance, he attributed different values to the franchise in Considerations on Representative 
Government.697 He proposed a scale of votes according to the following criterion: the more 
that voters rendered it evident that they were capable of reasoning and sympathising with
695 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, pp. 257-8.
696 See T. Fuller, ‘John Stuart Mill and The Transformation o f Politics in Representative Government, 
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their fellow-citizens, the higher would be the value of their franchise. It has already been 
argued that Mill’s proposed scale of votes is problematic.698 Nevertheless, it demonstrates 
that he thought that measurements on utilitarian grounds were possible. His ethical 
discourse implied not only the possibility of the establishment of a hierarchy of values, but 
also the possibility of a progressive elimination of intense conflict between men, two 
consequences which Mill envisioned as the highly probable outcome of the 
institutionalisation of debate in society. He circumvented the difficult task of presenting a 
fully developed theory, which would have offered a method of measuring pleasures, due to 
his belief that the utilitarian principle would be properly understood only in an ‘organic 
period’ where there was a certain degree of consensus in relation to the moral values that 
should ground social life. In the end, Mill expected that a social environment in which the 
hierarchy of pleasures which he proposed was adopted would emerge from the institutional 
debate between those who supported the values of the commercial middle class and those 
who defended the values of the educated elite. He failed to perceive that the emergence of 
such a consensual environment was only one possibility among others. Mill never intended 
to impose the values he presumed would triumph in a future organic period, yet to come, 
but it is important to examine to what extent his commitment to the promotion of general 
utility was compatible with his defence of liberty.
6.4. MILL ON UTILITY AND LIBERTY
In On Liberty, Mill portrayed the autonomous individual as someone capable of making 
choices according to his or her self-planned way of life. But it does not seem reasonable to
698 See above, Chapter III, pp. 126-31.
say that choices add to the general happiness by the simple fact that they are freely made 
and consistent with an individual’s own conception of the good. Mill should have tackled 
the question of how far a society organised according to the principle of utility can 
guarantee the freedom of individuals. When he approved Bentham’s dictum according to 
which, in the estimation of the general utility, ‘everybody is to count for one, nobody for 
more than one’, his intention was to assert that liberty should not be sacrificed on the altar 
of utility. He praised liberty on the grounds that it grants people the possibility of 
exercising their deliberative powers, which he deemed an essential component of 
happiness. However, one might have expected him to have clearly established where ‘the 
line should be drawn between the satisfaction of public needs and the protection of 
individual interests’.699 By not drawing this line, Mill has been subjected to the criticisms 
standardly made against utilitarianism. These criticisms consist in two main lines of 
argument: the first is that utilitarianism condones unjust practices, such as slavery, when 
such practices maximise overall utility; the second is that utilitarianism ‘illegitimately 
extends to society as a whole the sort of decision-making procedure that is appropriate only 
for an individual’.700 Both lines of argument are associated with the idea that utilitarianism 
has the irremediable defect of putting individuality at risk by considering individuals as 
mere parts to be subsumed by the aggregate of society. There are indications both in Mill’s 
life and in his theoretical work that he refused to sacrifice individuality to interests which 
many people assumed to be beneficial to society. It is worth mentioning that he always 
criticised attempts to treat workingmen as mere cogs in the chain of production. In 
Principles o f Political Economy and in Chapters on Socialism, Mill defended the attempt to
699 G. Scarre, Utilitarianism, (London: Routledge. 1996), p. 105.
700 W.H. Shaw, Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account o f  Utilitarianism, p. 125.
protect of individuals from the economic oppression resulting from the unfettered market. 
In his economic writings he supported the idea that workers must be the beneficiaries of 
their co-operative efforts in the process of production. The imposition of sacrifices on 
workers on the grounds that such sacrifices were beneficial to society was not acceptable. 
In On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, he defended 
individuality from the political oppression of the majority. It is also interesting to note 
Mill’s attitude towards the Governor Eyre affair. In October 1865, a localised uprising in 
Jamaica resulted in the killing of a small number of white British citizens. Following a 
series of trials conducted in a dubious way, Eyre, the Governor, authorised the execution of 
439 blacks. Before becoming Governor, Eyre had been a magistrate, a protector of 
aboriginal rights, and had served as Lieutenant Governor of New Zealand and of the 
Caribbean island of St Vincent. As chair of the Jamaica Committee, Mill decided to 
investigate the executions, and did everything within his reach to have Eyre tried for 
murder. Mill faced the opposition of prominent literary men such as Ruskin, Tennyson, 
Dickens, and Carlyle.701 In addition to this, Mill received many letters threatening him with 
assassination.702 Many people saw the executions as a justifiable measure to secure public 
order. These examples show that Mill did not think that the sacrifice of individuality could 
add to general happiness.
Sometimes it is difficult to make inferences from his utilitarianism. For example, Mill 
himself recognised that his utilitarianism offered no clear grounds for establishing whether
701 See W. Stafford, John Stuart Mill, (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 113.
702 See J.S. Mill, Later Letters 1849-1873, (CW), XVI, p. 1405.
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703it was appropriate for the state to prohibit gambling and prostitution. He might be 
accused of having accepted the right of society to interfere excessively in the life of 
individuals when he said that to give advice is a social act, which should be amenable to 
social control, and when he advocated the right of the state to forbid marriage if the parties 
could not show that they had means to support a family.704 But in various other parts of On 
Liberty, Mill appeared to sacrifice general utility in favour of liberty. For example, Mill 
rejected the idea of allowing state interference in the private life of someone who wished to 
drink alcohol in a society with a large majority of Muslims, in spite of the huge distress it 
would cause. In this case, the distress caused to Muslims would outweigh by far the amount 
of happiness obtained by the individual who was drinking. ~ Mill advocated the liberty of 
expression as something entirely necessary, even if the opinion expressed contradicted that 
of every other person and caused them distresses.706 It is not reasonable to assume that the 
actions of a single person, which causes distress for all other human beings, will contribute 
to the general happiness, because the amount of pain produced by the distress will outweigh 
by far the pleasure of the one. But Mill embraced the view that overall utility increased 
whenever people made choices in accordance with a judgement based on their own 
reflection. He did not take into account the possibility of people using highly developed 
capacities of imagination and artistic creation to promote ideas and practices harmful to 
society. In this sense, he fail to see the fact that an increase in people’s deliberative powers 
and the augmentation of their mutual commitment to the welfare of society were not 
necessarily linked. Mill conceived of individuals as self-creating beings who could develop
703 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, p. 297.
7(34 See ibid., pp. 296, 304.
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their capacities according to their personal inclinations.707 For him, their search to fulfil 
their inner nature made them altruistic by leading them to the recognition that they did not 
individually have all the elements they needed in order to enjoy a happy life. Realising that 
they depended on society to flourish, individuals would tend increasingly to respect the 
general well-being and understand that they owed it to society to return part of the benefits 
they received.708 The relationship between the individuals and society was mutually 
constitutive, in that, in order to improve, society relied on the genius of individuals, as 
much as individuals depended on conducive social conditions in order to flourish. In view 
of this, Mill formulated a principle according to which ‘the only part of the conduct of any 
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute’.709 The main implication 
of this principle was that individuals should not have power exercised over them against
71 ntheir will, except to prevent harm to others. If the encroachments of society on 
individuality were restricted to the prevention of harm to others, liberty would be secured in 
the domains of conscience and association. Such liberty was essential in order to prevent 
the character of individuals being moulded according to the vices of dominant groups in 
society. Mill’s principle for governing the dealings between society and individuals 
attracted fierce opposition. Most of Mill’s commentators have dismissed his principle of 
liberty on the grounds that it is ‘impossible to distinguish between that part of a person's 
behaviour which affects himself and that part which also affects others; and there is nothing
706 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, pp. 216-7.
707 See ibid., p. 188.
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to be gained by attempting to make the distinction’.711 To answer this criticism, in the 
1960s John Rees proposed a re-reading of Mill’s conception of self-regarding and other- 
regarding actions. Rees accuses Mill’s opponents of having mistakenly assumed that Mill 
believed that self-regarding actions had no effect on other people.712 According to Rees, 
Mill was aware that personal actions could affect other members of society, for no person 
was entirely isolated. In referring, therefore, to actions that merely concerned the actor 
himself, Mill did not mean actions that did not affect other individuals, but actions that did 
not affect the ‘interests’ of other individuals. It is thus important to clarify what Rees means 
by the term ‘interest’. Let it be supposed that patient A performed action X, which affected 
agent B. According to Rees, Mill thought that the simple fact that A’s action X in one way 
or another affected B offered no ground to justify state interference in A’s conduct. Mill 
would accept state interference in A’s conduct only if action X had damaged aspects of B’s
71 -5
life which society recognised as of great importance its members. Rees correctly shows 
that Mill did not see any part of the conduct of citizens as something that could be entirely 
isolated from the other members of society. However, Rees’s interpretation became a 
source of controversy because it established social recognition as the defining criterion of 
what constituted a person’s interests.
Richard Wollheim argues that Rees’s interpretation of On Liberty is incompatible with 
Mill’s progressivism, in that it presupposes that both the restraint of government and its 
actions depends on the feelings prevailing in society, and these feelings are largely
711 R.P. Anschutz, The Philosophy o f  J.S. Mill, (Oxford: Clarendom Press, 1953), p. 48.
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713 See ibid., pp. 82-3.
274
determined by the dominant class, which is generally inclined to maintain the status quo.714 
According to Wollheim, Rees’s account would put in jeopardy the freedom of dissenters 
who were at odds with the prevailing feelings, and disregards the respect which Mill paid to 
the developmental nature of human beings.715 In truth, Wollheim’s criticism of Rees is not 
entirely convincing. Rees does state that interests represent something regarded as valuable 
by many people in society, but he also states that such recognition was not the sole criterion 
in justifying the interference in the conduct of individuals. Rees argues that the fact that A’s 
life had been affected in some aspect which society recognised as being of significant 
importance was a necessary reason to justify interference in B’s conduct, but this was not a 
sufficient reason.716 Rees is aware that Mill’s principle could not offer automatic directions 
to govern the interference of the state in a wide range of cases in which people’s actions 
affected the interests of others.717 Rees states that ‘interest’ is inevitably a controversial 
notion because it harbours value-judgements which people would disagree about. He also 
sees that the main object of On Liberty was to oppose those who attempted to justify the 
comprehensive interference of the state in people’s lives, as if every aspect of the life of the
718individual should be subjected to the interference of society. His interpretation of Mill’s 
account of liberty is more sophisticated than Wollheim presumes. Despite this, Rees’s 
interpretation is unsatisfactory in that he provides no adequate clarification of how Mill 
differentiated self-regarding and other-regarding actions. Mill viewed as harmful any type 
of action performed by individuals, groups, or institutions, which damaged or put at risk 
individuals’ physical integrity, their possibility of exercising deliberative powers and
714 See R. Wolheim, ‘John Stuart Mill and the limits o f state action’, Social Research, 40 (1973), pp. 7,8.
713 See R. Wollheim, ‘John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin: The Ends of Life and the Preliminaries o f Morality’, 
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716 See J. C. Rees, ‘A Re-reading o f Mill on Liberty', p. 182.
associating with others in a pacific manner, or their access to proper nourishment and basic 
education. The values that Mill praised in Utilitarianism were the same as those he extolled 
in On Liberty. In this latter essay, he offered an account of liberty relevant to the stage of 
progress of more advanced societies. In these societies, the central problem relating to 
freedom was not coercive interference in people’s life, ‘but rather the renunciation of 
liberty by some members of society, together with the abdication of personal choice and 
judgement to the collectivity’.719 Mill did not use the term ‘autarchic’, but it captures the 
condition of subjects who stifle their faculties by doing a thing merely because others do 
it.720 The autarchic subject was free from the chains found in traditional society, but 
accommodated himself or herself to the standardising forces of mass society, being
I ' l |‘generally without either opinions or feelings of hotne growth, or properly their own’. " It 
is not possible to grasp the significance of Mill's defence of liberty without considering the 
fact that he saw the dynamic of modem society as tending towards a situation in which 
individuals paid total submission to government, and rejected the burden of making choices 
in conflict with dominant values. He did not suggest that genuine choices were necessarily 
at loggerheads with dominant values, ‘but rather that it is the experience of possible conflict
I '? '?between a man and society which gives meaning to the concept of one’s own choice’. 
His commitment to counteracting the power of the masses characterized not only On 
Liberty, but also earlier works such as The Spirit o f the Age (1831), Civilization (1836), and
717 See ibid., p. 185.
7,8 See ibid., p. 183.
719 R.B. Friedman, ‘A New Exploration o f M ill's Essay On Liberty', in J.C. Wood (ed) , John Stuart Mill: 
Critical Assessments, 4 vols., (London: Croom Helm, 1987), i. 96.
7“° See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, p. 262. For a fuller discussion o f the use o f the term ‘autarchic’ in 
this context, see J. Gray ‘M ill’s conception o f Happiness’, in J. Gray and G.W. Smith (eds.), J.S. Mill On 
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Coleridge (1840).723 However, in On Liberty, his preoccupation with the power of the 
masses was placed in the broader context of his thought. On Liberty was not intended to 
identify a specific institution to rival the power of the masses, but to encourage a social 
dynamic which would multiply the centres of power and prevent stagnation and tyranny. 
Mill’s discourse in favour of liberty followed two complementary lines of argument, which 
were appropriate, respectively, to the situation of the educated few and to that of the 
majority. For the few who appreciated and praised the importance of self-cultivation and 
individuality, he developed the argument that liberty required the protection of individual 
against the encroachment of the majority. In this case, liberty was essentially an individual 
value.724 For the majority who ascribed no particular importance to self-cultivation, he 
presented individual liberty as the foundation of social progress. In this case, individual 
liberty was primarily a social value. Mill’s strategy was aimed at persuading the majority 
that they could profit from individual liberty. To reinforce his argument, Mill referred to the 
historical fact that tribes which ceased to recognise individuality and imposed uniformity 
rapidly became dependents ‘of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forest when theirs 
had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples’.72^  Social progress did not depend only on 
the educated few, but they were the ones particularly responsible for it, because they 
contributed the ingredient of originality that made progress possible. Mill hoped that the 
majority would be dissuaded from using its emergent power to interfere with the liberty of 
those he assumed to be the most valuable members of society. “ He appealed to the 
majority by showing liberty to be an indispensable component of progress, and by making
723 See above, Chapter II, pp. 67-80.
724 See R.B. Friedman, ‘A New Exploration o f M ill’s Essay On L ibertx \ p. 303.
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it clear that he expected them eventually to participate in the process of self-cultivation. 
Both the individualistic and the social justification of liberty were, in general outline, 
attuned with Mill’s objective utilitarianism, according to which the free development of 
deliberative powers was one of the essentials of well-being. However, he appeared to 
believe that his account of liberty could be fully grasped only when there was a basic 
consensus about the essentials of morality. Therefore, knowing that this consensus did not 
exist, he judiciously shied away from any bolder attempt to articulate all the implications of 
his principle of liberty. In On Liberty, Mill offered a set of principles by which people 
could determine whether interference in the conduct of individuals was justifiable or not, 
but such principles were not sufficient to provide a clear definition of the notion of harm or 
clearly to differentiate private and public spheres of conduct. The primacy of politics 
underlay both Mill’s account of the principle of utility and of the principle of liberty. 
Instead of focusing on his ethical theory, which recognised freedom as a constituent part of 
utility, he focused on articulating a social, political, and educational framework capable of 
inaugurating a commitment to widespread debate and discussion in society. He expected 
this situation to be beneficial for everyone: for the majority who would be enlightened by 
the original ideas produced by the minority, and for the minority who would enlarge the 
range of their experiences by confronting their ideas with those of the common men. On 
Liberty is characterized by the idea that human beings will adopt the most elevated values 
when placed in a social setting that permitted such values to be identified. Mill saw no 
incompatibility between his account of liberty and his account of utility, because he had a 
highly optimistic conception of human nature according to which humans beings possessed 
a huge potential to sympathise with other people and to protect the interests of society as if 
they were their own. This implied that, once exposed to enlightening influences, moral
agents would tend to behave as impartial spectators who would show an identical respect 
for their own interests and for those of others. Following this line of reasoning, the political 
maverick and the artist endowed with a sophisticated imagination would be people who 
would value the happiness of others as much as their own. But this is not something that is 
confirmed by reality. Mill himself was aware that the enlightened Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius had persecuted Christianity, thereby showing that intellectual achievements did
727not necessarily make people respect the happiness of others. The emergence of a social 
culture, buttressed by institutions that encouraged debate about public issues and protected 
individuality, could encourage the altruism which Mill believed to be a fundamental 
element in human nature. However, he failed to perceive that the intellectual development 
of the people and the wider diffusion of an altruistic mentality would neither eliminate evil 
from society nor extinguish political conflict. Despite this unjustifiable optimism, Mill 
developed the idea in On Liberty that political conflict amongst diverse groups was more 
beneficial to society than attempts to cause social improvement based on the action of a 
centralised power, which risked undermining freedom and diversity.728 Besides, the damage 
caused by a centralised power could have devastating effects for society as a whole, and 
would be more difficult to repair than the damage caused by conflict between sections of 
society. In On Liberty, Mill assumed that utility was better served when the interference of 
society in individual conduct was moderate.729 He identified several situations in which 
interference in people’s liberty was unjustifiable and therefore should be avoided. In 
Utilitarianism, he presented sociability as an essential characteristic of human beings, and
727 See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (CW), XVIII, p. 236.
7^8 *See A. Oliva, Entre o dogmatismo arrogante e o desespero cetico: a negatividade como fundamento da 
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liberty as a structural component of general happiness. The defects of society were 
attributed to the shortcomings of institutions, which prevented individuals from developing 
their fundamental propensity to sympathise with others. Mill recognised that human affairs 
were complex and accepted that this complexity was aggravated by the disagreement about 
moral values that existed in the society he lived in. In view of this, he formulated both the 
principle of liberty and the principle of utility to offer general guidance as to how a liberal- 
utilitarian culture might be implemented, and not to define notions whose significance 
could not be properly grasped at that time. Mill, therefore, undertook to help people to 
understand that they were perfectible beings and could enrich themselves by creating 
institutions that encouraged cooperation with their fellow citizens and by preventing the 
concentration of power in society.
6.5. MILL’S UTILITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY
Mill’s ethical discourse was consistent with his gradualism. His intention was to encourage 
the continual adjustment of secondary rules, which governed people’s conduct, to the 
principle of utility. Examining the rules that governed their behaviour, people could see that 
their conduct should be modified so as to promote the general happiness. This occurred 
when people understood that, if they continued to behave according to the existing 
secondary rules, they would not add to the general happiness. The process by means of 
which secondary rules were adjusted to the principle of utility would prepare society for 
significant change, in that it engaged people in debates that generated changes in mentality. 
In Utilitarianism, Mill asserted that all people should have equal access to all the means of 
happiness, and he welcomed their participation in the public arena, by which they would be
encouraged to develop the self-discipline and willingness to co-operate which a civilised 
democracy required. But, at face value, utilitarianism appears to condone free-riding - a 
parasitic practice by means of which people profit from co-operative enterprises without 
themselves contributing to them. One can claim, for example, that the fact that someone 
does not pay taxes is justifiable from a utilitarian point of view because this exemption has 
no significant impact on general utility, while it significantly increases the well-being of the 
one who is exempted. A utilitarian can challenge such a claim by saying that when people 
achieve their goals by adopting parasitic behaviour they tend apply it to other aspects of 
life, so that free-riding foments other practices whose effects are more detrimental to the 
well-being of society. As a matter of fact, parasitic behaviour in collective enterprises is not 
consistent with the tenets Mill laid down in Utilitarianism, in that it would come into 
conflict with feelings that were deep-rooted in human nature and would undermine the 
spirit of co-operation that civilised life required.730 In this way, the prevention of free-riding 
was entirely consistent with the sentiments of justice, which rejected practices detrimental 
to the permanent interests of the community. Mill’s utilitarianism was based on the 
recognition that individuals had unique identities, yet were nonetheless bound together in 
relations of mutual dependency. The reforms he proposed in the sphere of the state and the 
participatory practices he recommended in the field of civil society were designed to 
prevent these relations of mutual dependence from becoming relations of domination. The 
aim of democratic institutions was precisely to educate people for mutual respect by 
removing undue privileges and by strengthening the ties that bound them.731 Mill did not 
intend to strengthen these ties by advocating the preservation of a specific set of shared
730 See F.R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The M oral and Political Philosophy o f  John Stuart 
M ill, (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), p. 153.
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traditions, but by reinforcing the natural propensity of people to sympathise with their 
fellow-citizens. This would be achieved by implementing a socio-political framework 
which stimulated participation, co-operation, and competence.
In Utilitarianism, Mill outlined a quasi-organic conception of society in which individuals 
were expected to perceive themselves as part of a totality to which they belonged, and in 
which they were able to sympathise with their fellow-citizens. Nevertheless, Mill did not 
adopt a communitarian account of society, in that he emphasised the need to grant people 
the opportunity to assert themselves against the dominant culture of the community. In 
other words, he refused to view society as the ultimate originator and arbitrator of the value 
system that human beings should follow, a view which was consistent with his allegiance to 
utilitarianism. In this way, the confrontation between secondary rules and the principle of 
utility expressed at the theoretical level what the confrontation between values of the 
majority and values of the cultured minority expressed at the political level. Mill has above 
been criticised for having been excessively optimistic regarding the consequences of the 
confrontation between opposing political alternatives. However, his optimism did not lead 
him to think that it was possible to remove the distinction between the governors and the 
governed, as Rousseau did in the Social Contract. Rousseau argued that the ‘general will’ 
was the genuine expression of popular sovereignty because it was embodied in the law, 
which was directly voted by the people in an assembly. The law should not, therefore, be 
regarded as a heteronymous command, but as a guarantee for people’s freedom.732 For 
Rousseau, as a participant in the process of constituting the ‘general will’, the citizen was a
731 See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (CW), X, pp. 219-21.
sovereign; and, as someone who obeyed the law, the citizen was a subject. But he was a 
free subject, since he obeyed the law which he had helped to make. The ‘general will’ was 
the true instrument for the rationalization of social life and for the realisation of individual 
autonomy.733 Mill did not accuse Rousseau of being an authoritarian. However, in On 
Libert}', Mill pointed out that, in presuming that the body of citizens could be sovereign 
over itself, people tended to shy away from a preoccupation with the limitation of power, 
and this indifference rendered the holders of power virtually unaccountable to the 
community. Mill believed that, in practical terms, the will of the people was not the will of 
the whole social body, but ‘the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the 
people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the
7 ^  J.majority’. This was why his political thought was focused on promoting institutions 
which facilitated the removal from power of both those who used power to tyrannize and 
those who were incompetent. To render the socio-political powers accountable by impeding 
them from accumulating enough strength to rule unopposed was, therefore, the central 
object of a truly democratic theory. Mill supported the direct participation of the people in 
the running of local institutions and he defended representative government as the best 
solution at national level. But what indellibly characterized Mill’s conception of democracy 
was not his preference for a specific type of institutional mechanics, but the fact that he 
incorporated within it his liberal concern with the control of power.
73~ See D. Zolo, Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992), p. 59.
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It has been argued throughout this thesis that accountability was the central preoccupation 
of Mill’s political thought. In the first chapter it was shown that Mill’s disapproval, in his 
later works, of the secret ballot was based on the fear that it could motivate voters to cast 
their votes exclusively on behalf of their private interests. He defended open voting as an 
electoral device which would make voters accountable to their fellow-citizens. Despite his 
intention to protect the minority, Mill failed to realise that the majority could use open 
voting to oppress the minority. Nonetheless, his account of the ballot shows that Mill hoped 
to foster a system of civic education, to prepare people for participation in the public 
sphere, and to make government accountable to the people and the people accountable to 
their fellow citizens. The main object of the second chapter was to argue that between 1835 
and 1840 Mill adopted Tocqueville’s belief that, if unchecked, the power of the masses 
would stagnate society by stifling individuality and diversity. This led him to make the 
protection of minorities a central concern of his conception of democracy. Although 
believing, as Tocqueville did, that the multiplication of intermediary bodies between 
individuals and the state was essential in order to motivate people to work together for a 
common purpose and to put checks on democracy, Mill differed from him in two important 
respects. First, he emphasised the role of rationally-built institutions in preventing the 
excesses of democracy, whereas Tocqueville wished to the reinforce habits of voluntary 
association. Second, he attributed the atomisation of society not only to the erosion of 
aristocracy but also to the very dynamic of industrialization. Hence, the institutions which 
Mill proposed from the early 1850s, and continued to advocate thereafter, were ultimately 
intended to render the masses accountable and to encourage freedom and diversity. The 
third chapter showed that Mill supported plural voting and Hare’s system of proportional 
representation with the aim of facilitating the election of educated MPs, whom he expected
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to counteract the ascendancy of the majority. He did not see that, by attributing differrent 
number of votes to different individuals, the plural voting system would have generated 
resentment instead of strengthening citizenship. He also failed to see that Hare’s system of 
representation involved a complex practical operation that would render the electoral 
process incomprehensible and, in consequence of this, unaccountable to people. Mill 
favoured the gradual extension of the franchise, while education and involvement in non- 
electoral institutions prepared the masses for full participation in the electoral process. 
Despite Mill’s failure to devise specific institutions, he contributed to democratic theory by 
showing that democracy required professional administration and a balance of power 
within society. The fourth chapter examined Mill’s efforts to promote the recognition of 
women's legal personhood, to give them a voice in public matters, and to protect them from 
the tyranny of their husbands. He supported women’s enfranchisement as a means of 
promoting the balance of power within families and of transforming marriage into a 
relationship between people who shared a common dignity. Mill was adamant that the 
renewal of family relationships was essential in opposing tyrannical forms of relationships 
in society at large. His stance in favour of women’s enfranchisement demonstrated his 
concern with accountability, since he not only wanted women to participate in the public 
sphere, but also required them to be held accountable for their choices and opinions. In the 
fifth chapter it was shown that Mill understood that threats to individuality came not only 
from the state but also from powerful economic agents. He argued that a proper democratic 
regime required the distribution of fruits of the material advances of civilization amongst 
all members of society. To make this a reality, he proposed reforms in capitalism to prevent 
undue accumulation of wealth across generations, and advocated state intervention to help 
overcome illiteracy and severe poverty. Mill favoured the participation of workers in co­
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operative enterprises, both with capitalists and with other workers, but fiercely opposed 
centralized forms of socialism, believing that they woul jeopardise liberty.
At this juncture, it is important to elucidate the connection between accountability and 
utility in Mill’s thought. Mill associated the triumph of utilitarianism with the 
institutionalisation of the confrontation of points of view in society, assuming that such 
institutionalisation would prevent the uniformity of thinking. Therefore, rendering the 
power of individuals, groups, and the state accountable to society was essential to the 
diffusion of the type of utilitarianism he proposed, which associated happiness with the 
human capacity to socialise and to exercise the powers of deliberation. He saw the 
utilitarianism he advocated as capable of offering an ethical standard to societies that were 
undergoing persistent change and were having their traditional points of reference eroded. 
In this sense, the solution to the ethical challenge posed by the instability of democratic 
societies was the examination of the rules which guided the conduct of individuals and 
institutions, and the testing of these rules against the principle of utility. One can, 
nonetheless, legitimately ask the following question: is it reasonable to claim that this 
appeal to the general well-being will help to determine the appropriateness of rules of 
conduct where there is no already-existing commitment to the common good? Mill would 
have given a positive answer to this question, and it is important to explain why he thought 
that an appeal to the principle of utility would be acceptable even in a society in which 
egotism prevailed. He combined a pessimistic view of the historical movement of society 
towards homogeneity with an optimistic view of human nature. According to Mill, 
defective social institutions, especially educational ones, contributed to the stultification of 
individuals’ capacities by treating them as if they were ‘machines’, while they were in
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reality ‘trees’, capable of growing their branches in various directions. People could 
develop a sense of belonging to a society where they could enhance their social feelings by 
enjoying a diversified set of experiences. Mill thought that a sense of belonging bound 
individuals together and provided them with a rudimentary practical reasoning which 
allowed them to see that certain rules or practices undermined the happiness of society. He 
recognised that there might be situations in which it would be quite difficult to identify the 
requirements of the principle of utility, while in other situations the identification of these 
requirements would be relatively straightforward. For example, for Mill, it was easy to see 
that practices and norms that generated extreme poverty and illiteracy were detrimental to 
the general well-being, while it was difficult for him to know whether gambling and 
prostitution were acceptable from a utilitarian point of view.735 In summary, Mill believed 
that, even when people did not articulate a conception of the common good, they could 
have a basic sense of what was either beneficial or detrimental to the happiness of all, as 
long as diversity had not been suppressed. The greater the diversity that existed in society, 
the more people understood that their happiness was dependent upon that of society as a 
whole. Taking the opportunity to enjoy varied experiences, people were able to see that 
uniformity was the supreme source of egotism and intellectual impoverishment. Mill aimed 
at a political order that protected freedom and created the possibility of development for 
each individual and cultural tradition. He expected societies to harbour a variety of 
traditions, and that the divergent ideas and practices associated with these traditions would 
stimulate the critical thought necessay for driving mankind towards improvement. Some 
commentators, nevertheless, think that Mill abandoned classical liberalism, which
735 See above, Chapter VI, p. 270-71.
736embraced a political order encompassing a variety of ways of living. ~ But he did not 
propose the destruction of traditions, and defended a social order in which civilised 
citizens, cultivating different traditions, came to respect their differences. However, he 
thought that the type of liberal-utilitarian culture which he proposed in On Liberty' and in 
Utilitarianism would prevail only if societies succeeded in promoting the diffusion of 
critical reasoning. In his view, the common people had the capacity to exercise critical 
reasoning, so that when the historical obstacles to their improvement, especially bad 
education and extreme poverty, were removed, they would be incresingly guided by reason. 
Mill saw the triumph of reason as the cause of the triumphs of autonomy, utility, and 
democracy. There is certainly a correlation between reason and autonomy, in that 
autonomous individuals are self-determining beings capable of making genuine choices, 
which is possible only if they are able to exercise critical reasoning. The correlation 
between reason and utility is also clear in the context of Mill’s thought, in that he conceived 
of the exercise of people’s deliberative powers as inextricably linked to their happiness, so 
that an advance in critical reasoning equated to an advance in well-being. But the 
correlation between reason and democracy appears to be more problematic. The diffusion 
of critical reasoning augments the number of people with the capacity to choose for 
themselves, but is it not possible that the multiplication of self-determining agents leads to 
anarchy? Mill did not fear this possibility. He thought that autonomous individuals would 
be more aware of their interdependence, so that it was reasonable to expect them to 
reconcile their decisions with those of society as a whole. He did not think that anarchy and 
confusion would result from debates amongst autonomous subjects with conflicting values,
736 See J.Gray, Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 261.
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because such debates were instrumental in determining normative disputes and in showing 
the need for institutional reforms. There is no doubt that serious objections can be raised 
against Mill’s optimism. But his optimism was not self-defeating because it was combined 
with the conviction that democracy required that neither the power of the state nor any 
other centres of power should be left unaccountable. Therefore, the creation of political 
institutions and the encouragement of socio-economic practices designed to establish a 
balance of power was essential to the general well-being in that such a balance prevented 
tyranny, which was a major obstacle to people’s improvement.
6.6. CONCLUSION
Mill’s utilitarianism was not grounded on the notion that human beings were agents 
interested only in maximising satisfaction and minimising effort, but on the conviction that 
the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain were the only things desirable as ends. 
He assigned greater value to intellectual pleasures than to mere bodily ones because the 
former were better able to fulfil people’s longing for happiness. Mill believed that people 
had a sense of dignity which predisposed them to pursue the higher pleasures when the 
environment in which they lived allowed them to exchange mutually enriching experiences 
with their fellow citizens. According to this reasoning, the selfishness of human beings was 
attributable to the warping influence of historical circumstances. If these circumstances 
were altered in the right way, human beings tended to become altruistic moral agents who 
respected other people’s happiness as if it were their own. The respect for the happiness of 
all was thus inherent to human nature and provided a foundation for the principle of utility, 
which should be resorted to when there were no secondary principles available to guide
conduct. Mill thought that pleasures were qualitatively differentiated. This made the 
calculation of overall utility a very difficult task - a task he thought would be properly 
performed only when a certain degree of social consensus on moral values had been 
reached. He associated higher pleasures with those activities by which human beings 
developed their capacity to sympathise with others and to exercise critical reasoning. He 
saw the development of the capacity to deliberate, therefore, as an objective part of human 
happiness, and linked the advance of utilitarianism inextricably with the advance of 
knowledge. Moreover, he argued that the institutionalisation of debate in society would 
generate a consensual social environment where the hierarchy of pleasures he proposed 
would be accepted. Mill never took seriously the possibility of a conflict between liberty 
and utility, because he saw liberty as an essential component of utility. He feared the 
prospect of people paying total submission to the government and refusing to make choices 
at odds with the dominant values of society. His account of liberty was, therefore, mainly 
intended to produce a social dynamic, which would prevent social stagnation by promoting 
debate and spreading power amongst various agencies in society. Mill failed to perceive 
that intellectual development would neither make political conflicts irrelevant nor impede 
people from using their highly-developed capacities to harm society. Moreover, he offered 
an incomplete account of when the state should interfere in people’s conduct. Despite these 
inadequacies, Mill contributed significantly to political theory by showing that no group in 
society should be allowed to gather enough power to control it. Democracy, therefore, 
required institutions that facilitated the removal from power of those who were not exerting 
it according to the wishes of those who delegated them. Mill saw the balance of power as 
the cornerstone of democracy, because it was important to favour mutual respect and 
cooperation in political relations, just as it was in family and economic relations. This was
why such a balance of power should be considered essential to the happiness of mankind. 
Mill aimed at a political order that protected freedom and created the opportunity for each 
individual and each cultural tradition to develop. He expected societies to harbour various 
traditions, on the grounds that the existence of divergent ideas and practices would 
stimulate the critical thinking which needed to be done in order for mankind to improve. 
Mill might be accused of being optimistic in relation to the outcome of the debate between 
divergent views in society. However, the comestone of his political philosophy was his 
conviction that democracy required that neither the power of the state nor the multitude of 
other centres of power should be left unaccountable.
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL REMARKS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Mill disagreed with the idea that society was condemned to choose either absolute power or 
anarchy. He thought that the groups who controlled power tended to believe that what was 
benefical for their well-being was also beneficial for that of society. For Mill, this was a 
dangerous belief which led either to tyranny or to paternalism. Mill never took seriously the 
possibility of a conflict between liberty and utility because he saw liberty as an essential 
component of utility. He failed to perceive that intellectual development would neither 
make political conflicts irrelevant nor impede people from using their highly-developed 
capacities to harm society. In addition to this, he offered an incomplete account of the 
relations between individuls and the state. Despite this, Mill contributed significantly to 
political theory by showing that no group should be allowed to gather an all-embracing 
control of society. Democracy, therefore, required institutions that facilitated the removal of 
those who were in power. Mill saw the balance of power as the cornerstone of democracy, 
because it promoted mutual respect and cooperation in political, economic, and familial 
relations. Such a balance of power was, therefore, essential to the happiness of mankind. 
Mill aimed at a political order that protected freedom and created the opportunity for each 
individual and each cultural tradition to develop. He expected societies to encompass a 
variety of traditions, on the grounds that the existence of divergent ideas and practices,
would stimulate the critical thinking which was important in preventing the stultification of 
people’s capacities. In view of this, Mill argued that governments should remove the 
obstacles generated by society which prevented individuals from enhancing their potential. 
Truly democratic governments could only exist in democratic societies. In such societies, 
people were encouraged to exercise their deliberative powers, which Mill deemed to be an 
essential component of happiness. Assuming that the use of such powers was essential to 
the enhancement of both individuals and society, Mill’s political strategy was an attempt to 
organise society on these lines. His defence of liberty was intended to counteract the 
tendency of mass society to lead individuals to reject the burden of making choices at odds 
with the dominant values and to pay total submission to the government. The protection of 
individual liberty from the encroachment of the majority and the multiplication of centres 
of power in society were instrumental in preventing social stagnation and rendering the 
masses accountable. Hence, Mill advocated the creation of a socio-political framework 
which positively demanded a confrontation between divergent views, on the grounds that 
the institutionalisation of such a confrontation would prevent uniformity of thinking and 
generate a balance of power in society. He thought that such a balance of power was a pre­
condition for accountability, because individuals, groups, and governments were not 
answerable to citizens when there was no power capable of opposing them. It was as a 
result of his preoccupation with accountability that Mill: 1) opposed the secret ballot, where 
he assumed that voters would tend to cast their votes in an egoistic fashion; 2) called on the 
universities, and the leisured and agricultural classes, to counterbalance the overwhelming 
power of the middle class, with its tendency to impose homogeneity; 3) proposed the 
implementation of electoral institutions in order to enable the election of educated MPs 
who, he thought, would exert an enlightening influence in parliament; 4) favoured the
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gradual extension of the franchise, while education and participation in local government 
prepared the masses for full participation in the electoral process; 5) advocated women’s 
enfranchisement as a means of self-protection against the tyranny of their husbands, but at 
the same time required women to be held responsible for their choices and opinions; and 6) 
recomended the distribution of the fruit of the material advances of civilization amongst all 
members of society. He opposed inequalities that put individuals under the complete 
control of others because such inequalities denied autonomy to those who were thus 
controlled. Mill intended to prevent the accumulation of wealth across generations on the 
grounds that the excessive concentration of economic power was a source of oppression. 
Unlimited economic power was as detrimental to society as unlimited political power. This 
was why he opposed centralised forms of socialism in which there was no room for 
competition. Mill’s ideal society was a form of market socialism in which co-operatives of 
workers competed among themselves. He assumed that this type of society would be 
democratic in that it allowed workers to participate in the administration of the enterprise, 
and encouraged commpetition among the co-operatives of workers as a mechanism which 
rendered producers accountable for what they produced. In point of fact, Mill wanted 
society to be gradually reformed by small-scale social changes, implemented as a result of a 
process of democratic debate.
Mill rejected any sort of hereditary deference and criticised those who believed that the 
House of Lords could be seen as an instrument for tempering the ascendancy of the 
majority of the lower House. He saw aristocratic governments as more inclined than 
democratic ones to operate in a way that benefited their own members and to keep common 
citizens at a low level of intelligence. Convinced that the precipitate extension of the
suffrage to the entire male population had caused the presidential election of Louis- 
Napoleon in 1848 and made possible the coup d'etat of 2 December 1851, Mill advocated 
the gradual extension of the suffrage. He thought that only citizens capable of reading, 
writing, and counting should be allowed to vote. In his view, deference to intellectual 
excellence was necessary in order to counterbalance the influence of the standardising 
forces that tended to influence the minds of those who were not educated. However, Mill’s 
concern with intellectual excellence was not restricted to the electoral process. He proposed 
the establishment of a Comission of Legislation, formed by people highly trained in the 
law, and endowed with powers to reject laws which were incompatible with other 
legislative provisions. In addition, in the 1850s, he advocated the selection of civil servants 
by means of open competition. Mill attributed a prominent role to intelligence and 
professional competence in the reform of social and political institutions. He presumed that 
the advance of intelligence in society was more compatible with gradual reform than with 
revolutionary change, because the former was better able to change the stagnant routine of 
institutions and, at the same time, conserve practices and values which were dear to society 
and important to its well-being. This was why he argued that the national character should 
be taken into account when reforms were implemented. Mill was correct to fear the tyranny 
of the masses, but wrong to assume that the so-called ‘educated few’ could not act against 
the well-being of society. This mistake was based on the sociological assumption that, as 
they had no affinity with the values prevailing in society, they would be unable to impose 
their will over others. It was also derived from Mill’s conviction that human beings 
endowed with knowledge would behave in a way that would add to general happiness. 
According to Mill, freed from the influence of bad institutions, individuals would act 
according to a deep sense of dignity which would impel them to pursue the higher pleasures
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and to understand that they depended on society in order to enrich and improve their 
character. Mill relied on the existence of powerful social feelings ingrained in human nature 
that prompted human beings to sympathise with other members of society.
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that accountability was a central concern in 
Mill’s liberal-utilitarian thought. To prevent individuals, groups, and governments from 
imposing their wishes on others, and to make them responsible for their actions, was the 
paramount task of a well-ordered society. Mill believed that accountability, or 
responsability towards the people, would be possible only if there was a balanced 
distribution of power both in government and in society. His concern with accountability 
was complex because it was not only restricted to the idea of setting limits to government, 
but was, in addition, related to the conviction that practices which contributed to the 
diffusion of power throughout society should be encouraged, whereas practices which 
created excessive concentrations of power should be discouraged. There is no doubt that, 
when Mill addressed the phenomenon of power, he did so preoccupied with the need to 
favour diversity and to set legal limits to government, but his ultimate intention was to 
create a social order where there existed no unopposed power. He argued that government 
should be limited in its power and in its functions, otherwise society would be at risk. 
Nevertheless, Mill did not equate the legal limitation of government with accountability, 
because he thought that, in certain circumstances, an excessively weak government might 
mean economic monopolies being left unopposed and hence unnaccountable. His notion of 
accountability was closely related to the way in which power in society was distributed, 
because Mill saw both government and society as potential sources of threats to the 
individual and to social improvement. Hence accountability, for Mill, means making
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answerable for their acts those who exerted power, whether in the context of the family, the 
workplace, the government, or in society in general, either by means of the law or by means 
of incentives for social practices which tended to prevent the concentration of power. He 
thought that the institutionalisation of the confrontation between various conceptions of 
how life should be lived would create an atmosphere of diversity, and thereby allow 
individuals to express their originality and to recognise that their ability to improve 
themselves depended on a diversified environment.
When Mill encouraged the participation of people in voluntary associations, he did, 
certainly, wish to encourage them to give expression to their diversity. However, he also 
saw those associations as intermediary bodies that could contribute to the dispersal of 
power and the protection of individuals both from the tyranny of government and of 
society. In an environment where opposing views could be openly debated, individuals 
would develop their moral capacities by improving their powers of deliberation and their 
public spiritedness. The forces of uniformity had to be opposed precisely because they 
broke the natural connection which human beings had to society. This was why Mill 
promoted institutions aimed at facilitating the removal from power of those who would 
otherwise accumulate sufficient power to rule unopposed. He did so motivated by the idea 
that the liberal concern with the control of power was a necessary component of the well­
being of both individuals and society. For Mill, individuals were like trees, needing the soil 
of democracy in order to grow their branches according to their natural inclinations. This 
growth was possible only if such a soil had a variety of nutrients, otherwise the trees would 
wither.
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